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INTRODUCTION
In 1919 anticommunist sentiment in America was at a crest. That year saw the
founding of the American Communist party and also the deportation of boatloads
of suspected Bolsheviks from the United States. Attorney General A. Mitchell
Palmer and his ambitious assistant, J. Edgar Hoover, laid their plans then for the
large-scale raids against alleged Soviet sympathizers that were launched early in
1920. Palmer did not escape unscathed. On June 2, 1919, his house at 2132
R Street in Washington was blown up by an anarchist. Across the street, windows
also shattered at the home of Assistant Secretary of the Navy Franklin D. Roose-
velt. 1 At the same time, over ten thousand American troops were occupying parts
of Russia, against Soviet volition; as part of an inter-Allied military intervention.
Yet this tumultuous environment did not prevent the Soviet People's Com-
missariat of Foreign Affairs (Narkomindel) from dispatching an unofficial "am-
bassador" tq the United States in the spring of 1919. Despite an existing ban on
Soviet trade during the Red Scare, Ludwig C.A.K. Martens, an engineer by train-
ing, was instructed to open a New York bureau in order to acquire American
goods. In the aftermath of the Bolshevik revolution, Russian leaders were con-
vinced that their country's future depended upon economic and political links
with the United States. Lenin realized that there were marked differences between
the outlooks of reluctant government officials and those of profit-seeking busi-
nessmen, and he sought to take advantage of them. He believed that by persuad-
ing American businessmen, the .representatives of doomed imperialism, to
contribute to the development of Soviet Russia, he would "promote the buildup of
an international- imperialist contradiction."2 Nearly half a century later, Soviet
historian V.A. Shishkin offered a very similar analysis: "A striking example of im-
perialist contradiction between the U.S.A. and the other great powers on the ques-
tion of economic relations with Russia was the paradoxical fact of secret, separate
contacts of American agents with Soviet representatives."3
This book investigates the early Soviet campaign for American trade and
recognition, as well as the American response, official and unofficial. It suggests
that the prerecognition era, like the post-Cold War era, embraced a Russian-
American relationship that was evolving rather than rigidly polarized. Despite the
absence of diplomatic relations with Russia and the unflagging opposition of
American officials to Bolshevism, Soviet economic initiatives and the American
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response to them gradually contributed to legitimizing the Russian regime in
Washington.
American firms were very interested in Martens's trade efforts, though
commerce with the Bolsheviks was not legalized until wartime economic restric-
tions were removed in July 1920. This interest encouraged Martens to perceive
that his prospects were bright, despite harassment from Washington and Albany
and a weak commitment from his own government. In early 1921, however, the
United States forced the Bureau director to leave New York amid accusations that
he was a revolutionary propagandist. In its short life, the Soviet Bureau was able
to establish contact with nearly one thousand American firms and to conduct trade
despite a stiff Allied embargo.4 Martens's work laid the foundation for the more
successful Soviet agencies that opened in New York during the 1920s. The story
of the Martens Bureau, the first Soviet economic mission to the United States,
will be discussed in Chapters 1 and 2.
As Martens returned to Russia, the dire economic conditions resulting from
revolution, civil war, and Allied intervention finally prompted Russian diplomats
to recognize that "temporary accommodations with the imperialist powers" were
necessary. The era of Soviet "peaceful coexistence," rather than export of revo-
lution, had begun, even as the Bolsheviks launched the quasi-capitalist New
Economic Policy at home, replacing militant war communism.5 The Western
powers, particularly Britain and Germany, were also ready to deal with Russia. As
Richard K. Debo points out, the British wished to promote stability in Europe,
and the vanquished Germans had nowhere else to go. As early as May 1920, the
Soviets had begun work on their first priority with the West, a British trade agree-
ment, and successfully concluded it nine months later. Commissar of Foreign Af- .
fairs Georgi Chicherin, a man who deeply distrusted Britain's ambitions,
nevertheless emphasized the desirability of the treaty for lessening the threat of
war, for trade and credits, and for Soviet "respectability."6 As Lenin noted, the
treaty would allow Moscow "to start as soon as possible to buy machines required
for our.large plans of restoring the national economy. The sooner we have done
this, the sooner we shall have the foundations to free ourselves from economic de-
pendence on the capitalist countries."7 In May 1921 the next vital goal was ef-
fected, a trade and diplomatic agreement with Germany.8 By 1924 the' Soviet
government had also established trade and diplomatic links with France, Poland,
Sweden, Austria, Turkey, and the Baltic states.
For the United States, the inauguration of the Soviet New Economic Policy
and peaceful coexistence, along with the waning of the domestic Red Scare, of-
fered a second chance for Russian-American trade and investment after Martens's
deportation. Lenin and Leonid Krasin, commissar of foreign trade, believed that
connections with American executives would bring a "big political gain" to the
Kremlin.9 Economic influence would culminate in official relations, they hoped,
and facilitate financial assistance, including credits to make purchases. Yet the
U. S. government steered clear of offering diplomatic recognition or financial as-
sistance. At the same time, it became heavily involved in humanitarian efforts in
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Russia that saved millions of lives and may have saved the Bolshevik regime.
This early American role will be examined in Chapter 3.
Though Soviet Russia signed no treaties of political or economic cooper-
ation with Washington, as it did with London, Berlin, and Paris, this diplomatic
impasse seemed scarcely an obstacle to Soviet agents and their American brokers.
These representatives set up offices in New York and other cities to buy cotton, ag-
ricultural implements, engines, and other goods, and found a welcome reception
from business in the 1920s. In tum, despite their dislike for the Soviet system,
most American businessmen could not help but notice the potential of Soviet
Russia's 140 million people, who occupied one-sixth of the world's surface, and
the incredible natural resources that lay beneath them. 10 Between 1923 and 1930
American sales to the Soviets grew twenty-fold, as total trade with the Bolshevik
state surpassed the half-billion dollar mark. American firms supplied Russians
with over a quarter of their imports, including oil drilling, mining, metalworking,
electrical, construction, and agricultural equipment. By 1931 Moscow, in tum,
purchased more than one-fourth ofAmerican industrial equipment exports. In cer-
tain fields, like power-driven metalworking equipment and agricultural imple-
ments, Moscow consumed fully two-thirds of manufacturers' foreign output that
year. II Vital to this growing trade were large credits, from firms such as General
Electric and American Locomotive Sales Corporation, as well as smaller busi-
nesses, and from banks including Chase National, Guaranty Trust, and Equitable
Trust. 12
Historians of early Soviet diplomacy have given little attention to Russia's
economic interests in the United States, emphasizing instead the Kremlin's suc-
cessful establishment of official ties with the European powers during the first
half of the 1920s. 13 Yet over the course of the decade, Russian purchases of
American goods served Soviet goals by promoting a significant change in U.S.
economic policy. Most notably, Soviet trade encouraged Washington officials, no
longer as reluctant as they had been in 1919, to authorize private long-term cred-
its. This cooperation of business and government to assist American economic re-
lations with Soviet Russia is representative of New Era corporatism, that system
of public-private collaboration to ensure "order, progress, and stability" that is
often associated with Herbert Hoover. 14
Hoover played a leading role in the development of early Soviet-American
relations, as director of the American Relief Administration's work in Russia, as
commerce secretary during the Harding and Coolidge administrations, and during
his presidency. Scholars ofAmerican foreign policy, however, have often portrayed
Hoover as too ideological to capitalize on Soviet Russia's economic potential.
William Appleman Williams, for example, blamed the commerce secretary's "ex-
treme hostility toward. the Soviet Union" for effectively limiting Soviet-
American commerce. Peter G. Filene notes that Hoover's animosity to commu-
nism and his belief in the imminent demise of Soviet Russia led him to pressure the
Harding administration to "maintain its aloofness toward trade with Russia" even
as business sought to take advantage of opportunities there. 15 Yet Hoover's eco-
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nomic policy toward Russia evolved during the 1920s, as did that of the three ad-
ministrations he served, a development that will be discussed in Chapters 4 and 6.
In general, the American government's flexibility on the Russian question
before 1933 has gone unnoticed by historians. Instead, they have emphasized
Washington's rigidity by citing documents such as the Colby note of 1920, a
statement that has been widely depicted as the ideological blueprint for American
policies until recognition. I6 Colby's uncompromising stand was a reaction to
Bolshevik initiatives such as the dissemination of revolutionary propaganda, the
repudiation of $250 million of ~erensky'sWorld War debts and previous private
loans to Tsar Nicholas II, and large-scale expropriation of American property in
Russia, which could not be ignored or forgotten in a debt-conscious and legalistic
America. I7 Yet Colby's note did not serve as a fixed compass for government
action and interaction with Bolshevik agents in the 1920s and early 1930s. Al-
though Republican officials remained committed to Wilsonian edicts on the illegiti-
macy of Moscow's government, they gradually facilitated efforts by the business
community to pursue relations with Russia, as trade became the great palliator
of Soviet-American relations during this period. As a result, the Soviet agencies
that opened in the United States during the Harding, Coolidge, and Hoover admin-
istrations received far better treatment than had Ludwig Martens, and cabinet level
departments increasingly referred businessmen to these agencies. These purchas-
ing bureaus, which are explored in Chapter 5, included Alamerico, the All-Russian
Textile Syndicate, and the Amtorg Trading Corporation.
There can be little question that Washington's initial policies, including re-
strictions on long-term credit and prohibition of direct loans to Bolshevik Russia,
did at first retard trade. But the Soviet Union also presented major impediments to
a flourishing commercial association. Foreign investment, the part of the Soviet-
American economic relationship that the Soviet Union controlled, fared far worse
overall than trade, the area that the United States regulated. In one of his speeches
defending the New Economic Policy and its program for foreign investment,
Lenin claimed that he would "not grudge the foreign capitalist even a 2,000 per-
cent profit," as long as this met the Bolshevik goals of improving the living stand-
ards of peasants and workers and thus gave the regime peredyshka, or breathing
space. I8 But no one made that kind of profit, as the policy's dictates for rapid tech-
nological development ultimately allowed for little return for investors. During
the First Five-Year Plan, concessions were replaced with technical assistance con-
tracts, which enabled firms to sell their technology on a more lucrative short-term
contract basis. The unpredictable terrain for American business in Russia during
the 1920s is addressed in Chapter 7. 19
During the Cold War, scholars researching early Soviet-American relations
often found that the bipolar frame of reference typical of their era was also appli-
cable to the period before 1933. Their work emphasizes ideologically based
American anticommunism as the prominent motif in the early relationship.20 Cold
War-era historians have focused upon Washington's policies rather than
Moscow's not only because of the lack of available Soviet sources, but also owing
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to a consensus that the United States was the most active partner in shaping the
relationship. Unfortunately, this American emphasis places the Soviet government
of Lenin and Stalin in a reactive posture. Soviet diplomatic efforts, however, were
bold and often effective during this era, as this study will show.21
The end of the Cold War has allowed for a new appraisal of early Soviet
foreign policy initiatives with the opening of Russian archives. However, it has
not ended the historiographical tendency to portray the United States as the im-
movable partner. In his recent study of Soviet foreign policy, Jon Jacobson sug-
gests that along with maintaining nonrecognition, "Washington refused to discuss
credits" with Moscow even as nations such as Germany offered them. Although
Washington did not extend government financing to Moscow, its officials did en-
tertain the subject of credits and responded positively to American firms' requests
to offer long-term financing beginning in 1927.22
The great expansion of Soviet-American trade ended in 1932, when sharp
cutbacks in Soviet orders, caused by the Five-Year Plan's autarkic practices as
well as by American charges of Soviet "dumping", drastically shrank exports to
Russia. When FDR opened diplomatic relations the following year, his consider-
ations included both geopolitical issues and a desire to ameliorate the Depression
through trade.23 The Soviet-American economic relationship of the 1920s, by leg-
itimizing the regime in the Kremlin, had paved the way for this opening.
MARTENS
AND THE
FIRST SOVIET MISSION
In 1919, as the Soviet government slowly emerged from the combined threats and
destruction of world war, revolution, and civil war, its new leadership looked to
the United States. "We are decidedly for an economic understanding with Amer-
ica," President of the Council of Peoples' Commissars Vladimir Ilyich Lenin told
a Chicago Daily News correspondent in October 1919. "With all countries," he
was quick to add, "but especially with America."l As Tatiana N. Kargina explains,
the Kremlin's keen ambition to obtain trade and diplomatic ties with "the most
powerful country of the capitalist world" was a product of the complete economic
breakdown in Russia. Lenin planned to entice American businessmen with "such
favorable arrangements that [they] will be compelled to come to do business with
US."2 Similarly, Commissar of Foreign Affairs Chicherin declared the same year,
"Our attitude toward official and non-official American representatives [is] differ-
ent from our attitude toward representatives of other countries."3
Thus, as Washington and the European powers were offering support to the
anti-Bolshevik government of Admiral Alexander V. Kolchak in Omsk, Siberia,
Moscow opened its first American commercial outpost, the Soviet Bureau.4 This
office was set up to accomplish two of the Kremlin's highest goals in regard to the
United States: increased trade and diplomatic recognition. Though Martens was
willing to concede that recognition and its "accompanying formalities" could be
postponed without serious damage to trade, he had always believed in the need
for "a definite minimum of political relations" for carrying out successful com-
merce.5 Despite an economic blockade, prevailing anticommunist and nativist
hysteria, and harassment from the federal government's legislative and executive
branches, along with a New York State probe, the Soviet Bureau succeeded in
shipping more than a quarter of a million dollars' worth of products to Russia.6
This small office signed an additional $30 million in unfulfilled contracts, for
meat, textiles, and machinery.7 The man who was chosen to orchestrate the Soviets'
extraordinary American effort, "the largest and most dangerous propaganda
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undertaking thus far started by Lenine's party in any country outside of Russia,"
according to the War Department, was Ludwig Martens.8
Martens was a blond-mustachioed, stockily built man with a "florid com-
plexion."9 Born in 1874 inYekaterinoslav, South Russia, to parents who had emi-
grated from Germany in 1850, Martens took a degree in mechanical engineering
from the Technical University at S1. Petersburg. In 1893, he joined the antitsarist
movement, and within three years his revolutionary activities led him to a Russian
jail after he and Lenin had organized a strike of thirty thousand textile workers in
the capital city. 10 Martens remained in prison until 1899 and left then only to be
pressed into the waiting arms of the Imperial German military forces because of
his German citizenship. He served in the Reich's Engineer Corps for two years.
During the 1905 revolution, Martens clandestinely returned to Russia. "When
things grew too hot for him" he fled, first to Switzerland, where he worked for the
Russian Social Democratic revolutionary movement, and then to London for the
next decade. 11 The police kept Martens under surveillance while his engineering
talents were put to good use in Britain, where he developed the "Mertens [sic]
Machine Gun." Unfortunately, he sold his patent to an unscrupulous agent and
was excluded from his rightful royalties. Martens's life in England was penurious,
and after World War I began, his German ancestry got him in trouble once again.
His freedom jeopardized as an "alien enemy," Martens departed for New York in
1915. There, his situation improved considerably. Martens first worked as an
agent for Demidov San Donato, the largest steel maker in Russia, buying machin-
ery and locomotives. 12 He then became vice president of Weinberg and Posner, a
"wealthy Demidov engineering firm."13
In New York he also met Leon Trotsky, Finnish radical Santeri Nuorteva,
and others active on the Bolshevik scene. In 1918 his connections led him to the
executive committee of the New York Left Wing Socialist party's American
Bolshevik Bureau of Information. 14 The Bolshevik Bureau was formed that Feb-
ruary under the auspices of Louis C. Fraina and included activists in the emigre
socialist community. 15 Martens was a frequent speaker before local left-wing
groups and a member of the editorial board of the Bolshevik magazine Novy Mir.
He also linked up with the Russian Federation, a group of antitsarist emigres in
the Left Wing Socialist organization who later formed the American Communist
party. 16
When Martens started his work at the Bureau in 1919, he put his revolution-
ary activity aside. Though his continued attendance and speeches at radical meet-
ings attest that he never lost interest in these pursuits, he removed himself from
leadership in the factionalized American communist movement, enraging the
more dogmatic socialists who wished to control him. I7 His main task became the
cultivation of American business contacts. He hoped to sell a variety of Russian
products including caviar and furs to American customers and in return wanted to
buy large quantities of tea, boots and shoes, underwear, and machinery and
tools. I8 His claim that he had $200 million with which to purchase American
goods drew the greatest interest in the American press. 19
8 LOANS' AND LEGITIMACY
Armed with credentials signed by Chicherin in January, Martens became
the Soviet "ambassador" on March 19, 1919. As the first official Soviet repre-
sentative in America, Martens hoped to establish operations at the Russian em-
bassy in Washington. He believed that his credentials gave him the right to "all
moveable and real estate of the former embassy and consulates" of Russia and re-
quested that the provisional government's commercial attache in Brooklyn, C.J.
Medzikhovsky, hand all Russian official property over to him.20 Martens also
wrote to a number of owners of private American warehouses, factories, and other
facilities that were holding millions of dollars in Russian assets from the First
World War. He made claims for close to $75 million for undelivered railroad sup-
plies, cash in the National City Bank, damage claims from the' Black Tom ex-
plosion in New Jersey, funds in the Russian embassy, and undelivered shoes,
clothing, ammunition, and other items.21
Secretary of State Robert Lansing flatly rejected Martens's diplomatic cre-
dentials. 22 The Soviet Bureau chief's appeals were ignored owing to the United
States' continued recognition of Boris Bakhmetev, ambassador of the defunct pro-
visional government, and Martens was forced to share offices in Nuorteva's
Bureau of Information on Soviet Russia at 299 Broadway. He nevertheless at-
tempted to recover the Russian assets through Morris Hillquit, head of the
Bureau's legal department and former socialist mayoral candidate of New York.
Hillquit was aided by Charles Recht, an attorney prominent in Soviet causes. Yet
there was really little that the Bureau could do to impress Washington that it had
a legal claim upon the Russian money. American officials continued both to see a
"Democratic Russia" as viable and to offer some limited support through Bakh-
metev for Kolchak.23 Indeed, Under Secretary of State Frank Polk "resented" the
Bureau's attempt to remove Bakhmetev "as an insolent interference with Ameri-
can affairs ."24
Despite these protestations on Bakhmetev's behalf, several historians have
pointed out that the Russian ambassador was increasingly ignored by leading
members of the Wilson administration after the Bolshevik Revolution, even as the
symbolism of his office and its usefulness as a conduit for funding anti-Bolshevik
causes were clearly recognized. Linda Killen suggests that by the end of 1919, the
rout of Kolchak's armies and· the American people's reluctance "to shoulder the
whole burden" in Russia made Bakhmetev's cause hopeless. David W. McFadden
contends that Bakhmetev's influence declined even earlier, during 1918, as influ-
ential men like Col. Edward M. House, Wilson's close confidant, recognized "the
necessity of finding a way to work with the Bolshevik government."25
At the same time, Sen. William E. Borah also pushed hard for Bakhme-
tev's exit from the United States. Further, he introduced resolutions calling for
the return of American soldiers from the Allied intervention effort in Russia.
Borah was able to undermine Bakhmetev by showing the Senate how the ambas-
sador had transferred millions of dollars to the unsuccessful White armies using
Treasury credits originally meant for Russia's World War efforts. Borah's vig-
ilance helped finally to eject Bakhmetev from his post in 1922, five years after
MARTENS AND THE FIRST SOVIET MISSION 9
the Bolshevik Revolution. Yet his financial attache, Serge Ughet, maintained the
fiction of provisional government representation in the United States until
1933.26
» THE SOVIET BUREAU'S OPERATIONS
Within two weeks of opening shop, the Bureau reported that large steel mill
owners and machinery makers were calling, and claimed that "the largest and
most influential bank in New York" was ready to finance shipments.27 The main
problem to increased sales was the ongoing inter-Allied economic embargo
against Russia. 28 Not to be deterred, in April Martens moved his staff to larger
quarters in the World's Tower Building at 110 West Fortieth Street, where the
Bureau occupied the entire third floor. 29 Santeri Nuorteva bragged that "six hun-
dred and twenty of 'the largest capitalists in America'" had been in contact with
the office. Nuorteva, like Martens also "stockily. built, florid [and] prosperous in
appearance," took over the Bureau's diplomatic department. He had come to the
United States in 1911 after being imprisoned for antitsarist activity.3D Nuorteva
had headed the Bureau of Information for Soviet Russia and in 1918 had also
served as director of the Finnish Information Bureau, an agency of the revolution-
ary and short-lived "Finnish Workers' Government."31 According to Felix Cole of
the State Department, the "Hebrew" Nuorteva was the "brains" of the Soviet
Bureau.32 Nuorteva's academic training was in languages, and he had recently
edited a Finnish-English dictionary.
The Bureau's general office department was headed by Gregory Weinstein,
editor of Novy Mir and activist among New York's Left Wing Socialists, and in-
cluded a large clerical staff. 33 The heart of the Bureau was the commercial depart-
ment, where Abraham A. Heller was in charge. Heller had immigrated to the
United States from Russia in 1891 at the age of sixteen. A long-time member of
the Socialist party of America, he also ran the International Oxygen Company.
Heller's publicity director was Evans Clark, husband of The Nation editor Freda
Kirchwey. In addition to the diplomatic, general office, and commercial depart-
ments was the financial department, personified in Julius Hammer, who played
an important role in financing the Bureau. Hammer also was manager of the
Chemico-Pharmaceutical section of the commercial department, which served as
a useful sales venue for many of his own company's medical products. Industrial
data were collected in the statistical department, directed by Dr. Isaac Hourwich.
Hourwich had been dismissed from the University of Chicago's economics de-
partment, according to the New York City police department, "on account of his
radical views and his stubborn attitude to all persons who opposed him."34 Mar-
tens also had attorneys on retainer, including Charles Recht, Walter Nelles, and
Morris Hillquit. Although Nuorteva insisted that his Bureau had no tsarist or pro-
visional government employees, one of the Bureau's key people was the Keren-
sky government's former Railway Mission head, Professor George Lomonosov,
who ran the railroad department. 35
10 LOANS AND LEGITIMACY
Lomonosov had an unusual background for a Bureau employee. The New
York Police Department noted that under the tsar, he had been a "reactionary and
a strict disciplinarian demanding execution of all persons who would commit any
acts against the government."36 Three months after the first Russian revolution,
Lomonosov became head of the Russian Railway Mission to the United States
and continued in this position even after the provisional government was over-
turned in November. In June 1918, Nuorteva reported, "He came out for the So-
viets ... [at] a time when it was dangerous to say a word in their favor."37
Lomonosov was identified in Soviet Bureau files as a "Menshevik intellectual,"
and he was thought to be "strongly opposed to the tactics of the Bolsheviki." But
Nuorteva was pleased with Lomonosov's criticism of the Allied intervention,
criticism that culminated in a speech Lomonosov gave at a "Justice for Russia"
meeting at Madison Square Garden. Ambassador Bakhmetev, a~gered at his em-
ployee's disloyalty in making this speech, fired the railroad expert.38
In May 1919 Lomonosov also had to leave his office at the Soviet Bureau,
when Maxim Litvinov ordered him back to Europe. The deputy commissar of for-
eign affairs was dubious that Lomonosov's work at the bureau would bear fruit
"in view of the absence of all possibility of receiving railroad equipment from
America." This equipment was extremely important to Soviet Russia; as Litvinov
declared, "All our economic disorder is connected in.a significant degree with the
collapse in the area of transport." But he felt that Russian efforts would be better
directed to European countries such as Germany~ 39
Litvinov's decision to send Lomonosov back to Europe in May was part of
a larger policy at Narkomindel that downgraded Martens's influence. Litvinov
told the Bureau chief that business would be "limited ... taking into account the
almost full impoverishment of the Russian ruble for foreign exchange and the ex-
treme difficulty of importing gold" into the United States.40 Thus, as late as six-
teen months after Martens's credentials had been issued, he still had not been told
precisely what to purchase, and this policy undermined his efforts to prove his le-
gitimacy in the United States. The Bureau's acting commercial director, Johann
G. Ohsol, complained to Moscow in May 1920, "We have been groping in the
dark and trying to work out a trade policy from the fragmentary information re-
ceived from you." Ohsol asked for a "complete acquisition list from you designat-
ing in the order of importance the commodities and quantities you need."41 The
Bureau's staff also needed Narkomindel to inform them of the "exact quantities
and nature of raw materials you would export." American customers were lining
up to buy furs, platinum, and other items.42
Martens was frustrated by his government's refusal to share his vision, and
he regularly complained about the lack of response to his inquiries. In September
1919 he wrote, "We remain struck by your indifference to all of our proposals for
better American machines, which we may receive for a payment of a small sum
for storage and insurance. Our proposition for buying printing machines remains
unanswered also. And all the suggestions relating to farming machinery are
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passed over in silence." After reading in Ekonomicheskaya Zhizn of difficulties in
Russia in obtaining items that he could order in America, Martens wrote exasper-
atedly: "All the organs that we receive from Soviet Russia complain of the short-
age of transportation stock and equipment. Yet, our proposals of shipments for
trucks and for shipments adaptable for railroads ... are still in need of attention."43
Moscow's preoccupation with the Russian civil war was the explanation
given by Litvinov, who told Martens that "the successful repair of the economic
apparatus, and the full implementation of the outline of social-economic tasks is
strongly hampered by the ... expanding spheres of war activities."44 Yet in 1920,
when the civil war was successfully concluded, Commissar Chicherin's focus was
on relations with Britain, as Leonid Krasin, a member of the Soviet trade delega-
tion in London, began negotiations that culminated in the Anglo-Soviet trade
treaty of February 1921.45 Chicherin believed that Washington's diplomatic im-
portance was limited by its "provincialism."46
It was because Martens and his associates did see opportunities in America
that their view of the Bureau's role remained far more ambitious than that of the
Narkomindel. As Commercial Director Heller declared, "The Russian people are
no fools. They want to do their shopping in America because they know that
America has the largest stock of goods to choose from ... and can supply them in
the quantities needed for the enormous Russian market."47 Despite the unsteady
support that the Narkomindel offered Martens's commercial ambitions, his value
as a high-profile trade representative was well recognized by the commissariat.
Thus, Narkomindel fully backed him in political matters, especially during his
conflicts with other activists.
Some of the socialist leaders in New York had become concerned that the
Bureau chief was not sufficiently devoted to the revolutionary cause and hoped
either to channel his energies more effectively or to replace him. Nicholas Hour-
wich of the Russian Federation told Martens that diplomacy and trade should be
subordinate to the "advance guard of the movement-the Left or Bolshevik wing
of the American Socialist Party."48 Martens made a scathing complaint to his
superiors. "Just days ago," he told the Narkomindel, "we learned that the Central
Committee of the Russian Federation ... sent around a separate statement with a
list of our 'sins' against their falsely understood principles of Bolshevism. This is
undoubtedly a counter-revolutionary act." The disagreement led to impassioned
internecine discussions about the fate of the purchasing agency, with Martens re-
ceiving important help from Gregory Weinstein and Julius Hammer, both of
whom were Left Wing Socialists and Bureau employees.49
The socialists' dispute over Martens reached the Comintern in July 1919,
when the Russian Federation sent a delegate to Moscow to settle its tactical differ-
ences with the Bureau.5o But the Narkomindel, knowing that Martens was more
valuable as an unrecognized diplomat than he would be as an overt revolutionary,
refused to give the federation what it wanted. Litvinov told Martens, "In your ac-
tions you can be guided by the exclusive directive of the Soviet Government."51
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Litvinov's defense of the Soviet Bureau chief reaffirmed the government's deci-
sion to separate "diplomacy" from revolution. It also fit Lenin's policy of "peace-
ful coexistence," a term first articulated in association with the German-Soviet
Treaty of Brest-Litovsk in March 1918. As Jon Jacobson suggests, the term then
referred to a peredyshka, or "breathing spell," from war. By early 1920, with vic-
tory in the civil war assured, peaceful coexistence had evolved into a long-term
strategy. Then, as E.H. Carr has noted, world revolution "began to take second
place to the idea of Moscow as the centre of a government which, while remain-
ing the champion and the repository of the revolutionary aspirations of mankind,
was compelled in the meanwhile to take its place among the great Powers of the
capitalist world."52 Lenin saw it as necessary to end Soviet diplomatic and eco-
nomic isolation with the West and to attract foreign investment and technology.
Like Krasin, who supported this policy "as one of several alternative paths to so-
cialism," Lenin favored the acquisition of Western equipment in order to "over-
take" the capitalists.53
Litvinov's strong political support of Martens in 1919 showed that the suc-
cess of Soviet economic development outweighed the importance of world revo-
lution in the Soviet outlook even before the Russian civil war ended and the
Allied economic embargo expired. This was well understood by u.S. intelligence
agent Jacob Spolansky, a prolific analyst who was always interested in the activi-
ties of socialists in America:
Lenin is a great tactician ... every act of his is absolutely consistent if one has in
mind constantly his fixed idea of world revolution.... If he can get American
manufactured goods, and American capital and enterprise, he can hold on in
Russia. He will therefore sacrifice his principles for the moment, and in line with
this tactic might very possibly have instructed Martens to work against active
Bolshevik propaganda in the United States.54
Spolansky's attempt to expose Martens and his office as the tools of a revo-
lutionary government was part of a larger effort by the covert agencies of the U.S.
government, the Military Intelligence Division (MID) of the War Department, and
the Bureau of Investigation of the Justice Department, that continued up to the
time of Martens's deportation in January 1921.55 Intelligence agents received sup-
port from their diplomatic colleagues in the State Department, who refused to
deal with Martens directly in order to avoid lending legitimacy to his mission.56
Despite the suspicion Ludwig Martens generated within the U.S. govern-
ment, businessmen were eager to deal with him during 1919 and 1920, and he con-
ducted high-level negotiations with some of the largest industrial firms of the
United States and Canada.57 Not all businessmen were interested, of course. After
receiving a mailing from the Bureau, Charles S. Clark of Koehler Motors Com-
pany wrote the War Department, "Personally, I feel much the same sensation in
having the enclosed matter before me, that I would if it were a copperhead
snake."58
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But such sentiments were not widely expressed. War Department intelli-
gence agents worried instead that Martens and Nuorteva were "attempting and in
some instances succeeding, in making American manufacturers believe that
Soviet Russia wants to do business totally with America." Indeed, when a Soviet
order for $6 million worth of agricultural equipment could not be placed in the
United States in 1920, Soviet represent~tive Johann Ohsol was apologetic: "It has
been our sincere desire to introduce in Russia mainly American agriculture and
other machinery, inasmuch as the great demands of Russia for such machinery
could have been filled best by American industries."59
Many prominent businessmen favored the expansion of Soviet-American
trade, as long as it was clear that diplomatic relations were not involved. The four-
thousand-member National Association of Manufacturers declared in 1919 that
"many thousands' of manufacturers in this country would be in a position to do
business with Russia."60 Thus, when Nuorteva and Heller attended the Sixth Na-
tional Foreign Trade Convention in Chicago in April 1919, attended by over one
thousand manufacturers, exporters, and bankers, they found grounds for encour-
agement. Heller was particularly heartened that "the dominant tone of the conven-
tion were complaints about a lack of export markets and the difficulty of getting
payment from Europe," areas where he saw Soviet trade as filling an
important gap. But he was annoyed by the prominence of the anti-Bolshevik
American-Russian Chamber of Commerce and the Russian cooperatives at the
convention. These "counter-revolutionists" were running an exhibition booth
where they "circulated pamphlets warning against establishing trade relations
with Soviet Russia."61 Foreign branches of the Russian consumers' and agricul-
tural cooperatives, including the largest, Tsentrosoyuz, had resisted incorporation
into the nationalized cooperatives in Soviet Russia.62 The foreign branches
yielded to Moscow's control, however, in January 1920, after the Allies lifted the
blockade against Soviet Russia. 63
The cooperatives and the American-Russian Chamber of Commerce were
both reviled by the Soviet Bureau because of their opposition to the Bolshevik
government. William Redfield, the president of the Chamber of Commerce and a
former secretary of commerce, complained that the Soviet Bureau's magazine
Soviet Russia should be kept out of the mails. The "petty-bourgeoisie coopera-
tives" were less open in their dislike for the Soviet regime but distrusted by that
government nonetheless, as Litvinov had warned Martens, "our relations [with the
co-operatives] are ambiguous and even secretly hostile."64 Despite the presence of
these unfriendly forces in Chicago, the Bureau's liaison at the trade convention
tried to arrange for Heller and Nuorteva to address the gathering. He was unsuc-
cessful. This was hardly surprising, since the convention's president, according to
Heller, "warned American manufacturers against establishing trade relations with
us, saying that American business men did not want 'looted money.' "65
In the face of such negative attention, the Soviet representatives lay low.
"We established our own headquarters in the Hotel La Salle," Nuorteva told Mar-
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tens, while he and Heller waited for exporters to respond to an ad in the Chicago
Tribune. The tactic succeeded. "We were swamped with visitors for two days,"
Nuorteva gloated, "mostly representatives of firms all of whom were impressed
with the possibility of trade with Russia." Firms including Marshall Field, Grand
Rapids Underwear, National Shoe, and several meat packers stopped in, along
with representatives of International Harvester and Advance Rumely, who, in ad-
dition to trade, were looking for information about their Russian factories. "We
told them that if they could get cable communications for us to Moscow we can
get them the information they desire," said Nuorteva. He thought it might be a
good idea to establish a trading bureau in Chicago, and Gregory Weinstein de-
cided to launch a Central Soviet Bureau at 2401 Division Street.66 Heller meas-
ured their success this way: "Our work ... is bearing fruit, in so far as it has
brought forth attacks by the opposing forces."67
Heller also met Ford representative Ernest Kanseler at the New York Ritz-
Carlton that April. Kanseler was interested in trading with the Soviets, going so
far as to recommend an organization to handle distribution and spare parts. He in-
vited Heller to Dearborn to inspect the plant and witness its impressive daily
output of 275 tractors. But Kanseler did not wish to press the State Department on
the blockade "or take any other diplomatic step," believing that export licenses
could be obtained. After the Chicago convention, Henry Ford's general secretary,
K.C. Liebold, hosted Nuorteva and Heller in Dearborn. There, E.L. Sorensen,
manager of the Ford tractor works, told Nuorteva that the firm's Russian business
was already being handled by an agent in Russia, who allegedly owned forty-five
banks along with steamship lines. Nuorteva informed Sorensen that neither this
agent "nor anyone else" owned any banks in Russia, and the only agency to deal
with was the Soviet Bureau.68
The Soviets' midwestern visit did not escape the notice of Chicago's Mili-
tary Intelligence Office. But little action was taken, because "after having made
arrangements to completely cover [Martens] and his activities" in Chicago and
New York, the Bureau of Investigation decided "to discontinue further investiga-
tion." Instead, it would limit its activities to attending political meetings. The War
Department's Military Intelligence Division (MID) followed suit, and John B.
Trevor's disappointment was doubtless shared by many in the intelligence com-
munity: "In view of the character of the group surrounding Martens,." he sighed,
"this is a most unfortunate policy at the present time."69
Trevor, a Harvard graduate who took over MID in 1919, fully recognized
that "any investigation of Bolshevism, even in an informal way, was not to be
countenanced by the Department." But he had become interested in Martens's
finances and was convinced that Guaranty Trust Company's president, Henry
Sabin, "one of the most unscrupulous bankers in the city," was "personally inter-
ested in Martens and his work." The Guaranty Trust Company's (GTC) interest in
Russia could be traced, Trevor contended, to its holdings of $6.5 million in Rus-
sian Imperial Government and provisional government funds, rendered worthless
by the Revolution. "The GTC are unable to see any satisfactory solution of their
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ruble problem unless the Russian Bolshevik government is recognized," Trevor
reckoned.70 He alleged that President Sabin had sent "personal funds" to Martens
and paid the bureau's yearly rent of $2,500 for the next three years.71
On April 29, 1919, a number of bankers attended a luncheon hosted by the
Council on Foreign Relations at the Hotel Astor. Martens was an invited speaker
and the financing of his bureau a featured topic in this well publicized event. De-
spite the coverage, Trevor was convinced that "all were sworn to secrecy as to what.
transpired." Trevor's suspicions were raised by the attendance at the luncheon of
three GTC men, including·Sabin. Other bankers were also present, but "the GTC
crowd constituted the backbone of this entertainment, because if there was one
hundred and fifty million dollars in sight, they wanted to be present when the dis-
tribution began."72 A Bureau of Investigation report suggested that banks were
working on Martens's behalf in order to "create the belief that Soviet Russia will
continue, so American manufacturers interested in foreign trade would bring pres-
sure on the administration to recognize Soviet Russia."73 Nuorteva insisted to re-
porters that the bankers' luncheon was an "informal" information meeting. He
declared that the Bureau was receiving money from Russia, not the GTC. Yet when
he was asked by the New York Herald how the funds came into the country, Nuor-
teva snapped, "That's our business. I don't ask you how you get your money."74
Trevor decided to investigate the host group, the Council of Foreign Re-
lations. He obtained a booklet about the organization's leaders, where he detected
a Guaranty Trust link in Alexander J. Hemphill, chairman of the council's finance
committee, and circled board of governors' members Henry Morgenthau, Oscar
S. Strauss, and Abram I. Elkus as Jews. Trevor's interest in Jews was not unusual
in the intelligence community, some of whom believed in an "International
Jewish Bolshevik conspiracy."75
The Bureau of Investigation was also interested in German Jews, making
much of the fact that Trotsky's real name was not "Bronstein" but "'Braunstein.'"
An agent alerted J. Edgar Hoover that "this is thoroughly German (Brownstone)."
The agent produced a number of other German Jewish names in Soviet official-
dom from Apfelbaum ("Zinoviev") to Gruzenberg ("Borodin"). Broadening the
conspiracy to those simply of German descent, the agent recalled Martens's return
to Russia in 1905, finding it "strikingly coincidental that ... both Russian revolu-
tions were supervised in Germany."76
Martens's German background was an issue for the government for other
reasons. Both the War and Justice Departments, acting at the behest of the State
Department, attempted to find out-six months after the war had ended-if Mar-
tens was a German "alien enemy," despite the fact that he had spent only two-and-
a-half years of his life in Germany, and that unwillingly. At the end of April the
War Department dispatched an agent to the Soviet Bureau to conduct an investi-
gation into his citizenship. The Justice Department also sent an agent. 77 Martens
foiled· both inquiries by claiming diplomatic privilege and insisted that he be
interviewed only after a letter from the attorney general or secretary of state were
presented to him. Because of the "peculiarity inherent in the Russian diplomatic
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situation," J. Edgar Hoover recommended that the attorney general await further
instructions from the State Department. W.E. Allen, acting chief of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation, was frustrated by the decision against the investigation of
Martens, whose "real purpose," he believed, was "to spread Russian propaganda."
He sighed, "Apparently we are at the end of our rope unless it should be deemed
advisable to invoke the use of a grand jury subpoena." Allen could be pleased that
the New York Senate's Lusk Committee would soon "undertake a thorough inves-
tigation of Martens' organization."78
Despite the highly charged political atmosphere, the Soviet Bureau contin-
ued to cultivate industrialists. In May, James P. Mulvihill, a Pittsburgh shoe man-
ufacturer, invited Heller to Washington to meet with Rep. Stephen J. Porter and
the State Department counselor, Frank Polk. Polk had previously alluded to the
"suspicion" under which the Bureau operated, describing Martens as "a mystery"
'and Nuorteva as "a very dangerous and clever propagandist." Polk told Mulvihill
and Heller that "no precedent exists" for trade without recognition. Heller and
Mulvihill found a more friendly government representative in Justice Louis Bran-
deis. Brandeis was a strong opponent of the Allied intervention in Russia and rec-
ommended that the Bureau gamer "maximum publicity ... in getting the liberal
opinion of America on [ylour side."79
Heller began planning a Russian trade convention for the end of June in At-
lantic City, which would lead to "the organization of an American Association for
the promotion of trade with Russia, officered by manufacturers of national prom-
inence." To spur interest, he sent a circular to a large number of American cham-
bers of commerce.80 While Heller planned his conference, his assistant, Evans
Clark, also made the rounds in Washington. Clark sought to "make as many per-
sonal connections as possible and to give certain senators information relative to
the desire of manufacturers to export to Russia." Armed with letters of introduc-
tion from American manufacturers, he visited Sense Joseph France, Hiram John-
son, William Borah, and Key Pittman.81 He relied on Paul Wallace Hanna, a
journalist for the socialist New York Call, to find out "just what powerful men
inside the Government and out are willing to give Soviet trade at least a fighting
chance." In addition to the senators, a number of congressmen were sympathetic
to Martens, including Joseph Walsh of Massachusetts, William E. Mason of Illi-
nois, and Stephen J. Porter of Pennsylvania. Companies did come forth to help
the Bureau's efforts in Washington. Spark plug manufacturer Apex Company
wrote that its congressman, Oscar R. Luhring of the First District of Indiana,
would work in Washington to help the firm gain an export license.82
Although the Soviet Bureau was beginning to make important inroads
among both liberals and trade advocates in Washington, the Red Scare made it
difficult for Martens to be tolerated. Unlike the federal government, the states
were not forced to limit their tasks to "observation" of local Bolshevism. On June
12,1919, New York State troopers stormed into Martens's offices, armed with a
search warrant from the city magistrate. The state senate's Joint Legislative Com-
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mittee for the Investigation of Seditious Activities, otherwise known as the Clay-
ton R. Lusk Committee, was identified as the raid's instigator, although Senator
Lusk denied ordering it and attributed responsibility to the state attorney general's
office.
For two hours, everyone, including visitors, was detained. Nuorteva fumed:
The raid was an outrage. Twenty detectives rushed into our office and at their
hands we received the roughest kind of treatment, short of physical violence.
They refused to let us communicate with our lawyers, they cut our telephone
wires, they barred all the doors, and refused to let any of the attaches and
workers leave the offices; then they seized all our papers, including correspond-
ence in regard to commercial orders to a number ofAmerican firms, and jumbled
them up in such a fashion that it will take us at least three weeks to straighten
them out if we ever get them back.83
Although Martens was not arrested, the raid was vivid proof of the Bureau's
precarious position. The Bureau's counsel, I. Horowitz, along with Martens, Nu-
orteva, Weinstein, and Heller, were subpoenaed to appear before the Lusk com-
mittee, which was to determine whether the Bureau "conducts agitation for the
overthrow of the U.S. government."84 Four days after the raid, Nuorteva trium-
phantly appeared before a huge throng of loyal supporters at Madison Square
Garden. He emphasized that "we are advised by our counsels that the raid was in
every way unwarranted and illegal," because of the hasty manner in which the
search warrant was issued.85
While the raid was being conducted, Alexander M. Berkenheim, president
of the Tsentrosoyuz cooperative, was allowed to ship food, clothing, and other
goods to both Bolshevik and non-Bolshevik Russia.86 Tsentrosoyuz's still autono-
mous American office had $3 million on deposit in the National City Bank and
$1 million of credit available. 87 Abraham Heller visited Berkenheim in early May
and suggested that their two agencies work together to supply Russia, "instead of
at cross purposes." Since Berkenheim sought to protect his "standing with the pre-
sent powers" in the United States, he was reluctant and suggested only the possi-
bility of an "unofficial" arrangement. 88 Nuorteva was probably correct that
American authorities were using the cooperative to divide the Russian people
from the Soviet regime. Yet he saw the Berkenheim shipments as having a larger
significance. "We welcome the news that the blockade against Soviet Russia has
been relaxed, and that the Russian Cooperative societies are loading ships in New
York with goods for Petrograd." To Nuorteva, it served as an opening.89
Six weeks after the raid, Martens told Moscow that all was quiet. Despite
his recurring troubles, he again announced in the press his intentions to place
large orders in the United States. But Secretary Lansing rejoined, "No arrange-
ments have been made to permit any trade whatsoever between the United States
and Bolshevik Russia."90 Yet one month earlier, acting in Lansing's place, Polk
had told the American embassy in Paris that with Germany no longer at war, he
opposed a British and French plan to continue the formal wartime blockade
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against Bolshevik ports. Polk declared: "A blockade before a state of war exists is
out of the question. It would not be recognized by this government. . . . [T]he
Allies exaggerate danger of trade with the Bolsheviks in Russia."91 Despite his
cogent assessment, the United States maintained blockade-like restrictions against
Bolshevik Russia for another year.
It remained vitally important for Martens and his associates to end the trade
embargo. Heller made contacts with a well-connected former New Jersey senator,
Thomas Martin, whose family manufactured binder twine used in farming and
who was ready "to trade with Russia on the basis of a definite order of consider-
able magnitude." In return, Martin promised to "undertake to use his best offices
to bring about the lifting of the blockade." Although the Bureau recommended
this purchase to the Central Committee, and gained the backing of Lenin and Lit-
vinov, advocates of a greater reliance on German trade, including Chicherin and
Krasin, decided against it. German competition meant that Americans who
wished to expedite Soviet contacts would have to work even harder toward ending
the blockade.92
In August, Martens and Heller traveled to Ford Motor Company headquar-
ters in Dearborn. Since Henry Ford was out of town, they were received by trac-
tor factory director Sorensen, who followed up by writing a letter to the State
Department, "in which he officially asked permission for export of tractors to
Soviet Russia." After seeing the Fordson tractor demonstrated, Martens declared
that "the Ford tractor will serve as the ideal machine for communist economy in
Russia." He was ready to buy ten thousand of them and hoped that Ford would
also "construct a factory in Russia for the production of tractors and cars." In
1922, following Martens's return to Russia, the Soviet Union ordered several hun-
dred Fordson tractors through Armand Hammer.93
Another of Martens's responsibilities in New York was to recruit "special-
ists in all fields of technology and science" who wanted to go to Russia to help in
its rebuilding. As Martens declared, "The possibility of Socialism in Russia is de-
termined by ... utiliz[ing] the whole technical and organizing experience of capi-
talism for its own purposes." Martens planned a conference for interested
emigrants for July 4-6. After the June raid, the conference was moved to Septem-
ber 30, when it drew large numbers of committed participants.94 By the fall of
1920 a thousand members had registered in New York with the Society for
Technical Aid for Soviet Russia, and by 1923 the society had facilitated the vol-
untary repatriation of over five hundred emigrants, who brought their American-
acquired skills and equipment back to Russia.95
> MARTENS'S FINANCING AND GOVERNMENT INVESTIGATIONS
Because the United States treated Bolshevik gold as "stolen" money and forbade
imports of Russian ruble currency, Martens could not count on large infusions of
cash. He had to rely largely upon the efforts of couriers, who smuggled in valu-
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abIes and bank drafts to him. It was a very risky business. Only about a third of
the couriers sent to him in 1919 arrived with their deliveries. They brought valu-
ables and funds from Moscow's "disbursing agent," Frederick Strom, a socialist
member of the Swedish Parliament, who belonged to the "central committee" of
Scandinavian Bolsheviks in Stockholm. Author Carl Sandburg even served as a
one-time courier for Martens in December 1918, bringing $10,000 in two bank
drafts. He was detained by New York port authorities, who confiscated his money.
Sandburg had obtained the funds in Norway, where he worked as a reporter for
the Newspaper Enterprise Association.96
Nuorteva urged that Moscow be more generous. "Considering the ex-
tremely costly character of the activities of the Soviet bureau," he wrote to the
Narkomindel, "I appeal to you with the request to call the attention of the Ve-
senkha [the Supreme Soviet of the National Economy] to this activity."97 Because
of the many obstacles faced by his couriers, Martens was forced to depend on
local benefactors for his financial survival. Among his strongest backers was
Julius Hammer, director of the Bureau's medical and financial departments. A
successful businessman and owner ofAllied Drug and Chemical Company, Julius
Hammer provided the chief financial means for the Soviet Bureau to open and
stay in operation, while garnering sales approaching $150,000.98 When Hammer
was later imprisoned, his company's business and its work with the Bureau con-
tinued with his son, Armand.
While the Lusk committee prepared for its hearings during the late
summer and fall of 1919, the Justice Department's Bureau of Investigation hired
a Finnish emigre, Ferdinand Peterson, to spy on Martens.99 The federal agency
suspected that Peterson was a double agent and hoped to use him to get the
Soviet Bureau, and particularly Martens, involved in a divisive socialist imbro-
glio. Thus, upon learning from Peterson that Louis G. Fraina, the secretary of the
Communist party of America, was suspected by some in the party of being a
government informant, G-men played along. They left out reports and canceled
checks "signed" by Fraina for Peterson to see. As hoped, Peterson fed Soviet
Bureau leaders this information. Nuorteva, initially "incredulous," was appar-
ently jealous and suspicious enough of Fraina's influence in the party to find Pe-
terson's story credible, as did Martens. Nuorteva, who was aware of Peterson's
government connections, befriended his fellow Finn and promised to pay him
$1,000 if he would recover the canceled checks allegedly signed by Fraina.
When Peterson tried to steal the documents, he was arrested and fired by the
Bureau of Investigation. 100
It was not until American Communists held a trial six months later that
Fraina was freed from suspicion, with his top associates supporting his vigorous
denial of the charges. 101 Here the Justice Department's strategy bore fruit.
Martens's attendance at the "trial" contradicted the Burean chief's claims of non-
involvement in party activities, officials asserted. J. Edgar Hoover opined, "Nuor-
teva and Martens were instrumental in the calling of this trial, not~ithstanding
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their public protestation to the effect that they never have interested themselves in
American [socialist] affairs."102
The Justice Department's intrigues against the Bureau were overshadowed
in the fall of 1919 by the Lusk committee's investigation into the dissemination of
Bolshevik propaganda in the United States. Martens was served with a summons
on November 14 and asked to report the following day. The committee wanted
him to bring his "business books, documents, and chiefly, notes ... to the Soviet
Government." Upon the advice of his lawyer, Martens presented the legislators
only with his account books and refused to share with them his diplomatic corre-
spondence. The commission soon became more interested in Martens's revolu-
tionary background as well as Lenin's inflammatory statements. 103
Lenin's "Letter to American Workers" of August 20, 1918, introduced as
evidence in the case, stated: "We are banking on the inevitability of the world
revolution. . . . The corpse of capitalism is decaying and disintegrating in our
midst, polluting the air and poisoning our lives." There was "only one holy and ...
legitimate war, namely: the war against the capitalists." Lenin's missive also
asked workers in America to start "general strikes to help the Russian Soviet
Government" and to prevent troops from being sent to Russia. The Soviet Bureau
chief, however, testified that his only goal was "to win ... to the side of Russia
the big business and manufacturing interests of this country, the packers, the
United States Steel Corporation, the Standard Oil Company."104
Martens's pursuit of big business perplexed the New York Times, which
questioned how this could be consistent with the aims of Lenin and the Bolshe-
vik revolution. Martens responded that his government did not promulgate revo-
lutionary propaganda outside Russia, and that Lenin had spoken only as a
"private citizen" when he "addressed Soviet propaganda to the American work-
ingman and soldier," urging them to topple the U.S. government. The Bureau
chief professed his own innocence; "I have not fostered any radical propaganda
in this country ... nor allowed anyone in my employment to do so," he told the
skeptical legislators. 105
Although Lusk could not find the Soviet representative in violation of any
law, he asserted that "every act ... [Martens] commits which is beneficial to the
Bolshevik regime . . . is unquestionably an act of hostility to the United
States."106 New York State attorney general Charles B. Newton, who headed the
inquiry, believed that Martens's money was used for propaganda purposes, and
newspapers including the New York Times, New York Tribune, and New York
World agreed. IO?
Commercial Department Director Abraham Heller attempted to capitalize
on the publicity that the Lusk trial generated. He claimed that his agency had been
in touch with "2,500 American business firms" to obtain needed products, from
5,000 initially contacted. 108 Not only had they "received offers from manufac-
turers and producers of all kinds of commodities throughout the United States,"
but "our offices are visited daily by representatives of different firms, and through
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the mails, we receive hundreds of letters." Heller released a list that included the
Chicago meat packing giants Armour, Swift, Morris, Wilson, and Cudahy, the
condensed milk producer Sheffield Farms, and the American Steel Export Com-
pany (a division of United States Steel).109
The New York Times promptly contacted some of these companies in order
to verify Heller's allegations. The firms dismissed his claims or pleaded ignor-
ance, possibly for political and legal reasons. U.S. Steel Corporation president
Elbert H. Gary declared that there was "no foundation" for Heller's assertions.
G.F. Swift of the Swift Company's export department declared, "I am sure we
have never had any dealings with them of any kind." Loton Horton, the president
of Sheffield Farms, stated, "If Martens has made inquiries ... for condensed milk,
I know nothing about it." Even Edward Morris of Morris and Company, the same
packinghouse that would soon take a $10 million order from Martens, disclaimed
any interest: "We have never had anything to do with those people [and] we
would not sell them a dollar's worth of goods for cash or credit."110
But Martens had no trouble demonstrating that his vendors were not telling
the truth. The next day, he waved a six-month-old letter from Swift that stated,
"We take pleasure in quoting you market values ... on the principal commodities
we think you will be interested in." In April, Heller had met with officials of Swift
in New York, who had informed him that "they would supply us with a carload of
fats, lards, and canned beef as soon as we are ready. Also offered to consult the
State Department on the possibility of shipments to Russia." Hammer also could
produce correspondence from E.H. Boyer of Morris Meats, dated August 7, 1919,
which read, "Should you be so kind as to place a contract with us, you have our
assurance that it will ... be a pleasure to give you all the assistance possible in
obtaining permits."llI
The Lusk committee, furthermore, released evidence that Martens and his
associates had met or corresponded with representatives of Armour, Swift, Case
Threshing Machine, Union Card and Paper, Reliance Yam Company, and Bridge-
port Rolling Mills, among hundreds of others. Although firms were reluctant to
confirm their trading role during the intensely hostile atmosphere of the Red
Scare, Martens had interested a great number of them. By May 1919, 853 firms
had contacted Martens's bureau by letter, according to the seized files of the Lusk
committee, and 235 firms had sent their representatives to the Bureau. 112
In his first year, Martens signed over $30 million worth of orders with
American firms, including meat packers, textile fabricators, and makers of ma-
chinery. In January 1920, the Soviet Bureau announced it was placing an addi-
tional $300 million worth of orders, for items ranging from agricultural im-
plements to pharmaceutical supplies. I13 Three hundred million dollars was un-
doubtedly an exaggeration, but there were some sizable orders in Martens's port-
folio: a $3 million contract for machinery and tools from Martens's former
employer, Weinberg and Posner, and a $4.5 million contract with Lehigh Machine
Company of Pennsylvania for one thousand automatic presses. lI4 The Chicago
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meat packing firm Morris and Company negotiated a $10 million· purchase for
fifty million pounds of food products, and hosiery and undergarment agent Fisch-
man and Company wrote an order for $3 million. 115 B.L. Bobroff of the Bobroff
Foreign Trading and Engineering Company of Milwaukee received contracts for
boots worth $4.3 million. Bobroff claimed that he had been selected "to negotiate
with the Milwaukee shoe manufacturers for two million pairs of shoes for the
Russian Red Army."116 He also received an order in January 1920 for $1.4 million
worth of machinery, including sixty-five milling machines, forty-five shapers, and
ten thousand pairs of nine-inch and twelve-inch shoes. 117 None of these spectacu-
lar orders were ever consummated. They all ran into the same problem: no export
licenses. 118
THE DEMISE OF THE
SOVIET BUREAU
After testifying before the Lusk committee in December, Martens was subpoe-
naed by a Senate subcommittee that had been established to investigate Bolshevik
propaganda. 1 But before Martens appeared before the Senate, Attorney General A.
Mitchell Palmer also wished to grab some headlines. Palmer, known to the public
as the "fighting Quaker," issued an arrest warrant for Martens on January 2, 1920.
The attorney general envisioned a spectacular public arrest of Martens for the
benefit of newsreel cameras, a scenario that had the approval of Palmer's special
assistant, J. Edgar Hoover. The attorney general was then in the midst of a full-
scale government offensive against suspected radicals and their fellow travelers in
the United States. His staff staged two broad sweeps on January 2 and January 5,
arresting an estimated five thousand people in twenty-three cities. The raids were
coordinated on the federal, state, and locallevels.2
Coming just after the December deportation from Ellis Island of 249 Rus-
sians (including Emma Goldman) on the Buford, the January raids were the cul-
mination of a Red-hunting whirlwind. The average number of dues-paying
Communist party members declined from twenty-four thousand in late 1919 to
fewer than six thousand by April 1920, and this drastic drop had long-term ef-
fects. At a meeting of the executive committee of the Comintern in 1921, an
American delegate complained that although nearly four million people were un-
employed in America in that recessionary year, only nine to ten thousand had
joined the party.3
Before Martens's Senate subpoena was issued, the Bureau of Investigation
also made exhaustive attempts to arrest him. After a disappointing wait outside
the Bureau on January 2, 1920, agents brought along twelve cameramen and four
motion picture machine operators to Santeri Nuorteva's New Jersey chicken farm.
Martens's close associate termed the raid on his farm "comical" and eagerly an-
ticipated "our 'little finale,'" the Senate hearing.4
Meanwhile, the War Department's Military Intelligence Division assigned
Clarence Converse to watch Martens's suite in Washington at the Lafayette Hotel.
But Martens was staying with a friend, Nation columnist Lincoln Colcord, and it
was at Colcord's that he was served a subpoena on January 10.5 The New York
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Times reported that Martens and Nuorteva "seemed to regard the serving of the
committee's subpoenas upon them last night as one of the best things that had
happened to them in months." Indeed, Nuorteva crowed, "The only thing I am
afraid of is becoming over-optimistic."6 Martens's counsel, the able and promi-
nent former Georgia senator Thomas Hardwick, devoted all his attention to
Martens's case, billing the Bureau $4,000 a month for his services. The attitude of
the Senate subcommittee, chaired by George E. Moses of New Hampshire, also
compared favorably to that of the Lusk committee. The former was "polite and
considerate," Nuorteva reported, while the latter's investigation had been "dirty,
insulting and ignorant."?
Martens told Glover Machine Works of Marietta, Georgia, "I am glad of the
Senate investigation, because I have reason to believe that it will be a real investi-
gation and not a blind persecution and that I shall be able there to throw full light
on all my doings." He added that some businessmen were going to write to Sena-
tor Moses on Martens's behalf.8
The Senate hearings followed an agenda similar to the Lusk committee's.
The legislators in Washington, like those in New York, asked Martens about his
distribution of Lenin's provocative "Letter to the American Workers." Reprints of
the letter had been found in Martens's office during the Lusk raid. Martens denied
knowing who had circulated the letter, but the Bureau of Investigation determined
that Martens, along with Nuorteva and Weinstein, was involved and that the pub-
lication had been printed on machines belonging to the International Workers of
the World.9
In the last week of January, MID Agent Converse reported that Martens
hosted a dinner at his hotel for fifty-six guests, including lawyer Charles Recht,
Colcord, the Nuortevas, and Bureau staffers Julius Hammer, Kenneth Durant, A.A.
Heller, and Etta Tuch, as well as a host of others including a reporter for the New
York Call. Nuorteva gave a speech on the occasion: "No matter what action is
taken against Mr. Martens within the next few days ... it will not be the expression
of the people of this Country." He announced that after the guests were treated to a
Russian song, the "Red Hog," they would be welcome to make speeches them-
selves. "I request that in the talks to follow that there be no criticisms of the gov-
ernment or its officials," he urged. Perhaps Nuorteva said this for the benefit of
Converse, who was observing inconspicuously outside the doorway. to
While the Senate hearings continued, an organization was launched: the
American Commercial Association to Promote Trade with Russia. Its founder was
Emerson P. Jennings, president of Lehigh Machine Company of Lehighton, Penn-
sylvania, which had a $4.5 million contract for one thousand automatic printing
presses from the Soviet Bureau that could not be shipped so long as the blockade
continued. I I Joining Jennings in this new association were the Borden Condensed
Milk and the U.S. Steamship Companies, as well as forty-three others. They con-
vened on January 25 in Manhattan's Raleigh Hotel, representing an alleged total
of $100 million worth of Soviet orders. Their goal was to lift the blockade. The
gathering was a "conference of Americans ... independent of the Russian Soviet
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Bureau," Jennings said, although one historian has suggested that Martens was in-
strumental in persuading the group to lobby the administration, and its agenda
and name were certainly similar to the group Heller had proposed in 1919.12 Ac-
cording to the Bureau of Investigation, Jennings had lent Martens $8,500. 13 Cer-
tainly the State Department found the two entities much too close and dubbed the
American Commercial Association the "chief and most willing instrument of [the
Soviet Bureau's] propaganda." Jennings's motivations, they declared, were based
on "greed."14
Just as he had to the Lusk committee, Martens testified to the Senate that he
had "scrupulously refrained from any interference or participation in ... domes-
tic affairs." Instead "the chief purpose of my mission ... has been and is the re-es-
tablishment of economic intercourse between Russia and the United States."
Although the American Communist party wished to "seize power in the United
States and establish a dictatorship of the Proletariat," Martens always insisted that
he was not involved in these efforts. But in late March, the Senate subcommittee
concluded that Martens was not only a propagandist but also a fraud. IS The sena-
tors contended that "the entire fabric of trade negotiations which [he] unrolled
was part of an ingenious scheme of propaganda to create sympathy . . . for the
Russian Soviets."16 Nuorteva's and Martens's hopes for the Senate were dashed.
In fact, the committee's final statement was written so as to enable the Justice De-
partment to arrest Martens and deport him as an "enemy alien."17
Yet Martens refused to give up. He and his associates still envisioned Amer-
ican trade as the answer to their difficulties and saw the postwar depression in the
United States as working in their favor. "The cotton farmers are crying for this
trade and are threatening to diminish the next year's cotton crops," Martens de-
clared. "The clothing industry is demanding it in order to find an outlet for their
overstocked factories. The heavy industries are beginning to feel the lack of for-
eign markets." Martens believed that tough times would enable him to buy a wide
range of goods in America, particularly leather products, textiles, chemicals, soap,
and machinery, at a time when American firms were threatened by foreign com-
petition. He wondered if America would "observe complacently how Great
Britain is about to secure the greatest trade concessions in Soviet Russia? Is this
country to help Japan get full control of Siberia and ridicule those Americans who
are earnestly striving to obtain some share of the Far Eastern Market [and] to
compel Russia to obtain all her machinery and locomotives ... from Germany?"18
Martens's Bureau also worked hard to impress American bankers such as
Henry E. Cooper of Equitable Trust with the abundance of natural resources in
Soviet Russia. Nuorteva believed that these resources, especially gold, "will
enable us within a period of six to eight months to buy, practically on a cash basis,
goods up to an amount of $600 to $700 million." When those credits had been ex-
hausted, the Russian harvest would be in, "which will give us additional purchas-
ing power." Moscow hoped that "some American financial consortium might
interest itself in the conversion of the entire Russian debt in return for vast indus-
trial, transportation, mining and forest concessions." Trading Russia's material
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riches in order to wipe out debt was something that Litvinov had broached at the
Paris Peace Conference in 1919. 19
After the Dorpat Peace Treaty was signed by Soviet Russia and Estonia on
February 2, 1920, Martens was able to use the port of Reval in Estonia as a trans-
shipment point during the embargo. Indeed, between May and December 1920,
Estonia transferred nearly 80 percent of the volume of all Soviet imports.2o This
was a lucrative business for Estonian agents, who collected 20 to 50 percent com-
missions from Moscow for handling Soviet orders. A representative from Morse
Twist Drill complained, "They are charging the Russians such extortionate prices
that they may very soon kill the goose that lays the golden eggs."21
Isidor Gukovskii was the general Soviet representative in Reval. The
Bureau of Investigation reported that Gukovskii worked with a man named
Solomon, whose task was "transmission of money to L.C.A.K. Martens."22 In No-
vember, agents intercepted a letter and learned that "Martens [was] entirely out of
funds but expecting two remittances from Solomon; the first for $35,000, and the
second for $33,240." The letter also mentioned "a previous remittance of $25,000
from Solomon to Martens, which the latter received through the National City
Bank."23 Since money from Moscow was insufficient, the Soviet Bureau relied on
businessmen to finance shipments to Estonia during the blockade.24
The United States supplied fully one-fifth of the value of all goods imported
to Russia between mid-April and mid-October 1920, much of it in violation of the
embargo, which ended on July 8.25 The Soviet cooperatives Tsentrosoyuz and
Selskosoyuz, whose foreign operations had been nationalized in 1920, the
People's Industrial Trading Corporation, which specialized in the purchase of
Ford products, and the Bureau itself contributed to this import total. In the first
half of 1920, the Soviet Bureau shipped $200,000 through the blockade in goods
to Russia. Notable among these were $46,000 worth of morphine and other medi-
cines shipped by Armand Hammer. These drug shipments were provided with
Hammer's personal credit, which he recouped in later dealings with the Soviet
government.26 In May and June 1920, the Bureau also sent more than $10,000
worth of soap, $2,422 in cutters, almost $11,000 in rubber galoshes, $25,000 in
gauze, and nearly $100,000 worth of shoes.27
Because the Federal Reserve Board refused to allow American banks to
make credit arrangements with their Estonian counterparts during this period, the
Soviet government paid for shipments in Reval by depositing funds in gold in in-
stitutions like the Reval Industry Bank. Gold ingots were then melted down, most
often in Sweden, to remove any trace of origin.28 In July, Moscow sent $150,000
in gold to Estonia to meet the Wheeling Mold, a steamship unloading chisels,
boots, resin, meat, camphor, and chemicals in Reval. Although this gold allowed
new orders to be placed, Martens knew that the shipments could have been
greater if the Estonian and New York banks been able to work out more flexible
financing. "The Federal Reserve deprived us ofa high potential of trade with
Russia," he complained.29
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In 1920, Gukovskii asked William H. Coombs, foreign representative of the
Pressed Steel Car Company, for assistance in purchasing "railway material,
mining machinery, wire rope, [and] structural steel." Gukovskii proposed that
Pressed Steel would become trustees for $500 million in Soviet gold, as well as
twenty thousand tons of flax, in order to open credits in the United States for
Soviet purchases. Coombs informed Guaranty Trust, which found the proposal
credible but would not approve it because of the American ban on Soviet gold.30
Shipping through Reval was difficult, and American firms were not enthusi-
astic about receiving payment in Estonia, "a state not recognized de jure." Firms
wanted payment through Western banks, Martens noted, but they were "beginning
clearly to understand that trade with Russia at the present moment is possible only
in this condition." Babbitt Soap Company was ·one company that did take a
$200,000 order through Reva1. 31
The American political climate continued to create difficulty for the bureau
throughout 1920. Martens believed that "the American government, mindful of
the opportunity of legal destruction of the Soviet Bureau, conducts a very ener-
getic campaign against us." Martens found the new secretary of state, Bainbridge
Colby, who replaced Lansing on March 23, as unfriendly as his predecessor. In
June, Colby telegraphed an appeal to the members of the American Federation of
Labor not to pass a resolution favoring recognition and ending trade restrictions.32
Colby's reference to the Soviet government as "based on the denial of honor and
trust" was insulting to Martens. Because Colby and his department had proved so
"unrestrained," the bureau chief told his superiors, "I think it necessary to quickly
protest to the American government ... and to demand a passport for exit from
America." Martens stormed to Colby, "If this is the official expression of the Sec-
retary of State of the United States respecting the established government of the
people of Russia ... my mission here has ended."33
With Wilson being ill, Martens thought that "a state verging on anarchy"
had emerged in the United States. During Wilson's incapacitation, his wife, Edith,
acted as his proxy. Her relationship with "Russian and other emigre aristocrats"
was far too cozy for Martens. Believing that "those elements, interested in a more
or less honest solution of Russian question," were no longer being heard, he
became convinced of "the uselessness of continuation of my activities in the
U.S."34 Martens's hints about departing led to speculation that he had been "re-
called by his government." Yet when questioned, Martens insisted his government
was not removing him, nor did he intend to leave.35
That did not stop the Bureau of Investigation from looking eagerly for
Martens's supposed successor in August 1920. They already had a man in mind,
along with a photograph, although they did not know the man's name. Customs
and immigration authorities at the port of Baltimore were ready to "question and
search all Seamen thoroughly, and will advise this office of any suspicious per-
sons being on board."36 But Martens would not leave until he was forced to in Jan-
uary 1921.
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The United States remained in a postwar recession while Martens continued
his operation in New York, and labor leaders began to lobby the Wilson adminis-
tration to lift the trade embargo with Soviet Russia, as unions representing thou-
sands of workers sent telegrams to the State Department demanding official trade
relations.37 More influential in the same cause were the employers of many of
these workers, who used their national clout to exert great pressure to end trade
restrictions. Newspapers including the New York Commercial and the Journal of
Commerce reflected businessmen's bullishness on Soviet trade. So, too, did many
individual firms. The. Standard Steamship Company, a subsidiary of Guaranty
Trust, wanted to buy flax, hemp, and manganese from the Bureau and was willing
to furnish credit. The firm declared that it was ready "to force the issue between
the United States Government and Russia as to trade." And medical supplier
10hnson and 10hnson had fifty thousand packages of surgical ligatures left over
from a government order to sell to the Soviet Bureau.38
Robert S. Alter, the vice president and foreign manager of American Tool
Works Company, lobbied particularly hard for the Bureau. He wrote to Ohio con-
gressman Nicholas Longworth to criticize the official American position on the
Soviet government. Alter pointed out that Italy, Britain, and Canada were already
taking advantage of the business. He was eager to take a $1 million Bureau order,
to be placed through agents Weinberg and Posner, "just as soon as the State De-
partment will allow us to do so." He appealed to Longworth "to try and clear up
this situation for the benefit of the American manufacturers." Alter noted his in-
volvement with the Mississippi Valley Association, a business group whose area of
representation "represents 55 percent of the voting power of the United States."39
Alter urged a colleague in the machine tool industry to take a strong stand
for Soviet trade, pointing to British competition. "The matter is of such impor-
tance that manufacturers who are affected should make a concerted effort to bring
Washington to its senses." S.L. Baron, the vice president of Weinberg and Posner,
commended Alter on his efforts but lamented; "In spite of all the concessions
which are being continually and cheerfully offered to the American people by the
Russian government ... our Government seems to pay no more attention to all of
this than to a voice yelling in the desert."4o Many other large companies wrote to
the State Department petitioning for the blockade to be lifted, including Packard
Motor Car Company, Duplex Machine Company, 1.1. Case Threshing Company,
White Truck Company, Lederle Antitoxin Laboratories, and the B.T. Babbitt Soap
Works.41 The State Department finally lifted the blockade against Russia on
luly 8, 1920, although officials contemplated no change in diplomatic status with
Russia.42
One of Martens's top priorities was the purchase of railroad equipment, es-
sential for newly industrializing Russia. In March 1920, he had visited Baldwin
Locomotive Works in Philadelphia. The firm's foreign sales manager, A.W.
Hinger, informed Martens, "We can assure you delivery at the rate of 100 engines
per month, beginning four months after acceptance of the contract." He also in-
vited Martens's engineers to come and inspect the factory, and discuss "the erect-
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ing and port facilities that will be necessary in Russia." But Hinger insisted that
remuneration must be payment in the United States upon delivery to a U.S. port,
because "your Government has not been recognized."43
The Soviet Bureau head wrote back a week later, "I note with pleasure your
willingness to build locomotives for the RSFSR ... upon condition that the State
Department of the U.S. raises no objection and that my government establishes
an irrevocable bank credit in your name in American gold dollars." Martens
was eager to establish an agreement, since Russia needed right away "not less than
15,000 locomotives." The Soviets particularly valued Baldwin technology; the
company was a prerevolutionary supplier of decapod (ten-wheel) locomotives to
the Imperial Russian Transportation Ministry. The arrangement was "limited only
by our ability to meet the required payments," Martens declared. Learning that
company president Samuel M. Vauclain was then in Europe, Martens hoped Vau-
clain would travel to Russia. "His personal visit would greatly facilitate an agree-
able understanding ... inasmuch as my government would then be able to discuss
with Mr. Vauclain in detail the establishment of the credits necessary."44
The Baldwin Locomotive president was certainly eager for foreign orders.
He had predicted in 1919 that his company's international business would soon
increase by more than twenty.,.five million dollars. Russia, along with Japan,
Cuba, and Brazil, were all eyed as customers.45
Martens returned to Baldwin in late March with Nuorteva, Kenneth Durant,
and the Bureau's locomotive inspector, Capt. Otto S. Beyer, Jr. They were met by
Fran<;ois de St. PhaIle, yice president in charge of foreign sales, Hinger, and
Hinger's assistant, Rockwell. Hinger and Rockwell took the visitors on tours of
the downtown Spring Garden plant and the modern, sprawling facility in nearby
Eddystone. After the trip, the Soviet Bureau wrote Baldwin of the Bureau's firm
intention to buy the one hundred decapod locomotives, to be delivered to Russia
via "an irrevocable credit in gold" at an Estonian bank. But Baldwin insisted that
"nothing further could be done" until the United States announced new regula-
tions allowing trade with Russia.46
Charles Muchnic, vice president of American Locomotive Sales Company,
a Baldwin competitor, was also approached by the Bureau. Although "somewhat
hostile" at first, as Etta Tuch told Martens, he warmed up considerably when told
that "the Russian Government is about to place orders for two thousand loco-
motives." Muchnic informed Captain Beyer, however, that credits were needed
before any deal could be struck, and government authorization was necessary. It
could not have been surprising to Martens that these large firms did not want to
create any trouble with Washington. The Bureau contacted other railroad car and
equipment manufacturers, including Pressed Steel Car Company, Standard Car
Company, Lima Locomotive, and American Car and Foundry. All were inter-
ested in Soviet trade, but they wanted to wait for a definitive policy from the
government.47
On May 24 Vauclain returned from Europe, and Otto Beyer came once
again to Philadelphia to see him. Unfortunately for Martens, few answers on the
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railroad purchases were forthcoming from his superiors, Krasin and Lomonosov.48
Martens was beginning to doubt that anything would eventuate with his locomo-
tive contacts. Both Baldwin and American Locomotive had appealed to the State
Department to gain. permission to ship to Reval, but their requests had thus far
been denied. Locomotives, despite the lifting of the blockade, were still restricted
as "war-related material."49
Despite the government's obstacles, Beyer still believed that the cooling in
the Bureau's relationship with Baldwin might be· due to Fran~ois de St. Phalle,
who "did not seem to be very warm to the desirability of doing business with
Russia." Vauclain, on the other hand, was more helpful and was ready to deal "as
soon as the financial situation on the one hand made it possible and the govern-
ment stopped interfering on the other." Vauclain, indeed, told Beyer "that space
would always be available within the Baldwin Locomotive plants for Russian
needs." The president insisted, however, that "he would reserve the privilege to
divide all orders received from Russia on the basis of 50-50 with the American
Locomotive Company."50
Although the Soviet Bureau badly needed to purchase railroad locomotives
and boxcars, it was also an "urgent necessity," according to the Bureau, to have
factories in Russia to directly produce such goods. American imports were costly.
The Russian standard Decapod engine cost $75,000, a jump of more than $20,000
in price since 1918. American factories, moreover, could not provide enough cars
to keep up with Soviet demand, as they produced only six thousand engines a
year while Russia needed twenty thousand just to match its prewar level. The
Bureau's technical department aspired for a locomotive factory to produce five
thousand engines annually and a railcar factory to produce 100,000 boxcars.
These factories, moreover, should "use the methods of highest specialization of
American industry and the principles of automobile factories." The technical de-
partment sought to launch an entire railway equipment industry within Russia.
Martens saw the develppment of railcar wheels, in particular, as helping to build a
domestic iron industry; he knew that the United States used almost a million tons
of iron annually in its production. Martens urged, "I ask you to turn to this work
the most serious attention and to discuss with me the necessity of construction of
foundry factories to produce wheels in Russia, and the Soviet Bureau can send to
Russia all machines, necessary for production of those wheels." There is no
record that he ever received an answer.51
While Martens was wheeling-and-dealing with Baldwin for new rolling
stock, he also had the chance to purchase 113 war surplus Baldwin and American
Locomotive engines. On April 27, 1920, Max Rabinov of the Revalis Company
told Martens that at a price of $52,000 each ($5.9 million total) he would disas-
semble, pack, and ship to Estonia locomotives purchased from the War Depart-
ment. But the firm demanded a deposit. In July, Martens cabled urgently to Krasin
in regard to this order: "I am conducting negotiations with banks. Cable quantity
and particulars regarding orders. Also amount of gold you intend to transfer here."
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A contract was possible, he said, "if initial payment effected." Martens's difficul-
ties in gaining a response from his own government were again apparent, because
he also lacked specifications for parts. He asked for an "immediate transfer" of
funds to Revalis through Estonia.52
He took this opportunity to complain about his general lack of funds. "My
budget at present is equal to three to four thousand dollars per week," he reported,
and with inspections of these locomotives, the budget rose an additional $1,000
weekly. "I received for the last eight months from Comrade Litvinov for support
of the Bureau all of $10,000 and was forced to go into debt."53 He did not mention
the more than $90,000 reputedly sent to him by Strom in 1919, perhaps because
some of it had to be disbursed to other groups, including local Communists.54
In August Martens told Krasin that necessary inspection of the locomotives
was impossible because the Bureau was "completely lacking in financial help
from you." Since November 1919, "we have spent no less than $150,000 ... only
thanks to the help of our friends did we succeed in continuing the existence of our
bureau." A frustrated Martens added, "I completely am at a loss to understand the
reason for the lack of financial assistance."55
Martens was supposed to get money "regularly," according to Litvinov. But
in September 1920 the Soviet representative complained, "despite repetition [of
requests], the Bureau up to now does not receive the means for its support." He
wanted $5,000 immediately through three banks, and "no less than $100,000 over
the course of the next month."56
This was a substantial sum to demand all at once, but his plea makes clear
that Martens's troubles were not all traceable to his treatment at the hands of the
U.S. government. Rather, his problems derived both from Washington's harass-
ment and from Moscow's neglect. Economic conditions were then very difficult
in Russia: in 1913, it took 2 rubles to equal one dollar; by 1920, it required 250.
Much of the inflation had occurred only since the abandonment of the gold ruble.
A pound of meat, for example, cost 35-50 rubles in 1919; it skyrocketed to
1,000-1,400 rubles in 1920. Milk had risen by a factor of ten and butter by a
factor of twenty.57
For the Bureau chief, it was not only money but simple answers that were
hard to get from the Narkomindel. "We have directed many questions to Moscow
of a very important character," Martens complained to Nuorteva, who had gone to
Moscow to lead Narkomindel's Anglo-American division. Martens urged rapid
action on "1) questions about passports, 2) emigrants wishing to go to Russia, and
3) questions of the organization of postal relations between America and Russia."58
More vexing to Martens was his inability to make purchases without
Moscow's official approval. In August 1920, when Martens tried to buy $40,000
worth of printing machines, he had to wait for Krasin to authorize it.59 Krasin
often did not answer Martens's queries because of his skepticism about the
agent's prospects in the United States. In 1920 Krasin was in the midst of negoti-
ations with officials in Britain, which he saw "as the leading capitalist state."60 In
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the United States, by contrast, Krasin noted "the extreme difficulty of receiving
foreign [Soviet] currency and the little chance for change in this position in the
near future." He was particularly worried that Martens had placed orders without
regard to the likelihood of completing them and ordered his agent to report "ex-
actly what contracts you have concluded at the present time." Krasin's chief con-
cern was "about the bringing of counterclaims from various contractors in relation
with the unfulfillment of these contracts and the lack of payment of deposits." He
instructed Martens to send two copies of all his signed orders and to make sure
that he submitted any new contracts to Krasin before signing them. In October
1920 Krasin flatly told Martens, "Contracts may be concluded by you only with
approval from me, and this must be made a proviso in the contract."61
Yet Martens could only see such requests as meddlesome. Regardless of the
problems that faced him in America, he wanted to be the sole purchaser of Ameri-
can products. He was angry to hear that Soviet trade representative Victor Kopp in
Berlin "had placed very large orders there for many kinds of goods from an
American firm," which would supply locomotives, trucks, and other supplies for
a German-Lithuanian-Russian trading organization. Martens strongly opposed
Soviet sales and purchases in Europe of American goods through "the clutches of
middlemen." He contended that "all our foreign representatives should never
place orders for American goods, but leave this to our Bureau, or at least, take up
the subject with us first."62
Krasin realized he had to discipline Martens and responded hoping to illu-
minate the Soviet view of the Bureau's subordinate position. "Your suggestion [of
being sole arbiter of placement of all American orders] ... theoretically is com-
pletely right, but until your existence ceases to be half-legal and a week does not
pass, in which we learn from newspapers of some kind of persecution against
you, Nuorteva, etc., of course there cannot be any talk of such centralization."
Krasin informed Martens of discussions about locomotive purchases then taking
place in Berlin and London, where orders would likely be placed. Martens could
not be "included" in this, said Krasin, because railway expert Lomonosov and his
engineers did not have visas to return to America. Martens commiserated, "I un-
derstand all the difficulty brought ... by the conditions of our half-legal existence
here." Still, he wanted Krasin to instruct all Soviet representatives placing orders
for American products that they had to "send to the Soviet Bureau all data both of
the price, and of the quality of the ordered goods, and that such orders cannot be
placed without our approval." Martens wanted carte blanche over the making of
all Soviet purchases in America. Although his Soviet superiors knew that his
office was an important beachhead for them in the United States, he would never
get such authorization.63
Nevertheless, Martens worked tirelessly to make his position more effec-
tive. By exploring trade opportunities in Canada, he hoped to build a new market
and also prod jealous American businessmen to lobby their government more ag-
gressively. It is likely, too, that he hoped to shore up his position as an important
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representative in the eyes of his government. "Open trade relations with Canada
on a broad scale would force the American merchants to raise such a noise that
the American government would decide to end the American blockade on Soviet
gold," he suggested to Krasin. In May 1920 Martens wrote to Sir George E.
Foster, the Canadian minister of trade, that since many railway and agricultural
machinery makers were interested in trade, "the Russian Soviet Government is
prepared to have its representatives visit Canadian firms in order to establish the
necessary relations." That summer, the Bureau sent Johann Ohsol to Canada, at-
tempting to get bank credits for sales to Russia. Ohsol met Canadian affiliates of
American firms such as GE, Ingersoll Rand, United Shoe, and Westinghouse. He
succeeded in obtaining a credit guarantee for $75,000. The plan involved using
Reval as a transshipment point, and the credit would be repaid with gold shipped
back to Canada, then deposited in "Treasury vaults." The money would be pro-
tected from any attachments.64
Soviet trade supporter Saul Baron noted, "[Ohsol] has been received by the
Canadian government with the same courtesies that Mr. Krasin is now being re-
ceived in England." But the widely publicized deal could only be carried out if the
British government allowed the gold to reach Reval or a Scandinavian capital,
where the Bank of Nova Scotia would receive it. The gold must not sully the bor-
ders of England.65
Unfortunately, Russia attacked Poland shortly after this discussion and
jinxed the deal. Canada, still a member of the British empire, "looked up to
London for its general policy in foreign affairs," Martens lamented. To make
things worse, Canada had recently deported fourteen Russians for subversion. But
Ohsol would not give up easily. He was gratified by the words of Undersecretary
of State Thomas Mulvey, who believed that "the treatment accorded Russia ...
had been simply a shame." But it was important to act quickly if the deal was to
be ~onsummated.66
But Krasin told Martens to drop the discussions. He did not want to send
$75,000 for what he saw as a weak guarantee and he was even more skeptical
about Canada's refusal to accept a Soviet trade representative, which to Krasin
was more important than anything else. Canada was far too dependent upon the
whims of Britain, the commissar declared, and he compared it disparagingly to
friendlier Sweden. Since "trade with Russia for the Swedish government is a
question of life or death," the Swedes had "guaranteed us the inviolability of our
gold." Krasin not only doubted Canada's potential for Soviet trade, but he was
also concerned about Russia's vulnerability. "Until the conclusion of a solid
peace, we ought in the first line to protect the exchange of our gold resources ....
With a change of political position unfavorable to us all these deposits could be
confiscated."67
But Martens felt that Canadian business would pan out, particularly because
Ottawa had $65 million of "unfulfilled credits for trade with foreigners." Its gov-
ernment wanted to use this money to trade with Moscow, "not on the basis of love
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between Canada and Soviet Russia, but simply cold judgment." Canada was even
interested in helping the Soviets to establish factories to build locomotives in
Russia. Passport and postal relations might soon be possible. Even better, a "Di-
rector of a Canadian bank in New York is very interested in organizing a bank
syndicate here for taking deposits and transferring money to Russia."68
In November Martens was even more hopeful. Ottawa was ready to estab-
lish a credit line for the Soviet Bureau for $2 million to $3 million if orders were
placed soon. The credits would be used to pay firms dealing with the Bureau.
They would be backed by Soviet gold deposited at Reval, and the gold would
return to Canada on the same ship that brought in the goods. Ottawa, at last,
wanted to see a "Commercial Soviet Bureau" opened in the country. Martens was
particularly excited about the possibility of a $5 million railroad contract with
manufacturers' representatives Boyer and Sloan. "This proposal seems to me an
extremely important one, both in a political and economical sense, and I therefore
used all force, in order to convince Comrade Krasin of the necessity to act quickly
and resolutely," Martens told Nuorteva.69
But before he got a response, the Canadian Department of Labor, influ-
enced by "our enemies," as Martens described them, had published a pamphlet
"directed against us." In a public letter, the Soviet Bureau chief asked the Cana-
dian prime minister to "remove it from circulation." The result, however, was that
the Canadian venture collapsed. The Soviet Bureau thus did not purchase any lo-
comotives-from Baldwin, American Locomotive Sales, Boyer and Sloan, or
anyone else-by the time that Martens left the United States.70
> MARTENS'S FINAL DAYS
There was nothing Martens could have done that would have persuaded the
panoply of committees then investigating him-the Lusk committee, the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee, the Justice Department's Bureau of Investigation,
the War Department's Military Intelligence Division, or the Labor Department's
immigration division-that he was innocent of revolutionary intentions.71 Toward
the end of the Senate hearings, University of Chicago professor Samuel Harper, a
consultant to the State Department and the Bureau of Investigation, predicted the
fate of the Soviet representative. Although he "was surrounded by a group of
clever lawyers, when the Senate is through with Martens, the Department of Jus-
tice will arrest him and the Department of Labor follow this action with deporta-
tion."72
Although Martens was not arrested-the subsidence of the Red Scare and
the decline of A. Mitchell Palmer's influence in 1920 saw to that-the Depart-
ment of Labor did launch deportation hearings two days after the Senate investi-
gation ended in March. Between then and October, Martens reported to Ellis
Island for thirteen deportation hearings that centered on his attendance at the
Fraina trial. 73 On December 17, 1920, Labor Secretary William B. Wilson issued
the order for Ludwig C.A.K. Martens to leave the country. Yet he supported
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Martens's claim that "There is no proof that Martens ... at any time ... spread or
gave orders to spread any kind of literature supporting such propaganda."74
Martens was being expelled because of his association with Moscow.75 His
attorney, Thomas Hardwick, was disappointed. "The Secretary's legal proposition
is grotesquely absurd ... and is in effect almost an act of war." Hardwick had
great hope that the Harding administration would take a more balanced approach,
and he was ready to help Martens through a "protracted" fight that could go all
the way to the Supreme Court. Hardwick felt that an appeal had a good chance of
success but also feared that the lame-duck Wilson administration might rush the
case through in as little as two months, putting Martens again at its mercy.76 Not
all members of the administration agreed with its policy, as the opinion of Assis-
tant Secretary of State Roland S. Morris demonstrates: "It saddens me so to see
how completely the President-the greatest 'liberal' of his generation-is so
completely out of touch with the liberal opinion on this Russia problem." Morris
blamed "the unimaginative and inarticulate" policies offered by the men around
Wilson, including Basil Miles, DeWitt Clinton Poole, and Felix Cole.77
Even if he were deported, Martens felt confident that his expulsion would
not prejudice the actions of later administrations. After consultation with a man
with ties to Harding's future cabinet, Martens's feelings were confirmed. He
learned that "the Russian policy of the incoming administration will be diametri-
cally different from the policy of the present administration."78 By placing the
onus of his deportation firmly on the Wilson administration, Martens urged his
government "absolutely not to consider my deportation in our international policy
making."79
While waiting to hear advice from Moscow, Martens discussed his options
with Hardwick and Charles Recht. Hardwick still believed that the decision "rests
on very fragile ground" and that a new administration would offer a better envi-
ronment for Martens's appeal. But the realistic Martens thought he should throw
in the towel "in order that the future administration will not be installed with the
soiled mistakes of the old administration, so that it can begin its Russian policy
without having on its hands the legacy of the old government." He recommended
against an appeal in a letter to his government written on December 20. Martens
was prepared to close the Bureau, transferring its business to a trusted trading
firm. He also arranged for the printing of the next issue of the Bureau's magazine,
Soviet Russia. The magazine had been launched for "fighting his own enemies
with their own weapons," and its circulation had grown to twenty-five thousand.8o
Chicherin answered his American representative on Christmas Eve. "You
have during the preceding two years honorably and patiently endeavored to carry
out instructions received by you to establish friendly relations with the United
States, notwithstanding malicious insults and petty persecutions." Although
Chicherin believed that a rapprochement between the United States and Russia
would occur eventually, at present "America makes such cooperation impossible."
Martens was told to return to Russia along with his Russian staff. All orders were
to be canceled, and Ohsol, Hourwich, and Durant would be put in charge of the
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liquidation.81 Under Harding, who freed Socialist Eugene Debs, there was a good
chance that Martens would have been vindicated had he chosen to stay. Some of
Wilson's advisers, including the anti-Bolshevik John Spargo, feared that Harding
would open relations with Russia.82 Yet Martens's concern that the success of
future Soviet~American initiatives not be constrained by his failure prompted him
to leave.
Martens was energized by the turnout of well-wishers who came to see him
in his last days in New York. "You ought to have seen the crowds of financiers and
commercial representatives who thronged our reception rooms prior to our depar-
ture. You ought to have heard how they abused Wilson and his advisers," he chor-
tled. 83 Unions such as the International Association of Machinists and the
Amalgamated Clothing Workers also expressed their sympathies. The Interna-
tional Free Trade League, an export organization, told the Bureau chief that his
treatment had been "idiotic and disgraceful."84 On January 2 ten thousand people
gathered in Madison Square Garden to "condemn the action of the Department of
Labor in ordering the deportation of Mr. Martens." Two nights before Martens
was scheduled to leave, the National Defense Committee held another large gath-
ering in his honor. It attracted seventeen hundred people to the Manhattan
Lyceum and Astoria Hall.85
Chicherin took the long view of Martens's deportation. He felt it was "tp.e
product of an incomprehensible, panicked state of mind which will appear to the
impartial observer as a puzzling psychological curiosity." It could not represent
the opinion of working men, he contended. "We also refuse to believe it repre-
sents the viewpoint of American business interests, whose many negotiations with
us demonstrate their great desire to reestablish relations with Soviet Russia."
Since American relations were so difficult, Russia would target Europe. "We will
be less hurt by this incomprehensible attitude of America than America will hurt
herself," Chicherin declared. "We shall not impose ourselves where we are not
wanted."86 .
Martens was granted a dignified deportation proceeding in which he was al-
lowed to leave the United States "voluntarily." To Martens, the deportation itself
was insignificant. "It was merely a measure inspired by the Wilson group and is to
be interpreted as a last demonstration, as a parting kick. Everything seems indeed
to point to a radical change in the policy of the U.S. towards Russia, so soon as
Harding, the newly elected president, begins his term of office." Such thinking was
based largely upon the Republican policy to restore trade as soon as possible.87
There was some backlash in Russia·as a result of Martens's deportation.
American businessmen in Tiflis, Moscow, and Kharkov were stunned to hear that
their visiting privileges were being revoked when the Soviet government decided
to stop their entry "in retaliation for the deportation," according to the Washington
Star. 88
Just before departing in January 1921, Martens managed to ship a final
$120,000 in drugs, books, tools, locomotives, cotton, and equipment, much of it
for the Soviet Russia Medical Relief Committee. As American intelligence in
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Riga reported, this amounted to over three million poods (108 million pounds) of
"coal, soap, agricultural implements and other cargoes" in January and February
1921.89 Because of his quick departure, Martens was forced to cancel several large
orders, not having an opportunity to obtain export licenses for them. This greatly
disappointed some contractors. Emerson P. Jennings, president of the American
Commercial Association to Promote Trade with Russia, tried to get a Soviet pass-
port to further a broad scheme to restore trade. Martens was skeptical of Jen-
nings's plans. What Jennings really wanted in Moscow, he believed, was "to
receive ... payments for contracts we entered into with him relating to his print-
ing presses." Martens refused to issue Jennings any kind of passport or letter of
recommendation, "but I told him that as soon as trade relations begin between
America and Russia, I will do all in my power in order to fulfill, even if only in
part, our contract with him." Jennings told Martens he was going to Europe
anyway and would then travel to Russia, despite the Bureau's insistence that he
would not be allowed in.90 Martens and his family left the United States on Janu-
ary 22 in deluxe quarters on the steamship Stockholm. 91
After returning to the Soviet capital, Martens was rebuked by Litvinov, who
disapproved of the representative's unconsummated deals with Americans. De-
spite his support for Martens against the domestic revolutionaries' agenda, Livti-
nov had worked consistently to curb the Bureau's economic role and blamed
Martens for "speculators and dark personalities thumping on our doors with ref-
erence to their friendship with you.... Judging by your propositions, I can only
believe that in areas of commerce you are as badly oriented, as in your appraisal
of political positions." This was apparently a reference to Martens's continuing
confidence that his Bureau would flourish in the United States. Litvinov scowled,
"It will not astonish you that I ... stopped 'reckoning with your opinion.'" The
torrent of abuse from the future commissar of foreign affairs went on. "You sup-
ported friendly relations with Jennings and you ... showered praise on [him.]"
Martens had, in fact, tried to warn Moscow about the printing press manufacturer.
Litvinov reported, "Jennings arrived in Moscow with reference to your promised
order of goods, blackmailed us over the course of six months and at the present
time he abusively spews out vile libels to American firms, warning against trade
relations with the Soviet government."92
Jennings had indeed journeyed to Russia in December 1920 to secure his
order for presses but had returned six months later deeply disillusioned. He told
his association that its members had been "deceived, humbugged and flim-
flammed by Martens, who has acted in a most despicable manner." Jennings had
once been a tireless supporter of the Bureau, and his change of heart was testi-
mony to the difficulties of dealing with the Soviet government in the early years.
He had lost hundreds of thousands of dollars in preparation for his order, and he
returned to the United States one of the bitterest critics of the Soviet government.93
Soviet leaders had not only been besieged by Jennings; they had also been
badgered by Bobroff, the Wisconsin manufacturers' representative. Bobroff had
come to Moscow on the same ship as Martens, infuriating Litvinov, who hectored
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his agent, "You supplied recommendations ... for Bobroff, who came to get in
Moscow a contract for $6 million, an extremely disadvantageous contract for us,
and this very man now blackmails us, demanding our carrying out of discussions.
Sooner or later this episode will take us for many millions of gold rubles." Litvi-
nov alleged that Martens had time and again entered into deals with people who
had turned out to be unreliable. Max Rabinov, whom Martens had recommended
be paid in gold for the Revalis locomotives, was now under pursuit by police in
Europe. Yet, Litvinov conceded, "the truth is, knowing of the conclusion of deal-
ings with Rabinov and Bobroff, you began to warn us concerning them." But to
Litvinov, this only showed "your lack of discernment about people and the
thoughtlessness with which you gave people recommendations."94
"Permit me to say," Litvinov concluded, "that I never asked for any kind of
trade in America; that I did not contract for dealings in coal, for example, and that
from the very beginning I did not approve nor did I order in America either
leather shoes, or agricultural machines." These, of course, were the very items
Martens had first set out to buy in March 1919. Litvinov's statement that he had
never wanted trade was a blatant fabrication and reflected more accurately his dis-
gust with the abortive nature of the mission.95
Historians have been much more sympathetic to Martens. As two Soviet
historians note, "Ludwig Martens' creation of the Bureau of the Soviet Mission
carried out great work in arranging friendly relations with the United States and
establishing trade relations with American business circles."96 Martens himself be-
lieved that his tour in New York had brought a "significant profit in the sense of
attracting the attention of the American businessmen on the question of trade with
Russia."97 But he was glad to return to Russia after an absence of over two
decades. Martens's engineering background fitted him well to serve as an early
head of the Soviet metallurgical administration, Glavmetall, where he later as-
sisted the Hammer family's asbestos investments. In 1922 Martens served as the
head of the Subsection of Industrial Reemigration of the Supreme Economic
Soviet, in charge of workers who had returned to Russia from America, including
a group that had saved $50,000 to open a coat factory in Moscow. He later edited
a series of technical encyclopedias. Ludwig Martens was fortunate to live out his
years in relative comfort, unlike many of his old Bolshevik colleagues, before he
died of natural causes at the age of seventy-four.98
DIPLOMATIC, MILITARY, AND
HUMANITARIAN INITIATIVES,
1919-1923
The first secretary of state to deal with the Soviet regime was Robert Lansing. In
1906 Lansing had helped to found the American Society of International Law,
and he later became counselor for the Department of State. His legal background
was not conducive to friendly relations with the Soviets, whom he thought had
done little but flout international rules. As Norman Gaworek writes, Lansing be-
lieved that "it was impossible to deal with the Bolshevik regime."l
With the Allied embargo still in effect and Soviet Russia seen as a trans-
gressor of international law, all queries that reached the State Department regard-
ing Soviet commerce received this standard answer: "No arrangements have been
made to permit any trade whatsoever between the United States and Bolshevik
Russia." If the Soviets imported gold into the United States to conduct trade, the
State Department suggested in 1919, the gold "could be used to sustain their
propaganda of violence and unreason."2 Above all, the Soviet repudiation of inter-
national debts, nationalization of property, and spreading of revolutionary propa-
ganda were cited as the acts of outlawry that prevented the Wilson administration
from recognizing the Soviet state.3
Political relations between the United States and Russia were not so
farfetched a concept in the early years of the Bolshevik revolution as State De-
partmentpronouncements would make them appear. The United States had dis-
patched to revolutionary Russia agents who hoped to further "American interests"
as well as maximize opportunities there. Prominent among them was Arthur Bul-
lard, who came to Russia in June 1917 "entirely unofficially" but with the bless-
ing of President Wilson and his close associate, Col. Edward M. House. Shortly
after the Bolshevik revolution, Bullard began working for Edgar Sisson and the
wartime Committee on Public Information (CPI), which had recently opened an
office in Russia to conduct "a publicity campaign to inform the Russian people as
to our country and our friendship for them and our purpose in the war."4 As an op-
ponent of any outright efforts against the Bolsheviks, Bullard tried t() convince the
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people of Russia of America's "good will to themselves." Ernest Poole, an associ-
ate of Bullard, ~oted, "it was an almost hopeless job."5
Bullard's attempt to persuade Russians of American good intentions was
not helped by the u.s. army's intervention in Siberia and northern Russia. The
intervention in Siberia was designed to assist the transportation of several thou-
sand Czecho-Slovak soldiers in Vladivostok to join the war against Germany and
Austria-Hungary in the West. The effort in northern Russia was aimed at protect-
ing Allied war materiel and ammunition dumps from falling into German hands
after the Soviets exited the war.6
President Wilson stood opposed to naked interference in another country's
affairs. Thus, he had intervened in Russia that summer only reluctantly, after pro-
longed pressure from the British and French leadership, whose soldiers were al-
ready involved, as well as from Russian Ambassador Boris Bakhmetev.7 The
president insisted that he did not want American troops used in Russia for the pur-
pose of fighting the Bolsheviks. As Betty M. Unterberger notes, this would have
been a violation of point six of the Fourteen Points. The "acid test" of Europe and
America's "good will" to Russia, as point six put it, was these countries' treat-
ment of that unsettled nation.8
George F. Kennan points out, however, that all of the Allies, including
Wilson, had an "active distaste" for the Bolshevik regime. Linda Killen agrees,
noting that officials like Assistant Secretary of State Breckenridge Long "reasoned
that the United States did not have the right to interfere in Russian internal affairs
but that it might ... have a duty to combat Bolshevism." The American interven-
tion, even if "half-hearted," certainly reflected this sentiment.9 American troops
helped the anti-Bolshevik forces hold out longer than they would have otherwise,
something that Ambassador Bakhmetev clearly recognized as he tirelessly lobbied
for American assistance. to This contribution pleased some prominent members of
Wilson's cabinet as well. In November 1919, with the anti-Bolshevik Russian
forces in retreat, Lansing realized that "Kolchak is in danger of being wiped out"
and planned to ask Wilson for permission to loan $6 million in Treasury funds to
pay the Czecho-Slovak troops in Russia, "for the purpose of waging war on [the]
Bolsheviks." Upon hearing of this scheme, a perturbed Assistant Secretary of
Treasury Russell Leffingwell worried that the president was "not in a condition to
give careful consideration to the question of authorization" because of the stroke
he had suffered and would approve this "wholly irrelevant" use of Treasury funds
intended for the Allies' war effort. 1t Fortunately, the troops were not paid for this
purpose. Although the futility of the entire intervention in Russia became increas-
ingly clear, American forces stayed well into 1920. They left in part owing to.the
lobbying efforts of some members of Congress, who believed that "troops [were]
being held there through the influence of the bondholders" of tsarist debts."12
Confused as its aims were, the intervention hardly stopped American efforts
to reach a settlement with Russia. If Wilson had reluctantly joined the Old
World's struggle in Siberia, the Paris Peace Conference was at least his creation.
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Here, Moscow had reason to hope for something better from the author of Point
Six. Indeed, this great global gathering served as the catalyst for the first Ameri-
can diplomatic mission to Soviet Russia. The secret mission was the idealistic
product of young William C. Bullitt, chief of the Division of Current Intelligence
Summaries with the American Commission to Negotiate Peace. On January 19,
1919, Bullitt recommended to Colonel House, the American representative on the
Allied Supreme War Council, that a delegation "examine conditions in Russia
with a view to recommending definite action." Bullitt had long believed that rec-
ognition of Soviet Russia would serve as a ringing validation of Wilson's "un-
compromising liberalism."13 The twenty-eight-year-old Bullitt was "brilliant,
inexperienced, and greatly excited" about the potential of a diplomatic break-
through with Russia. 14 In Paris, Bullitt warned the administration of the ineffec-
tiveness of the American military presence in Siberia. 15
Although Bullitt wanted to send a mission to Russia, the Allied leadership
weighed different approaches~ At Litvinov's invitation, William H. Buckler, an
aide at the American embassy in London, had gone to Stockholm for discussions
on January 14-16. Litvinov had indicated to Buckler his government's eagerness
to "compromise" on foreign revolutionary ambitions, in order to end the war and
begin reconstruction in Russia. 16 Encouraged by this conciliatory stance, Wilson
and British Prime Minister David Lloyd George wanted to invite Soviet officials to
Paris to negotiate an end to hostilities in Russia. French Premier Georges Clemen-
ceau, however, refused to host the Bolsheviks on French soil. Wilson then sug-
gested that the meeting take place instead on the Prinkipo Islands of Turkey, where
representatives from both White and Red factions in the Russian conflict would be
summoned as well as from the nations of the former Russian empire. The French
agreed, and invitations were radioed for all to appear at Prinkipo by February 15.
But anti-Bolshevik Russian forces reacted in horror to the thought of sitting down
with their Red foes. I? The French foreign office was sympathetic to their views and
soon informed anti-Bolshevik leaders in Omsk, Archangel, and Ekaterinodar that
they could tum down the invitation to Prinkipo and still maintain Western support.
As the Prinkipo proposal began to fall apart in mid-February, a third initiative was
offered by British Secretary for War Winston Churchill, whose view of the Com-
munist regime in Moscow was similar to Clemenceau's. He proposed that a ten-
day ultimatum be extended to Moscow, requiring the Soviets to either lay down
their arms or face "large-scale intervention." Wilson and Lloyd George disap-
proved of this aggressive expansion of the existing Allied military effort. 18
The conferees thus reached an impasse. Then, on February 19, Clemenceau
was wounded in an assassination attempt, and all discussion on Russia was post-
poned. It was during this lull that House and Philip Kerr, Lloyd George's private
secretary, decided to implement their secret plan: Bullitt's mission to Russia. Sec-
retary of State Lansing was an unlikely candidate to initiate dealings with the
Bolsheviks, but apparently at House's urging, he furnished Bullitt with his orders
for the mission. Lansing's letter indicated that the young envoy was going to
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monitor "con.ditions, political and economic ... for the benefit of the American
commissioners plenipotentiary to negotiate peace." Bullitt would be accompanied
by the radical muckraking journalist Lincoln Steffens and two other officials,
neither of whom were experienced at diplomacy.19 The secretary of state did not
know that House had also authorized Bullitt "to discuss terms of settlement with
the Soviet government."20 The secretary hoped that sending Bullitt to see actual
conditions in Moscow might at last "cure him of his Bolshevism."21
Bullitt received eight bargaining points from Kerr as conditions for "the
Allied Governments to resume once more normal relations with Soviet Russia."
Bullitt's conditions called for the de facto governments in Russia to remain in
control of their occupied areas, a provision that worked against Soviet interests. In
return, a cease-fire would be called and the Allies' blockade and assistance to anti-
- Bolshevik forces would end. The terms also provided for amnesty for political
prisoners and the future discussion of "all other questions connected with
Russia's debt to the Allies."22 John M. Thompson writes that the American presi-
dent "certainly" did not know the points that Bullitt was going to discuss with the
Soviet government, and Wilson was probably also unaware that Bullitt was going
to "negotiate, as well as to investigate." Because it was thought that French offi-
cials had helped derail the Prinkipo proposal, they were not apprised of Bullitt's
journey either. All parties including House and Wilson envisioned the trip as an
"exploratory ... attempt to sound out the Bolsheviks" rather than a serious nego-
tiating session. Everyone, that is, except Bullitt.23
The American envoy met Lenin in Moscow on March 11. Although some
Soviet officials, including Trotsky, initially resisted the terms, Lenin agreed to
them and gave the Allies until April 10 to extend a formal offer under these con-
ditions. Privately, Lenin compared Bullitt's provisions to those of Brest-Litovsk in
their severity, but he believed that accepting them, just as he had done at Brest,
would tum out to be "entirely correct." The Soviet leader would note a year later,
"when we proposed a treaty to Bullitt . ".. which left tremendous amounts of terri-
tory to Deniken and Kolchak, we proposed [it] with the knowledge that if peace
was signed, those governments could never hold OUt."24 Indeed, as Richard Debo
suggests, the treaty represented "self-determination Bolshevik-style with a ven-
geance" since the Kremlin leaders well recognized that the authority of the
Whites was limited without foreign military aid, which the treaty prohibited.25
Bullittapplauded what he saw in Soviet Russia during his week in that
country. He pronounced that "the red terror is over" and determined that "prosti-
tutes have disappeared from sight, the economic reasons for their career having
ceased to exist." Finally, in a phrase that Steffens would later copy and popularize,
Bullitt claimed he had "been over into the future, and it works."26 Returning from
Russia "bug-eyed with wonder," Steffens and Bullitt could only be disappointed
with their reception in Paris.27 Wilson had a severe headache and was unable to
meet with Bullitt. The timing of their return was inconvenient also, because the
conferees were busy just then discussing the more pressing German question. AI-
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though Bullitt received encouragement from American Commission members
Gen. Tasker Bliss, Henry White, and even Lansing, the man who mattered most
was unavailable. The president had recently suffered a minor nervous collapse,
and he had also now become preoccupied with the more important and engaging
German question. Lloyd George also put a damper on the agreement. Two days
after Bullitt's return, the prime minister asserted that British public opinion would
not allow a peace treaty with the Bolsheviks. He vaguely mentioned sending a
"prominent Conservative" to Russia to gamer bipartisan support. Lloyd George
had clearly spumed his own creation, but his reading of the mission's unpopular-
ity was accurate. 28
Over the next few days, British newspapers turned up the volume of criti-
cism of the mission. So too did Churchill, who pleaded with Lloyd George to
reject any question of recognition. "I do trust that President Wilson will not be al-
lowed to weaken our policy," Churchill wrote, apparently unaware of the prime
minister's leading role in the mission. Lloyd George reassured anti-Bolshevik
Britons in an address to the House of Commons in Apri1.29 He was constrained by,
the angry French leadership as well, who attacked him for his duplicity. The
proposal was unpopular and its sponsors distrusted by the Allies, who were now
focused on the German settlement and with Kolchak's suddenly improving pros-
pects, and uninterested in any initiative that might lend legitimacy to the Bolshe-
vik regime. 3D
Meanwhile, another avenue for dealing with Russia had opened. Herbert
Hoover, the highly respected administrator of the wartime Committee for Relief in
Belgium, recommended sending nutritional assistance to Russia, which was
suffering from famine in the midst of its civil war. The scheme required that fight-
ing cease in Russia so that food could be distributed and was based upon a much
older plan first broached by Colonel House in 1918 and then dropped after the
Allied intervention that summer. 31 FritjofNansen, a prominent Norwegian human-
itarian, had also been advocating famine relief for Russia at the peace conference.
Hoover favored Nansen taking the lead in the relief effort, as he represented a neu-
tral power.32 Hoover assured Wilson that a relief mission like Nansen's would "not
involve any recognition or relationship by the Allies of the Bolshevik murderers"
and would preserve Poland, the Baltic states, and Kolchak's Siberian republic from
the "threat of Bolshevist invasion." Aid would also allow the Allies to see "whether
the Russian people will not themselves swing back to moderation and themselves
bankrupt these ideas." This alternative appeared to seal the fate of Bullitt's plan.33
Hoover insisted that relief would not imply relations with the Bolsheviks,
but Santeri Nuorteva of the Soviet Bureau saw it differently. "If this plan was not
some new intrigue against Soviet Russia it would in practice lead to the establish-
ment of trade relations," he noted with optimism, since local authorities would
distribute goods and this "would lead to the establishment of commercial relations
between the Allies and Soviet Russia." Nuorteva had heard that Acting Secretary
of State Polk agreed with this assessment and had said the "jig is up for the Bakh-
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meteff crowd."34 But nothing would happen unless both sides stopped fighting,
and Kolchak's army was advancing west. As Bullitt noted upon his return, "im-
mediately the entire press of Paris was roaring and screaming on the subject, an-
nouncing that Kolchak would be in Moscow within two weeks." His onslaught
was successful enough to extinguish much of the remaining interest in either Bul-
litt's or Nansen's proposa1.35
Bullitt did not give up easily, however, and made several last-ditch attempts
to combine his diplomatic initiative with the food program. Able to make only
limited adjustments to the Nansen plan, and disgusted with the Allied peace trea-
ties as a whole, he resigned on May 17 from all his official positions. The treaties
contained the seeds of future wars, Bullitt declared, which "the present league of
nations will be powerless to prevent," necessitating the intervention of a treaty-
bound United States.36 By then, the Bolsheviks had rejected the Hoover-Nansen
plan because of the disadvantageous requirement for an immediate cease-fire with
the Whites, which in Lenin's view, "linked the 'humanitarian' with the 'politi-
ca1.'" Lenin insisted his government was ready to deal with the Allies-and had
been since Prinkipo-but not with their counterrevolutionary "pawns."37
In September 1919 Bullitt vented his anger and disgust with the Wilson ad-
ministration and its foreign policy on the floor of the Senate. During hearings on
the ratification of the peace treaty, he revealed that Lansing also did not support
the proposed accord. Bullitt's testimony disclosed confidential conversations he
had held with Lansing in which the secretary had said, "I consider that the League
of Nations at present is entirely useless. The great powers have simply gone ahead
and arranged the world to suit themselves." Bullitt, who of course agreed with the
secretary, also quoted Lansing as suggesting that "if the Senate could only under-
stand what this treaty means, and if the American people could really understand,
it would unquestionably be defeated." Lansing said he had been misinterpreted
but made only feeble attempts to praise the treaty elsewhere. Wilson, who had
also suffered his incapacitating stroke that month, became increasingly irritated
with his secretary of state. By February 1920 the rift had widened so far that Lan-
sing tendered his resignation.38
Bullitt himself become part of that "lost generation" of American expatri-
ates in France. Disenchanted with the American ideal of "normalcy" and seduced
by both the high culture and low cost of Paris life, he lived splendidly near the
Pare des Princes with his bohemian wife, Louise Bryant, the widow of John Reed.
In 1933, when another Democrat returned to the White House, Bullitt would
become the first American ambassador to the Soviet Union.
Like Bullitt, Santeri Nuorteva was skeptical about the Paris Peace Conference. He
believed that it "has all the characteristics of an old fashioned diplomacy of 'give
and take' and 'balance of power.' The rest of the world shall have peace, but not
Russia! ... Soviet Russia, millions of whose sons have fallen ... shall not only be
left more isolated from the world than Imperial Germany ever was, but she shall
have to continue to defend herself against renewed attacks."39 The Bullitt mission
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had heightened Soviet hopes for a more conciliatory approach from the United
States.40 With the mission a failure by late May, however, Litvinov charged that
"America was consolidating its policy with the rabid one of Clemenceau, and ac-
tually participated in the unified military and diplomatic initiatives against us in
the economic blockade." Along with the other "reactionary circles at Versailles,"
the United States had suggested the "laughable and clearly not acceptable propo-
sition of Nansen, for which we in exchange for a promised delivery of provisions
must agree to stop our war activities and opposition to Kolchak and Deniken."
Litvinov did not trust the Allies to permit the Soviets to stay in power. "All these
proposals have the goal of ... covering up the preparation of a new intervention
now starting up, a campaign for Petrograd with direct participation of English
naval forces, and for strengthening the war efforts of Deniken."41
Despite this, Litvinov stressed that the Soviets continued to look with more
favor upon Americans than they did Europeans. Moscow had freed some Ameri-
can prisoners of war. Moreover, Soviet officials had not carried through the sen-
tence of execution for Xenophon Kalamatiano, who had been convicted by a
revolutionary tribunal of spying for the United States.42 As Litvinov noted: "Even
in the time of last year's intervention, our relations to American officials and un-
official representatives were different from relations with representatives of other
states. We did not lose a chance to make a note of our particular wish to get in
contact with America. We are prepared to give any economic concession to Amer-
icans principally before other foreigners. We have in mind concessions in Si-
berian Russia, exploitation of forests and iron resources, construction of railroads,
electric stations, remaining canals, etc."43 Litvinov also endorsed a plan for the
United States to assume all Soviet debts, including those owed to France and Brit-
ain, so that Moscow would have just one debtor. In exchange, the United States
would be able to exploit resources in "an expansive area."44
Although the Versailles Treaty was signed with Germany on June 28, 1919,
the British and French sought to continue the formal wartime blockade against
Russia. Americans were opposed, though a member of the u.S. mission in Paris
conceded that "we should go as far as possible with our associates in assisting
Koltchak [sic] and preventing aid from reaching the Bolshevists."45 Kolchak's for-
tunes had been reversed in May, and he lacked popular support in Siberia, his
base. Nevertheless, the Allies continued to restrict trade and in September agreed
upon an embargo of Bolshevik Russia that covered goods, mail, telegraph service,
passports, and financial exchange. Owing to American opposition, this postwar
embargo was never officially a "blockade."46
The utter failure of the White armies that fall, however, made the existing
policy obsolete. Lloyd George recognized this in November and hoped to end
Soviet economic isolation by developing trade with the Russian cooperatives, a
development that would certainly assist British trade prospects. Clemenceau also
initially liked the idea, as he thought such trade would crush the Bolsheviks. The
Supreme Council lifted the embargo on January 16. Lansing, still awaiting some
kind of "evolution" in the Bolshevik leadership, retained American restrictions.47
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Britain's opening soon created pressure across the Atlantic. By March 20
the U.S. government was prepared to lift its embargo. However, Britain wanted
American officials to wait until Lloyd George and other Allied officials had com-
pleted their discussions in Copenhagen with Krasin and Litvinov, who were sup-
posedly representing a delegation from the Tsentrosoyuz cooperative. The
discussions moved to London after Lenin agreed that the delegation could drop
Litvinov, who had been thrown out of Britain in 1918.48 In late May Lloyd George
and the head of the British Board of Trade, Sir Robert Home, met in London with
Krasin and his associate and interpreter, N.K. Klishko, "with a view to the imme-
diate starting of trade relations with Russia ... through the medium of coopera-
tive organizations." The prime minister told members of the House of Commons
that it was "essential in the interests of the world to resume trade relations with
Russia." The Soviets, who already had a commercial treaty with Sweden, were es-
pecially eager to establish relations with Britain, since this would create a prece-
dent for other large powers to follow.. The negotiations eventually led to a
commercial treaty in March 1921.49
With the British beginning trade discussions, Washington was free to repeal
the trade embargo. Secretary of State Colby finally authorized the measure on
July 8. Undersecretary of State Norman H. Davis carried out the task while Colby
was away at the Democratic National Convention. The government allowed firms
to trade on a caveat vendor basis but retained restrictions on the sale of war ma-
teriel as well as forbade postal and passport privileges. Business organizations in
the United States took immediate notice. The American-Russian Chamber of
Commerce, whose members had sustained huge financial losses in the Bolshevik
revolution, was pleased at the lifting of the blockade. The group's publication
opined that "it would expose the real blockade of Russia, which is internal, and
also conduce to mutually satisfactory relations with Russia in the future."5o A dif-
ferent perspective came from the National Association of Manufacturers (NAM),
which declared that this step had "aroused a great deal of interest in manufactur-
ing and export circles." NAM nevertheless believed that a combination of Euro-
pean competitors and poor transportation meant that for American firms, "trading
with Russia is bound for some time ... to be a thing of the future rather than a
present reality." NAM was still skeptical of the Soviets a year later. Its foreign
trade department told a firm that "it is possible that concerns doing business now
with ostensible agents of the Russian Government would find themselves looked
upon with disfavor by the elements which we feel must eventually supplant the
present regime."51
}> THE COLBY NOTE
Wilson once archly declared that Bainbridge Colby was his first secretary of state
who was capable of writing a diplomatic note without the president's assistance.
As Daniel Smith writes, in 1920 Colby in many ways "occupied the intimate po-
sition formerly held by House."52 In August 1920 the secretary did in fact pen a
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highly significant letter, although he hardly acted alone. A query about the Ameri-
can position on the ongoing Russo-Polish war from the Italian ambassador, Baron
Camillo Avezzana, gave the secretary an opportunity to set down his views on the
Soviet regime in his famous "Colby note." This document, written for Colby
almost entirely by the moderate Socialist and Wilson confidante John Spargo, was
a reflection of Spargo's long-held desire that Colby issue a "forceful statement"
against Russia, the "'outlaw nation."'53 Colby did. He wrote, "We cannot recog-
nize, hold official relations with, or give friendly reception to the agents of a
government which is determined and bound to conspire against our institutions
and whose diplomats will be the agitators of a dangerous revolt."54 Although
Washington had no "desire to interfere in the internal affairs of the Russian
people, or to suggest what kind of government they should have," it would not
open relations with the Soviet government. Colby, like Lansing before him and
Hughes afterward, wanted to place the issue of recognition in the context of inter-
national law rather than domestic politics. The secretary did not specifically men-
tion Soviet-American trade in the note, but he did believe that the Soviets would
"sign agreements with no intention of keeping them." President Wilson felt the
note was an "excellent and sufficient" exposition of American policy.55
The Colby note has become one of the most well-studied· documents of
early Soviet-American relations. The secretary's attempts to distinguish the non-
recognition policy from ideological anticommunism became a State Department
leitmotiv in the twenties. Historians have dismissed Colby's assertions that he was
not interested in reshaping the Soviet government and have described the note as
one of the most ideological statements to come out of Washington during the
decade. Peter Filene suggests that pronouncements such as Colby's persuaded
most Americans that nonrecognition amounted to a "moral boycott." Joan Hoff
Wilson agrees that this was occurring even as officials "denied they were subordi-
nating practical economic to abstract ideological considerations."56
A second major thrust of scholarly analysis is that the note served as a blue-
print of Washington's policy for the remainder of the period of nonrecognition,
until 1933. This was, of course, Spargo's aim. He wanted the Colby note to serve
as "a fait accompli not to be lightly done and reversed" by the incoming, and in
his view suspiciously less resolute, Harding administration.57 Historians have af-
firmed that Spargo was successful and that the note introduced sixteen years of
diplomatic rigidity. Daniel Smith writes that Colby "formalized a policy of non-
recognition that was to become increasingly unrealistic." William Appleman
Williams described the note as "a measure of the failure of American policy
toward Russia." G.N. Tsvetkov avers that the note's expressed policy was "the
principal weapon of American imperialism in its 'cold war' against the first so-
cialist power." And David W. McFadden writes that the note terminated a period
of significant Soviet-American interchange and "condemn[ed] Bolshevism in
Russia in such an unqualified manner that it served as a policy statement of both
non-recognition and non-intercourse for three successive Republican administra-
tions." One of the few to disagree with this view is Christine A. White, who
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suggests that after 1920 the United States "clearly shifted away from the risks, re-
focusing instead on the trade to be had in Russia."58
The still predominant view of a static U.S. policy in the 1920s does not ac-
count for the transformations in the economic arena that shaped Washington's re-
lations with Russia during that decade. Although the Colby note was the first
significant official declaration of American policy toward the Soviets and its terms
remained important components of official policy until recognition, this document
may be viewed more accurately as a depiction of the perfervid times in which it
originated than as the blueprint for Soviet-American relations during the next
decade. Colby and Wilson believed that the Soviet government was faltering and
saw their statements as a means to pressure reform or, indeed, to effect an end to
that government.59 Yet as Soviet Russia proved its staying power, and as its pur-
chases of American goods increased, U.S. policy changed. The twenties became
an era of growing American receptivity to the economic potential of the Soviet
Union.
After the embargo was lifted, Washington initially maintained some restric-
tions on trade that represented serious burdens to those firms interested in com-
merce, though Undersecretary Davis declared that those who said the department
was still limiting Soviet-American commerce after July 1920 were "less inter-
ested in trade than in politics." The department believed its policies were a judi-
cious response to circumstances, not ideology-based opposition. "We ... do not
recognize the Government of Russia; but we do not outlaw her citizens, boycott
her trade and destroy personal relations between our citizens and hers," said
Davis. Over the course of the following decade, this passive, and despite Davis's
words, often limiting policy toward Russia became a more active and facilitating
one, especially in relation to trade and credits.60
» CHARlES EVANS HUGHES' INFLUENCE ON FOREIGN POLICY
Harding's campaign rhetoric had indicated that his administration would concern
itself less with idealistic tenets and more with economic growth, and these pillars
of anti-Wilsonianism and prosperity proved "invincible" in getting him elected.61
Ironically, the return to "normalcy" created a more progressive era than that
which preceded it. Harding, the first president to have received a majority of
women's votes, and Calvin Coolidge, his vice president and successor, restored
civil liberties that wartime regulations and postwar hysteria had suspended, and
freed political prisoners.62 Harding had also been elected on a platform that prom-
ised to modify existing policies toward Soviet Russia, stating, "We pledge the
party to an immediate resumption of trade relations with every nation· with which
we are at peace." Albert Fox of the Washington Post noted that President Harding
believed in "encouraging trade relationship[s] between the United States and
Russia as a preliminary to adjustment of political relations." Unlike his predeces-
sor in the Oval Office, Harding saw recognition as "a purely technical matter" that
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did not imply endorsement of a government but was instead designed to expedite
international commerce.63
In his support of an opening to Russia, Harding had been influenced by a
number of progressive Republicans, including Raymond Robins, former Red
Cross chief in Russia, and Sense Hiram Johnson and William Borah. Robins and
Johnson had offered their support to Harding in 1920 in return for a promise "to
reconsider" existing policy on Russia.64 Robins recognized this was a dubious
prospect once the makeup of the Harding cabinet was revealed but still made the
demand for recognition in 1922 in return for taking a seat on the Coal Commis-
sion. He received only a "vague" commitment.65 Robins, Borah, and Johnson,
along with other activists including Robins's former secretary and interpreter, Al-
exander Gumberg, and the members of the Women's Committee for the Recogni-
tion of Russia, nevertheless counted on Harding to change policy as a means to
bring about world peace. Another advocate of change was Indiana governor
James P. Goodrich, whose close ties to Hoover took him to Russia for the Ameri-
can Relief Administration. Goodrich believed that "Communist Russia would
evolve into Capitalist Russia."66 Despite the influence of these men in Congress
and in the administration, the opposition of cabinet members Hughes and Hoover
to recognition proved impossible to overcome.
Even before his inauguration, the president-elect along with Secretary of
State-designate Hughes and Harding's choice for attorney general, Harry Dau-
gherty, met in St. Augustine, Florida, with a Russian named Dalinda and some of
his business partners to discuss Soviet trade. Cyrus Huling, one of Dalinda's asso-
ciates, declared, "The encouragement with which we met on that occasion has in-
duced us ... to form a syndicate for the purpose of becoming the fiscal agent of
Russia in the United States, receiving gold or other commodities and exchanging
them by sale or barter for goods." Daugherty took a sympathetic view toward this
syndicate and encouraged Huling three months later to remind Hughes about the
proposal. The State Department gave no response to Huling, however. Mikhail
Kalinin, chairman of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of Soviets,
also telegrammed the White House soon after the inauguration to offer "the
formal proposal of opening trade relations." Kalinin wanted to send "a special
delegation to America which will negotiate upon this matter." This too went unan-
swered.67 Despite his intention to resume trade relations and return to "normalcy,"
Harding had made no plans to open negotiations with Moscow. He was not a
policy innovator but rather a president "in tow behind his two Secretaries."68
Harding did not take an active role in policy-making and relied on those in his
cabinet who did: Secretary of State Hughes and Secretary of Commerce Herb~rt
Hoover.
As leader of Harding's cabinet, Charles Evans Hughes was a brilliant jurist
who had accumulated an impressive record as a professor, lawyer, Supreme Court
judge, and politician. He had served as the lead counsel in New York City's gas
company investigations in 1905 and in 1906 was elected governor of the Empire
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State. Four years later, Hughes was appointed to the Supreme Court, where he re-
mained until his bid against incumbent Wilson for the presidency in 1916, which
Hughes lost in a close vote. In 1921, when he joined the Harding administration,
his credentials made him one of the "most distinguished" State Department
chiefs. One historian contends that as secretary, Hughes was an adherent of
change-but only the "slow, evolutionary" kind. The progressive of 1905 had
become rather conservative. If either Harding or Coolidge seemed open to re-
lations with Russia, Hughes was there to "nudge them back into line."69
Though the president supported Hughes, Harding increasingly identified
nonrecognition as "State Department policy" rather than administration policy.
"Harding is said to be sympathetic to the [recognition] movement," as one con-
temporary account reported, "but is being held back by Secretaries Hughes and
Hoover." Yet there exists no indication that Harding fought to have the policy
changed, so he may have been comfortable with nonrecognition even if he did not
feel personally committed to it.70 Although his ear was always open to those who
sought to revise the policy, including Robins and Goodrich, Harding did not
change course but rather consistently "invok[ed] Hughes's stale formula of pre-
conditions."71
This formula was regularly on the secretary's lips. In Hughes's first major
speech on Soviet-American economic relations on March 25, 1921, the secretary
declared that there was no "proper basis for considering trade relations" until
"fundamental changes" were effected in Russia.72 Less than two weeks later,
Hughes received another opportunity to discuss the subject when American Fed-
eration of Labor President Samuel Gompers asked him for information on the de-
partment's policy in light of "propaganda" being circulated about Russia's plans
for orders. Hughes confirmed the union leader's own low reckoning of Soviet
trade potential, noting that during 1920 American trade with the Soviets had
amounted to an "absolutely negligible" $4 million in a year when total U.S. trade
turnover had amounted to $13.5 billion.73
Even though Hughes minimized Soviet economic potential for American
firms, the full extent of Soviet Bureau purchases, as well as those of intermedi-
aries such as the Robert Dollar Company, became apparent in early 1921. Ar-
riving in Reval then were four cargo ships brimming with American products
made up largely of shoes and soap, "a cargo that must have been sorely needed in
Soviet Russia," the Commerce Department sniffed.74 These early American ship-
ments were small, however, compared with those originating in Britain, which
supplied half of Russia's imports in 1921.75
Britain's trade had been bolstered by its agreement with Russia signed in
March of that year. The treaty's immediate aim was to eradicate Bolshevik propa-
ganda in India and other countries and secondarily to build trade. British Board of
Trade President Home remarked that the agreement was a method to introduce
"the beginning of better relations in Europe." In terms of ending Bolshevik propa-
ganda, the treaty was a failure, especially in areas of British interest including
India, Afghanistan, and Persia.76 The New York Post quickly asserted that the
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treaty had been "practically worthless" for increasing trade as well. But statistics
show that Britain took the leading role in Soviet trade in the early twenties.77
With the opportunities of Soviet trade being eagerly seized upon by Britain,
Hughes allowed that "it is unquestionably desirable that intimate and mutually
profitable relations" be opened with Moscow, although "readjustments in Russia"
would first be necessary. The Bolsheviks had to demonstrate "the recognition by
firm guarantees of private property, the sanctity of contract, and the rights of free
labor." When Hoover asked the secretary of state in 1922 about the proposed re-
entry of International Harvester and Westinghouse to Russian trade, Hughes did
not want "to put any obstacle in the way." He predicted failure for any business-
man who tried to deal with Moscow, yet should anyone succeed, he hastened to
add, all the better that the State Department did not interfere. Hughes's State De-
partment found the issue of dealing with the Soviets more complex than the
Colby note would indicate. The office asked, "Should private American firms
seeking to trade with the bolshevik Government have the moral support of the
State Department?" These were questions that introduced shades of gray to the
black-and-white statement of government opposition to Soviet Russia expressed
by Colby.78
The State Department closely followed developments in Russia. A series of
new initiatives in Russia in the twenties, most notably the New Economic Policy
and the Five-Year Plan, made a static approach on Soviet-American affairs unre-
alistic. DeWitt Clinton Poole, who headed the Division of Russian Affairs at
State, recorded that in 1922 "the Department received an average of three and
one-half dispatches and one cablegram per day relating to the Russian situation,"
much of it originating in Riga, Latvia. The consul in this Baltic capital, the pro-
lific F.W.B. Coleman, furnished reams of reports. Representatives overseas also
sent in commercial information when they thought it would "prove of some value
to Americans seeking trade with Russia."79
The State Department was particularly interested in the progress of Soviet
international trade. In May 1921 Hughes had a circular mailed to commissioners
and consul generals in the Baltic states, the Scandinavian countries, and Britain
and Germany, telling them it was of "urgent importance .... to keep the Depart-
ment fully informed regarding the development of trade with Russia." He wanted
to know which countries had opened relations, the quantities of what they were
trading, how it was being paid for, and "the names of individuals and corpora-
tions, whether American or foreign, prominent in this trade." He believed that
"the United States is not in an unfavorable position as compared with other na-
tions in the matter of trade with Russia. The difficulties of that trade are attribut-
able to conditions within Russia." As Poole informed him, "we stand in a better
situation with respect to British competition in Russian trade-despite the Soviet-
British trade agreement-than we did in 1913."80 The State Department requested
that all American shippers to R~ssia report what their vessels carried.81
That spring, the War Department considered sending its surplus five-foot
gauge locomotives to a firm that would resell them directly to Russia. Poole saw
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two good reasons to allow the sale: the need for locomotives in Russia "to allevi-
ate the suffering of the people and prepare the way -for eventual rehabilitation"
and the resulting drawdown of Bolshevik gold. But Poole still felt that "American
firms might well abstain from trading with Soviet institutions" as long as Ameri-
can prisoners were being held in Russia. The War Department locomotives were
not sold to the Soviets, even though the State Department during the same period
allowed Baldwin Locomotive to sign a $6 million order with a Russian agent for
one hundred locomotives, after advising the firm about the prisoner situation. As-
sistant Secretary of State Frederick Dearing was puzzled, saying it is "a little
paradoxical" that the War Department was being "prevented from doing what any
locomotive manufacturer can do." The episode demonstrates the evolving, some-
times contradictory nature of American economic policy toward Russia. 82
Even the most steadfast enemies of bolshevism at the State Department did
not want to be perceived as being closed-minded on the issue. Thus, it bothered
Poole "that the State Department has been frequently accused of doing active
anti-Bolshevik propaganda, with the result that anything which it now puts out on
the subject of Russia is discredited in not a few circles."83 And Loy Henderson, a
staunch anticommunist who worked at the East European Division, recalled that
his most "time-consuming" task at that post in the early twenties was watching
"developments in Soviet Russia ... that might justify a reconsideration of our
policy of non-recognition." Officials needed to keep abreast of any revisions in
Soviet policy and practice "in order to move in the direction of recognition with-
out having to be pushed ... by critics in Congress," such as gadfly William
Borah.84 Although Borah did not make a resolution for recognition of Russia in
the Senate until 1924, his regular speeches on the subject kept the issue promi-
nently in front of the public.85
American officials also were careful to distinguish among Kremlin repre-
sentatives. Robert P. Skinner, who headed the State Department's consulate in
Britain, described Soviet trade delegate Leonid Krasin as "relatively sane and
moderate." On the other hand, he found Karl Radek, the publicist for both the
Kremlin and the Communist International, a "very pessimistic" influence on
Soviet policy. Krasin, whose work in London with the Soviet Trade Delegation
had led to the Anglo-Soviet treaty of 1921, was seen as the ideal man to work
with, and some businessmen were interested in bringing him to America. Poole
believed it was "obviously undesirable" that Krasin come to the United States, but
in December 1921 he did authorize Consul Skinner to meet with the Soviet com-
missar on the condition that Skinner "not take [the] initiative." Poole instructed:
"[I]f Soviet delegate calls you may receive him informally ... listening to what he
has to say without, of course, committing yourself in any way. Use utmost discre-
tion." The State Department was committed to its policies on debts and propa-
ganda, but it would "let no opportunity pass of ascertaining practical means
whereby the distress of the Russian people may be relieved."86
Still, the State Department did not believe that trade was going to be of any
significance for the time being. A.W. Kleifoth of the Division of Russian Affairs
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claimed that only "new and unknown" firms were trading with Russia. "The older
experienced traders ... to date ... have [not] attempted to re-enter Russia, except
for the purpose of investigation," he said in 1922. They were "modeling their
policy on that of the Department." He attributed this reluctance to the fact that or-
ganizations and individuals had lost a total of $245 million in investments and
properties during the revolution.87
}> HOOVERS EXPERIENCE IN RUSSIA
While the State Department debated the extent of American engagement in Rus-
sian trade, Secretary of Comm~rceHoover was planning a huge expansion in the
dimensions of American involvement in Russia. The occasion was the terrible
famine, complicated by civil war and revolution, that hit the Russian countryside
with horrifying force in 1921. The worst disaster of the early Soviet regime would
ironically result in an American intervention that enabled the Soviet government
to survive. As director of the American Relief Administration's (ARA) effort, arch
anti-Bolshevik Herbert Hoover would wipe out hunger in Russia during
1921-1922 with funds from American taxpayers and private charities.88
Herbert Hoover's involvement in the ARA in Russia had a pivotal influence
upon him. It emphasized for him something that he had recognized at the Paris
Peace Conference: Russia's problems were not simply those of bad government
but were based on genuine social problems compounded by centuries of oppres-
sive authoritarian rule. Hoover empathized with the residents of the former tsarist
empire and recognized that "a foundation of real social grievance" had brought
about the revolution. However, he did not in the least admire the new Bolshevik
government: "They have resorted to terror, bloodshed, murder to a degree long
since abandoned even amongst reactionary tyrannies." Hoover's humanitarian
form of diplomacy was his answer to military intervention, which he opposed in
countries that had undergone communist revolutions. He believed military ven-
tures would only lead to a reinstallation of "the reactionary classes in their eco-
nomic domination over the lower classes." As he had with the Nansen plan in
1919, Hoover hoped that humanitarian aid in 1921 would derail bolshevism but
do so without a reinstatement of the ancien regime. This progressive-minded
administrator played a leading role in American policy-making, not only because
he was a very involved commerce secretary and president, but also because he
was considered approachable by those pursuing Soviet trade in a way that Hughes
was not. 89
Hoover grew up in a devout Quaker family in West Branch, Iowa. In 1895
he graduated from Stanford University with a degree in geology and was soon
hired as a mining engineer by a British concern. He played an important role in
the development of mining technology, contributing frequently to engineering
journals and authoring a popular mining textbook.90 His early work took him to
Australia, China, South America, and Burma, where he discovered a silver bo-
nanza worth $2.5 million.91
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After 1908 Hoover left the British firm and turned to Russia, where, follow-
ing an unsuccessful oil venture on the Black Sea, he constructed a copper-smelting
facility in the Urals for the Kyshtim Corporation. Here, he metamorphosed a
money-losing gold mine into a successful copper mine for Kyshtim, making "huge
profits" in the process. Subsequently, he contributed to the creation of a large for-
eign venture in Russia, Leslie Urquhardt' s Russo-Asiatic Consolidated, where he
served on the board of directors. Hoover instituted improved living and health
conditions for his miners, for humanitarian reasons as well as to increase their effi-
ciency.92
By 1912 Hoover was recognized for his "prominence in Russian enter-
prises" and was invited by Tsar Nicholas II to develop East Siberia's resources.
Hoover's Irtysh Corporation found rich lodes of gold, silver, copper, lead, and
zinc in this region. He would later report that the Bolshevik revolution had cost
him over $15 million in connection with these Irtysh holdings alone. These Rus-
sian losses would often be cited by his critics as the reason for Hoover's oppo-
sition to recognition, but his criticisms went deeper than these lodes.93
In 1914 Hoover was a forty-year-old multimillionaire involved in eighteen
mining enterprises on four continents. Yet he had become tired of the business
world and gravitated toward public service. With the onset of the First World War,
he would have ample opportunity. In Europe when the war broke out, Hoover
was by October 1914 running the Commission for Relief in Belgium, a neutral,
American-dominated effort to supply that occupied and blockaded country with
food. The position required him to be a skillful diplomat as well as a good organ-
izer. Given this background, it was natural that Wilson would choose Hoover to
be the U. S. food administrator after America entered the war. Here he was re-
sponsible for overseeing the production, distribution, pricing, conservation, and
consumption of food. After the armistice, Hoover returned to his European relief
work by chairing the American Relief Administration and then went to Paris.
There, he offered the Nansen plan for Russia, as described earlier. Hoover had
similar plans for other war-ravaged European countries, regularly using food as a
weapon of diplomacy. As one historian writes, he used food aid "to defeat both
Bela Kun's communist regime in Hungary and a Habsburg comeback in Austria,
while propping up the regimes the Anglo-Saxon powers favoured."94
Hoover achieved widespread popularity because of his highly publicized
humanitarian work, and the Democratic party tried to recruit him as its presi-
dential nominee in 1920. Among his supporters were Louis Brandeis, the Harvard
faculty, and the New Republic, as well as many of the newest voters, women.
Even after he had officially declared himself a Republican, Hoover won the
Democratic primary in Michigan, and A. Mitchell Palmer, who had been expected
to win easily there, found his presidential prospects obliterated.95 Following Hard-
ing's victory that year, Hoover joined his administration, enticed by the new pres-
ident's offer of posts as either secretary of the interior or secretary of commerce.
Hoover's interest in foreign affairs, his wish to make business and governmental
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practices more efficient and rational, and perh~ps most of all, Harding's promise
that the Commerce Department could be "as important and influential as he de-
sired," helped Hoover make his decision.96
In July 1921 Russian writer Maxim Gorky made an impassioned appeal to
the world on behalf of his starving countrymen for food and medicine. At that
time, American and British Quakers were already in Russia providing relief, as
they had been since 1916. But with conditions growing increasingly desperate,
American Anna Haines and Briton Arthur Watts persuaded Gorky to issue the
broad appeal for aid. 97 The American Relief Administration was the largest or-
ganization to respond, although other groups also volunteered. As the biggest and
most "official" agency involved, the ARA would control the distribution of grain,
while the Soviet government would provide housing and transportation for the
charity organization's personnel. The agency also asked for the return of Ameri-
can prisoners still in Russia. 98 To organize this massive task, 350 ARA workers
traveled to the Soviet Union and began distributing food financed by three
sources: the U.S. government, private donations, and the Kremlin. Moscow pur-
chased several million dollars' worth of grain in the United States with gold cer-
tified to be of "unstolen" origin, "in the possession of the Russian Treasury since
the beginning of the war in August 1914."99
The Relief Administration's work was supplemented by the efforts of many
members of other charitable organizations, among them the Mennonites, the
Friends of Soviet Russia, and the Quakers. Hoover was dubious about the value of
these groups' assistance in this campaign. Although sympathetic to his Quaker co-
religionists, he sometimes felt that they were too easily manipulated by the So-
viets. lOo As for the Friends of Soviet Russia, an umbrella organization of two
hundred affiliated groups, he declared that .it was "frankly communistic." Hoover
urged Walter Liggett, who headed the American Committee for Russian Famine
Relief, to break his group's ties with the Friends of Soviet Russia, whose letter-
head urged, "Give without imposing imperialistic and reactionary conditions as
Hoover and others have." Liggett refused. The Relief Administration chairman
then wrote the senators on Liggett's advisory council that the Friends of Soviet
Russia was "a propaganda agency for the recognition of the Soviet government,
both economically and politically."101
Actions such as this irritated many observers. Gilson Gardner, a journalist
and member of the American Committee for Russian Famine Relief, complained
of Hoover that "if anybody but himself wishes to keep Russia from starving,
[Hoover] finds himself running at large snorting and kicking like a bay ass."102
Since Hoover and his organization received $20 million from the federal govern-
ment, it was not difficult for the Relief Administration to dominate the charitable
effort. Considering the sharp postwar domestic recession, Congress' passage of
this appropriation was noteworthy. 103
Hoover's relief effort took place during the Soviet program known as the
New Economic Policy (NEP). This initiative had been developed in response to
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the devastating conditions that war, revolution, and war communism-a three-
year push "to arrive at genuine communism"-had inflicted upon the countryside.
As Hoover well knew, conditions were truly desperate in Russia, with millions
dying from starvation, disease, fuel shortages, and other deprivations. 104 War,
ultraorthodox economic control (including oppressive grain requisitions), and
revolutionary terror combined to decimate the population between 1918 and
1922, with peasants the chief victims.
The conditions under which Russians had lived during this period were ex-
emplified by this decree from a rural area: "The extraordinary commission hereby
makes it known to the citizens of the city and district of Metelnich that for the
slightest attempt to take action against the authority of the laboring people as well
as every agitation and spreading of false rumors, the persons so engaged, taken as
hostages and confined in concentration camps, will be shot."105 Such ruthless poli-
cies, if necessitated by war and revolution, could not be long sustained were the
country to hold together or to develop economically during peacetime. The failure
of militant war communism was made manifest in March 1921 at Kronstadt. Sail-
ors there mutinied against the government, declaring that the Bolsheviks had be-
trayed the revolution. They were crushed, but their rebellion led to the inau-
guration of the more liberal New Economic Policy. War communism had gone too
far, its "errors and stupidities" alienating the people. 106
NEP allowed more opportunities for entrepreneurial Russian peasants and
also created promising trade and investment avenues for Westerners after its in-
ception in 1921. As Washington's representative in Riga told the State Depart-
ment, the New Economic Policy meant "state commercial enterprise is curtailed
on every hand." This was an exaggeration, since Gosplan, the Soviet planning
agency, was already well entrenched in its management of major sectors of the
economy by the time this economic reform program made its debut. 107 The Soviet
government also maintained a strict control over foreign commerce through the
state monopoly of foreign trade. The state's management over foreign commerce
was enacted just five months after the revolution to promote socialism, develop
the economy, and protect the nascent Soviet republic from foreign capitalist
domination and was strongly defended by Krasin. 108 Although small businesses
were for a time "privatized," large firms were consolidated into huge trusts and
syndicates in order to provide centralized operation of the country's key industries
under a program that Lenin called "state capitalism."109
The capitalistic reforms of the New Economic Policy were necessary, Lenin
had said, because the revolutionary leadership was in danger of leaving Russian
peasants behind in the planned transformation of the economy: "That is why we
have ... had to retreat to state capitalism, retreat to concessions, retreat to trade.
Without this, proper relations with the peasants cannot be restored in the condi-
tions of devastation, in which we now find ourselves. Without this we are
threatened with the danger of the revolution's vanguard getting swiftly so far ahead
that it would lose touch with the peasants. There would be no contact between the
vanguard and the peasants and that would mean the collapse of the revolution."110
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Lenin believed the retreat was necessary to avoid the mistakes made by an
earlier revolutionary, Robespierre, in 1794. The French leader had "failed to take
into account the class nature of his enemies." 111 Lenin would not fail. Indeed, the
reforms of the NEP did play a large role in the 1920s in keeping the peasants
loyal to the regime by such methods as substituting a tax in kind on peasant pro-
duce, rather than relying on outright requisition of grain. The efforts of the Ameri-
can Relief Administration were of more immediate importance in cementing the
peasants to Bolshevik Russia, however. By 1923 the agency had saved 10.5 mil-
lion lives in Russia, .and other organizations had saved an additional two million.
Hoover, of course, had hoped that infusions of food might weaken the appeal of
the Bolsheviks, since they would no longer be able to blame the oppressive condi-
tions in Russia on the Allied blockade. It was for this reason that Hoover had op-
posed the embargo, believing that keeping food and other necessities from the
Russians would only encourage the spread of bolshevism as well as waste the
supplies then languishing in American grain elevators. 112
Historians have viewed Hoover's relief campaign in three ways: as a self-
interested effort to support the American economy, as a selfless humanitarian
effort, and as a combination of both humanitarianism and a hoped-for crushing of
Communism. Supporting the first point of view is N. Gordon Levin, who calls the
Relief Administration a "proto-Marshall plan to establish liberal-capitalist sta-
bility," as well as Arno Mayer, who states that Hoover carried out the charitable
effort as a way to hold up commodity prices in the United States. The idealistic
and humanitarian concerns typifying this era, however, make this interpretation
too narrow an analysis of American policy.113
Hoover's anticommunist proclivities and his willingness to use food as a
weapon, as shown in Hungary, provide evidence for a less economically oriented
and more moralistic policy. Peter Filene, for example, suggests that Hoover hoped
to use the ARA for "rescuing Russia from the Bolsheviks." Benjamin Weissman's
argument is more nuanced. He writes that Hoover's first goal was to end the
famine, but his "collateral American goals" included the hope that "a demonstra-
tion of goodwill would enhance American influence in Russia and somehow
induce changes in the Soviet system beyond those instituted by the NEP." When
this proved untenable, he hoped for a "'lasting impression'" in Russia. Joan Hoff
Wilson takes a similar view, noting that Hoover believed the legacy of goodwill
he left might later prove useful for Americans to take a leading role in Russian
economic regeneration. Il4
Aware of Hoover's mixed motives, the Soviet government was naturally
suspicious. Lenin, for instance, accused him of "rank duplicity." But Lenin him-
self was guilty of not a little double-dealing in the matter. Two days after Litvinov
had signed the aid agreement with ARA representative Walter L. Brown in Riga,
Lenin instructed Zinoviev to have the Comintern "put forward a definite slogan,
without coming out against the American Government ... saying that the workers
should send in their donations only directly to the address of Soviet Russia's
representatives abroad." Lenin wanted aid "without strings."115
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As the ARA effort proceeded in 1922, fears deepened that it served as a
cover for military action. Alexander A. Yazikov, head of the Washington delega-
tion of the Far Eastern Republic, the Soviet front government in Siberia, pre-
dicted, "Hoover will use the ARA to prepare a counter-revolutionary movement in
the spring." Yazikov had heard Hoover say that "it follows in Soviet Russia as in
Hungary." Perhaps he had also readARA aide T.T.C. Gregory's smug assessment
of the Hungarian relief effort the year before: "a handful of Americans, employ-
ing only economic weapons, brought down the Government of Bela Kun." Ray-
mond Robins had also been informed by a friend of Hoover's that the secretary
had "bragged of his having overthrown Bolshevism in Hungary and told of his
getting from [Left-wing Socialist] Max Eastman just what the Bolshevists wanted
so that he could make his plans accordingly." Robins had heard that Hoover had
told a group of businessmen that his '''ambition was to be known as the man who
overthrew Bolshevism.'''116
Yet among Hoover's closest advisers in the relief effort were men much
more open to the Soviet experiment, including James P. Goodrich, former Indiana
governor and prominent Indianapolis banker, who made several trips to Russia for
the American Relief Administration. These trips ranged from surveys of famine-
afflicted areas to informal meetings with representatives of the Kremlin, men
whom he believed were "honest, sincere, misguided, enthusiasts." His travels re-
ceived wide attention in the newspapers. The Washington Globe called him "os-
tensibly an American charge d' affaires" to Moscow. And the Washington Star
declared, "by far the most profound impression upon American political leaders"
on the Soviet question "has resulted from James P. Goodrich." The New York
Times, too, reported that "the tone of the references to Russia at once began to
change" as a result of Goodrich's positive reports. I 17
Goodrich's second trip to Moscow in the spring of 1922 led to his meeting
with Soviet authorities. Harding and Secretary of State Hughes had asked him to
meet "informally" with Soviet leaders "so that they might understand the attitude
of Americans toward Russia."118 This was a significant gesture at a time when the
United States refused to recognize the Soviet Union. It was also noteworthy that
Hoover considered sending Alexander Gumberg, a supporter of trade and recogni-
tion who had emigrated to the United States from Russia twenty years earlier,
along with Goodrich. The ARA chief went so far as to have Gumberg quit his po-
sition with the Far Eastern Trade Delegation and report to Washington. There,
Gumberg reported, he "got strung along for two weeks" only to learn that "bu-
reaucracy" had prevented his trip. Hoover did, at least, pay Gumberg for his
trouble, and the Russian returned to his job. But he was disappointed that he had
not joined Goodrich: "I could have been very useful in healing the breach between
America and Russia."119 James K. Libbey suggests that the State Department sat
upon Gumberg's visa request for reasons both ideological and personal. 120
During his Russian visit, Goodrich spoke to a number of leaders, including
Leonid Krasin, Maxim Litvinov, and Karl Radek. Radek informed him that
"America cannot be prosperous as long as England and Germany are not, and
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these two countries cannot thrive as long as Russia is down and out." Goodrich
was sympathetic. He did not press the issue of Soviet propaganda in the United
States, for which he blamed domestic activists. With Russia's "pure Aryan stock,"
Goodrich believed that country would soon "occupy a place among the family of
nations second only to that of America itself." It is not surprising that Goodrich
won support among advocates of better U.S.-Soviet relations in the United States,
including Gumberg, who wrote glowingly to Raymond Robins, "[O]utside of
yourself I never heard a foreigner talk with more intelligence or real human sym-
pathy or understanding about Russia."121
Goodrich was not shy to press his advocacy of better U.S.-Soviet relations
upon President Harding, telling him in 1923 that "many intelligent Republican
businessmen" were dismayed with the administration's Soviet policy. He re-
minded Harding that his election platform had included a promise of "resumption
of trade relations with all nations with which we are at peace." This economic ad-
vantage was needed, said Goodrich, "for Republican success in 1924." He posited
that heightened Soviet-American trade would bring Moscow more speedily
"toward a settled democracy" and also suggested that the problems of Russia
"will be solved sooner, and the Russian people more quickly relieved, by the rec-
ognition of its government ... and the opening up of Russia to the world." As far
as the debt issue, Goodrich believed that "we ought to have the courage and the
wisdom to get out of the legalistic impasse in which we are now involved by rec-
ognizing the rather disagreeable fact to some that the present government is in
fact the government of Russia, and then sit down with Russia and adjust the mat-
ters in dispute."122
Goodrich's influence on ARA leader Hoover has been questioned. Benja-
min Rhodes suggests that the governor was perceived as someone "who had lost
touch of reality" and "his views were ignored."123 Hoover did not agree with many
of Goodrich's counsels, particularly on the advisability of recognition. Neverthe-
less, the governor was a highly trusted adviser as well as a key source of firsthand
reports on Russian developments. His merits were summed up by Hoover in
1921: "It will be of substantial benefit to have a man of such experience as Gov-
ernor Goodrich obtain a real knowledge of what the real difficulties of this foolish
economic system are." Hoover's assistant, Christian Herter, declared that his boss
was "not afraid of any Bolshevik tinge" in the governor's reports. As Rhodes him-
self observes, Hoover often agreed with the governor, in theory if not in practice.
Yet it was "too risky politically" for him to make a "public endorsement" of
Goodrich's views. 124
The American relief efforts proved their effectiveness when a grain surplus
was announced in the Soviet Union in 1923. Farmers in the United States who
had been shipping grain to the starving Russians were now worried about an
export crop of two to five million tons of Soviet wheat. That summer, a group of
farm state congressmen traveled to Russia. They hoped to offer credits, along with
agricultural equipment, in order to encourage the Soviets not to sell their surplus
to Germany until commodity prices rose. 125
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With this clear evidence that the Soviet regime had weathered the crisis,
there were renewed calls from ARA representatives in Russia for improving re-
lat~ons with Moscow. Goodrich stated that the organization's leadership "almost
without exception" had "reached the conclusion ... that we ought to open up
trade relations with Russia." Col. William Haskell, the head of relief operations in
Russia, also became an active proponent of improved Soviet-American relations.
And Frank Golder, a relief official who would later direct the Hoover War Library
at Stanford University, said in 1922 that "it would be best for Russia and the
world to tie up with the Soviet authorities." Such a step would help the "right
wing of the Communists," he added. 126
Goodrich was the most influential, as well as the most vocal, among these·
men because of his close access to both Hoover and the president. He rarely dis-
cussed the matter with Secretary Hughes, whose "technical lawyer" perspective,
he said, made discussion unproductive. But he did talk to others, including the
powerful Sen. Henry Cabot Lodge on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
Lodge opposed recognition of Russia as strongly as Borah advocated it. Goodrich
noted, "I called his attention to the ratification even of the Sinclair [oil] conces-
sion and told him that Chicherin had said to me that every treaty and contract
made by the Government would be carried OUt."127
Although the American Relief Administration certainly had not made NEP
or Soviet society more oriented to liberal capitalism, as Hoover had once hoped,
it did stabilize the Bolshevik regime and thus created the opportunity for a bur-
geoning Soviet-American economic relationship in the 1920s. Christine White
suggests that the American response to the famine so eclipsed the meager British
contribution that it pushed the Soviets increasingly toward commercial relations
with the United States despite the existing Anglo-Soviet agreement. Moreover,
Robert Murray contends that Hoover's ARA effort "convinced him of [Soviet]
trade potential." Indeed, though lacking State Department authorization, members
of the American Relief Administration had served as "trade scouts" in Russia. 128
Hoover, however, could never bring himself to agree with Goodrich on the
legitimacy of the Bolshevik regime. His litmus test for recognition was one issue:
debts. Shortly after seizing power, the Soviets had renounced the $187 million
that the U.S. Treasury had extended to the provisional government as well as the
$86 million that American banks had lent to the tsarist regime. 129 Central to Her-
bert Hoover's outlook, and a reflection of his Quaker upbringing, was a passion
for cooperation and voluntarism, whether among nations abroad or businesses at
home. Soviet Russia, in his view, had showed it would not cooperate with the
maxims of international law by its repudiation of foreign debts and nationaliza-
tion of properties. Hoover's emphasis on the debt issue suggests that his objection
to the Bolsheviks was less related to anti-Soviet ideology than it was to Moscow's
refusal to conduct itself in what he considered civilized international behavior.
Despite these beliefs, in a gesture of humanitarianism in 1921, Hoover suggested
to Harding that the international war debts be canceled. The European countries
collectively owed $9.6 billion to the United States. This suggestion "shocked his
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colleagues," writes David Burner, and by the fall of 1922, perhaps owing to public
pressure, Hoover was urging that they be repaid in full, although he was willing to
make concessions on interest payments. Hoover served as one of five members of
the World War Foreign Debt Commission, which operated between 1922 and
1927. The commission, along with the more significant Dawes and Young Plans,
set up a number of payment schedules, almost none of which were met. Since the
Soviet Union was not recognized by the United States, its debt did not come up
for negotiation by the Foreign Debt Commission, although the principal and inter-
est of Russian debts totaled $260 million by 1926.130
ECONOMIC FOREIGN POLICY
UNDER HARDING
Herbert Hoover brought up his concern with Soviet unpaid obligations almost im-
mediately after he entered the Commerce Department. He pronounced that "com-
munism and long term credits are incompatible" because "no one would trust men
who repudiated debts and agreements whenever it suited them."l Nevertheless,
within a few years, Hoover's own department would be among the vanguard of
Washington agencies in facilitating Soviet-American trade, both financed and un-
financed. Hoover is known for his successful practice of corporatism, first at the
Commerce Department and later in the White House. During Hoover's eight
years at Commerce, as Robert H. Zieger writes, this once soporific agency revived
to become "the epitome of progressive government ... combining scientific man-
agement, organized cooperation and private initiative." In this way, Hoover car-
ried Progressivism into the 1920s.2 Businessmen were pleased at Hoover's steps
in the department, and they especially welcomed his aggressive efforts to promote
foreign trade by finding markets for domestic products at the Bureau of Foreign
and Domestic Commerce (BFDC).
In an effort to professionalize this division, Hoover selected Julius Klein, an
eminent economics professor, to direct it. The bureau became very successful.
In late 1921, seven thousand inquiries flowed in weekly. Within a year, this figure
had doubled and by 1924, more than quadrupled. Foreign trade was now a
priority for many businesses, and the u.S. Chamber of Commerce lobbied Con-
gress to appropriate an additional $250,000 to support foreign trade functions and
staff for the Commerce Department. The American Manufacturers' Export Asso-
ciation wanted a separate department of overseas commerce established. Hoover
boasted about his department's contribution to the strength of American foreign
trade and was pleased that exports, only ten percent of the economy's gross na-
tional product before the war, were growing significantly. He was especially grat-
ified that British trade journals "credit our stronger position in this matter very
considerably to the service built up by the Department of Commerce."3
This campaign did not neglect Soviet-American trade. Hoover, according to
his secretary, was "very much interested in any trade relations with Russia." Ray-
mond Robins reported that Hoover had told him "confidentially" in early 1921
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that he saw Soviet-American trade as being "right and necessary without delay."
In his first month in office, the commerce secretary announced in a press confer-
ence that for the health of the global economy, nothing was more vital than "the
recovery of productivity in Russia." But in the same breath, Hoover predicted that
American firms would have "no consequential trade" with Moscow. Russia had
traditionally relied on food exports to finance its purchases abroad, and its current
severe grain shortage would preclude much trade.4
In pursuit of what he felt was the right policy for Soviet-American relations,
Hoover did not mind stepping on the toes of other cabinet-level colleagues. Early
in his term, he complained that other federal departments were restricting potential
growth of American sales to Moscow. He attacked the Treasury's ban on Soviet
bullion, pointing out that firms wishing to trade with Russia had to compete with
British companies not subject to a ban. "We could immediately start up some
export to Bolshevik Russia if our people were allowed to receive Bolshevik gold,"
he declared. Hoover was well aware that market forces eventually attracted to the
United States much of the Soviet gold initially shipped to other countries. This
gold could enter the United States as long as it came under "the mint mark or coin-
age stamp of any friendly recognized nation." As a Treasury undersecretary con-
ceded, such gold was accepted "as free from any suspicion or possibility of Soviet
origin." The Federal Reserve confirmed that by the end of 1922, French and Swed-
ish purchases and payments had supplied the United States with nearly $300 mil-
lion in Soviet gold, making bullion supplies "largely Russian" in origin. In 1928
the Soviet news agency Tass pointed out that Reserve officials were "always ...
confident that whatever gold Soviet exported would ultimately arrive [in] Ameri-
can coffers." Tass asserted that this gold had served to compensate for the 1921 de-
pression. But Treasury Secretary Andrew W. Mellon was adamant that no Soviet
gold had been assayed by his staff for eight years.5
In addition to his opposition to the ban on gold, Hoover also disagreed with
Secretary Hughes's proposal that German intermediaries resume their prewar
practice of brokering America's Russian trade. Hoover protested that renewing
this system contradicted his department's "policies ... for [a] commercial and
economic relationship to Russia." He declared that compared to Germans,
"Americans are infinitely more popular in Russia and our Government more
deeply respected." Owing to Russians' "racial sympathy" toward Americans, they
would find German intermediaries a "crushing disappointment," he added.6
In an internal State Department memo, Assistant Secretary Frederick Dear-
-ing sharply dissented from Hoover's statements, particularly his idea of "racial
sympathy." Direct commerce with the Soviets was preferable, Dearing agreed,
but indirect sales through Germany should not be discouraged where they were
the best available option. Moreover, Dearing criticized Hoover for completely
overlooking the importance of German economic rehabilitation to the United
States. Washington wanted to use Russian trade to build up Germany and thus
strengthen the entire European economy.7 If Hoover had decided on some
other, "definite" scheme for Soviet-American trade, he ought to make the State
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Department aware of it since "his broad policies are of such a nature that they in-
volve the conduct of this nation's foreign affairs."8 The State DepC:lrtment had
good reason for concern about Hoover's involvement. Throughout the 1920s, the
commerce secretary was the most influential official in matters relating to Soviet-
American economic relations.
The challenge of German competition continued to concern American
representatives. Samuel H. Cross, acting American commercial attache in Bel-
gium, intimated in 1922 that "this conception of the Germans as the chosen
people to rebuild Russia for the rest of the world should be fought down with all
possible means." If the United States allowed German "domination of Russian
economic life," warned Cross, it would lose the ability to wield its own "desirable
future economic influence." At a conference of commercial attaches in Europe
that year, attendees agreed that although American firms would use German mid-
dlemen to aid in the reconstruction of Russia, "the U.S. Government should not
support existing German-British plans for a greater German expansion into
Russia than those two countries can jointly finance, nor encourage American capi-
tal to furnish Germany or Great Britain credits for those plans which ... may be
detrimental to the future interests of the United States and Russia." As it turned
out, the Dawes Plan certainly helped finance German-Soviet trade via private
American loans to Germany.9
In order to learn what possibilities existed for trade with Russia in 1921, the
Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce assigned three trade commissioners
to the Baltic region and central Europe, including Felix Cole, who had headed the
State Department's Division of Russian Affairs during 1920. Frederick Dearing
carefully advised diplomatic and consular officers in Europe about the Commerce
Department's delegation: "It is not so much the purpose of the investigation to
promote immediate trade with Russia as to enable this Government later to in-
form American business interests when the proper time shall have arrived for
large scale commercial operations and investments." The Commerce Department
could get no closer to Moscow than its consulate in Riga, Latvia, an outpost six
hundred miles from the Bolshevik capital that nevertheless became the center of
intelligence on Russian developments. lo
In November 1921, as part of the BFDC's reorganization effort and in rec-
ognition of the breakup of the old tsarist empire, its Russian Division became part
of a new Eastern European Division, run by Dr. E. Dana Durand. A former pro-
fessor at Harvard, Durand had worked for International Harvester in Russia
before the revolution. He had later served as a trade commissioner in Vladivostok
and Riga, as well as joined an investigative mission in Bolshevik Hungary.
Durand recommended to Hoover that the "quickest way to bring about the desired
reforms is by participating in commerce and investment." To enable businessmen
to learn more about Russian opportunities, his division issued bulletins and circu-
lars, based largely on Soviet publications, and drew an eager response. A survey
by the Russian Division in 1921 attracted replies from "nearly 8,000 concerns that
declared themselves interested in the Russian field."ll
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While all of this energetic fact-finding was under way in his department,
Hoover remained wary. In December 1921 he noted, "for the first time I now see
signs of change with regard to Russia." Eventually, he believed, "Americans will
be in position to take a great leadership in reconstruction work."12 President Hard-
ing agreed with his commerce secretary's assessment. "I hope the day will soon
be at hand," he wrote, when "we may ... resume commercial relations." But five
months later, Hoover was still convinced that "discussion of economic relation-
ships are a waste of time" until conditions in Russia changed. 13
His cautious approach reflected reality. As the Soviet Trade Delegation in
London acknowledged at that time, Russia "is obligated to limit foreign trade to
fundamental necessaries" since the treasury was short of hard currency.14 This
situation was reflected in trade figures. In 1921, for instance, while Soviet Russia
was suffering from famine, its total imports amounted to only $120 million, less
than one-fifth of the prewar tally. 15
Although Hoover adamantly opposed the philosophy and operation of the
Bolshevik regime, he looked forward to the opportunity of trading with Moscow
and saw economic intercourse as one of the more effective ways of bringing
Russia into the "civilized" world. As he contended in one of his more famous pro-
nouncements, "whatever goods could filter to Russia would relieve just that much
individual misery and ... it would be well for the world to lift the curtain on this
experiment in economics." Hoover's views of the Soviet Union developed from
an amalgam of beliefs, one of which was his strong opposition to communism,
but another of which was his equally vigorous conviction about Russia's potential
as a trading partner. Businessmen joined him in this outlook, intermingling their
dislike for the Bolshevik regime with an avid desire for that government's "real
money" and an appreciation for its commercial opportunities, particularly with
the onset of NEP.16
The members of his department promoted Soviet trade aggressively, and the
BFDC was at the forefront of these efforts. In 1922 the head of the Bureau's
Automotive Division, Gordon Lee, declared, "If there is any business . . . for
American motor truck manufacturers, we want to help them." Soviet-American
trade began to rise dramatically in 1923, and with Moscow's need for increasing
levels of credit, the BFDC's Finance and Investment Division stepped forward
with a special circular about Soviet financing. Commerce Department staff also
made a point of familiarizing themselves with the Soviet agencies that opened in
the early twenties in New York, including Allied American Corporation (Alamer-
ico) and Amtorg, and sending interested businessmen their way. Such efforts did
not go unnoticed by the Soviet agents. S.D. Winderman of Alamerico was grati-
fied that "the Chief of the Department in Washington thinks so well of us ... it
shows what can be accomplished."I?
By 1924 U.S. sales to Russia were $42.1 million, out of a total U.S.-Soviet
trade turnover of $50.3 million, and within four years overall trade had doubled to
$100 million. 18 This compared favorably to the prewar record. Between 1910 and
1914 American exports to Russia averaged $25 million annually.19 Hoover was
66 LOANS AND LEGITIMACY
pleased that the American positive trade balance with the Soviet Union had sur-
passed that of countries that had opened relations with Moscow, including several
of its traditional prewar trading partners. He believed that withholding recognition
contributed to the growth of trade by encouraging Moscow to try to win Washing-
ton's favor. 2o
Hoover's basis for rejecting recognition of Russia was anchored to the
Colby note ofAugust 1920 and the Hughes statement of March 1921. These docu-
ments were not materials with which to build a thriving trade relationship.Never-
theless, Hoover did so. Contemporary observers, as well as historians, have
contended that Hoover's protrade posture was a contradiction of his own antirec-
ognition policy.21 This view is now undergoing some revision. Andrew J. Williams
recently explained Hoover's distinct views on trade and recognition this way: "to
have banned trade with Russia would have implied a degree of state· intervention
in the economic life that Hoover and most Americans would have found unaccept-
able, while Hoover's refusal to recognize Russia was widely accepted."22 But this
interpretation does not go far enough. Rather than refraining from banning trade,
Hoover actively worked to facilitate it by pushing for eased fiscal regulations to
allow firms to offer long-term financing to the Soviet Union.
The growth of financial ties between the two nations despite the absence of
relations is evidence of the success of policies of the Commerce Department fol-
lowed later by the· State Department. Large credits came from banks, including
Chase National, Guaranty Trust, and Equitable Trust, and from firms like General
Electric and American Locomotive Sales Corporation, as well as from smaller
businesses.23 Supporters of better Soviet-American relations were impressed by
Hoover's actions. Norman Hapgood, former ambassador to Denmark and a lead-
ing supporter of Soviet recognition, declared in 1923 that "Hoover has swung
around on the Russian situation." His attitude compared favorably to Hughes's,
who, as Gumberg complained, "learned his lesson from Colby and sticks to it."
Isaiah Hurgin, a Soviet trade representative in the United States, was also heart-
ened by Hoover's declaration that no ban on Soviet commerce existed. Hurgin felt
that this was "a direct blessing on trade with the United States." In September
1925 Alexander Gumberg met with Hoover and came away convinced that the
secretary was "very much interested in the Russian situation" and "fully aware of
the economic revival" that had taken place in the Soviet Union. Gumberg attrib-
uted this to Relief Administration leaders Goodrich and Haskell's continuing ad-
visement of Hoover.24
Such was the interest of the Commerce Department in matters Russian that
E.C. Ropes had announced to D.D. Borodin of the Soviet agricultural agency in
New York that he was "deeply interested" in sending a department agent to Russia
to help conduct the preliminary census of 1926 and, along with an Agriculture
Department agent, "help the Russian government whip its annual agricultural sta-
tistics into shape."25
So strong, indeed, was the belief that the Commerce secretary's views on
the Soviet Union were being shaped by pro-Russian counsels that Gumberg was
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shocked when rumors surfaced that Hoover had expressed an opposing per-
spective. The New York Times leaked a story in 1925 that a Washington "high of-
ficial" who was active in the promotion of foreign trade had denounced Soviet·
plans to purchase $300 million annually in the United States as being "propa-
ganda pure and simple." Suspecting that the unnamed pro~inent official could
only be Hoover, Gumberg was outraged. Sales to Moscow were then over the
$70 million yearly mark, and "with proper credits and with good crops" there was
no reason why the figure of $300 million was not attainable, in his view. Senator
Borah, too, suspected that a two-faced Hoover was the newspaper's source: "A
certain prominent gentleman who is talking one way to one class of people and
talking another way to another class of people flatters himself that he is doing so
without being uncovered.... In my opinion, he is an unmitigated hypocrite."
George Barr Baker, Hoover's publicist, rushed to Hoover's defense. Confessing to
feeling "touchy" about the whole matter, Baker declared that the secretary could
not possibly have been the person quoted since Hoover had only recently refused
to discuss the trade issue with Walter Duranty, the Times correspondent who
wrote about Russia. "He has not talked with a newspaper man for some time,"
Baker asserted. He added, "It would be typical of Mr. Hoover to speak with frank-
ness to you but it would have been totally untypical of him then to have talked in
a different vein for publication in a newspaper." Gumberg was much relieved and
told Goodrich, "I am very glad that Mr. Hoover is not to blame for that interview,
and that we can count him among our friends."26
~ THE GENOA CONFERENCE
Although the United States would be only peripherally involved in diplomatic
moves to reintegrate Moscow into the world economic system, Europeans were
less dissuaded from dealing with the Bolsheviks because of their greater need for
past payments from and future trade with Moscow. In London, Paris, and Brus-
sels, banks, firms, and bondholders had experienced huge losses in the Russian
revolution, and they continued to feel acutely the weakened Russian market, now
hobbled by war and starvation. In early October 1921, twenty-one nations (but not
Russia) had sent representatives' to Brussels for a conference on the Russian
famine. The conferees agreed upon aid to Russia, but only if the Soviets acknowl-
edged their debts and made commitments on the security of future credits. The
Soviets were interested, particularly now that NEP had encouraged a retreat from
revolutionary foreign policy. On October 28, Chicherin responded by announcing
that his government was ready to acknowledge the debts owed to the Allied
powers with the quid pro quo that the Soviets be awarded loans, recognition, and
a peace treaty as well as reciprocity between Allied claims against Russia and
damages caused by the Allied intervention. He proposed an international confer-
ence on the entire issue.27
This Soviet opening toward the West also gained a receptive response.
German foreign minister Walter Rathenau, prominent leader of A.E.G. Corpora-
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tion, had since 1918 been eager to create in Russia "an economic dominion
which would enable the Reich to ... eventually become again a world power of
the first rank." Rathenau still saw Russia in semicolonial terms as both a market
and a source of raw material. Well aware that it was necessary to act together
with the Allies in order to raise sufficient money, he approached British and
French representatives to suggest that they join in a consortium in which Ger-
many would rebuild the railway system, refurbish industrial installations, and ex-
ploit mines in Russia. One-half of Germany's profits from the venture, Rathenau
proposed, would be used to pay reparations.28 In December, Lloyd George,
Prime Minister Aristide Briand and Finance Minister Louis Loucheur of France,
and Rathenau and other German business representatives held discussions on a
plan for an international syndicate with British, French, and German participa-
tion to promote reconstruction in Soviet Russia. 29
Lloyd George packaged together elements of both Chicherin's debt initiative
and the Western consortium and, at a meeting of the Allied Supreme Economic
Council in Cannes in January 1922, persuaded Briand to agree to a European eco-
nomic conference at Genoa that April for the purpose of rebuilding European trade.
The "Cannes Conditions" insisted that the Soviet government must pay Russian
debts in order to receive credit assistance. Yet as Carole Fink notes, the French
hope for "a straightforward Anglo-French military alliance" was spumed by Lloyd
George, who dealt "heavy-handedly" with Briand. The French prime minister re-
signed from his government soon thereafter. 30
Lloyd George had a very different view from the French on the postwar
European order, as Jon Jacobson points out. The British prime minister saw
Genoa as part of his "Grand Design" of British-led European reconstruction and
disarmament. He rejected the existing mechanisms of collective security, in-
cluding Versailles and the League covenant, bec.ause he saw them as destabilizing.
Lloyd George believed that a general peace treaty with Russia and economic re-
construction of the Soviet state would encourage international investment and
trade, as well as generate more British jobs and exports. He further hoped that this
wou~d "bring the United States-attracted by the promise of European disarma-
ment-back to Europe both as a generous creditor ... and as a guarantor of
peace." Raymond Poincare, who replaced Briand, was certainly interested in
Soviet reconstruction. He also wanted a repayment schedule from Moscow before
any credits were offered. Unlike Lloyd George, however, he had no interest in
general disarmament or any other "schemes to supplant the League of Nations"
and refused to allow this subject, along with the issue of reparations, on the
agenda. 31
While the French and British representatives were meeting in Cannes,
Soviet officials Krestinskii, Krasin, and Radek were in Berlin in an attempt to
reach a diplomatic and economic settlement with German government and busi-
ness representatives. Chicherin was not interested in the imperialistic-sounding
consortium and hoped instead to detach Germany from the Allies with a signed fi-
nancial agreement. Soviet newspapers had applied pressure with angry articles
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decrying foreign exploitation, even suggesting that Russia should sign the Ver-
sailles treaty and take reparations from Germany. Yet as Robert Himmer suggests,
Germany could not pay for "both substantial and independent aid as the Soviets
wished." Rathenau, moreover, wanted to wait until the Genoa conference before
acting.32 The German-Soviet agreement thus hit a roadblock.
These various proposals would unravel at the Genoa conference. Even
before the meeting, Lenin had asserted that his government had no obligation to
follow the Cannes conditions. 33 At Genoa, Chicherin and Krasin expressed their
keen interest in obtaining significant financial assistance immediately; Chicherin
told the conferees that he needed "a big loan" of about $2 billion.34 If this was
not possible, the Soviet representatives would accept credits to purchase Western
goods. Only if they gained "credits to an amount approximating their require-
ments" would the promised recognition of Western debts be considered and the
Kremlin's own counterclaims for the Allied intervention be renounced. 35 British
and French representatives assured Russia of its right to German reparations. 36
But they also insisted that there could only be extensive credits after the Kremlin
made a commitment on the old obligations, and Chicherin rejected these terms,
insisting on reciprocal treatment for the Soviet claims. This impasse proved to be
unbridgeable.37
The United States had been invited to Genoa, but Hughes sent only an un-
official observer, American Ambassador to Italy Richard Washburn Child. The
secretary would not allow his envoys to sit with their Russian counterparts. 38 The
Free Press reported that the Genoa discussions and their potential for accelerated
British-Soviet trade brought "enormous pressure ... on the administration to 'lib-
eralize' its Russian policy." Advocates of Soviet-American trade, meanwhile,
"bombarded Congress and cabinet officers with appeals." Secretary Hughes suc-
cessfully countered this pressure by enlisting the support of Samuel Gompers, the
president of the American Federation of Labor.
Gompers was in the midst of fighting a communist takeover of his organi-
zation and vehemently opposed the opening of relations between the United
States and Soviet Russia. Referring to the Anglo-Soviet trade treaty, he declared,
"The British government ... succumbed to the 'trade with Russia' propaganda,
but it got no trade and admits that it got no trade." Despite the interest of many
American workmen in Soviet orders, confirmed at the State Department where
dozens of union resolutions calling for trade relations were received, Gompers
continued, "American labor is uncompromising in its opposition ... and it sees
no reason for going to Genoa to do what America elsewhere has refused to do."
Gompers had reason to distrust the Soviets and their friends in the United States.
The executive committee of the Comintern had proclaimed in 1921, "The attrac-
tion of the broad proletariat masses to the movement of the revolutionary class
struggle is one of the many tasks of the American Communists at the present
moment . . . the party must with all its strength rapidly create a split in the
AFL and establish strong centralized economic organizations of the working
class."39
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Chicherin was dismayed at the United States' absence at Genoa. "What is
the matter with America? America would be a favored nation in Russia and we
are desirous of establishing relations," he lamented. Ambassador Child was told
that "Russia has more faith in the United States than in any other nation" because
Chicherin saw the United States as better equipped to help his country.40
Raymond Robins was convinced that what happened at the Genoa confer-
ence could be very important. "If any sort of agreement is arrived at there be-
tween Russia and England ... our policy on Russia will change." But if nothing
happened, he fretted, "we will revert to the old policy with more enthusiasm than
ever before." His concerns were so strong during the conference that they inter-
rupted his sleep. He wanted Alexander Gumberg to persuade Borah to make a
rousing speech in the Senate in support of recognition. Robins exclaimed, "This is
the Hour to Strike for Free Russia!" The timing was crucial, he believed. "We are
nearer results than at any time in the past, and yet if we fail now [it] very well
may be used at the critical moment against Russia."41
But it was the Germans and Soviets who were closest to reaching results at
Genoa, rather than any of the Allies. On April 16 Soviet and German diplomats
signed a pact at the nearby resort of Rapallo that officially restored Russo-
German diplomatic and economic relations. This was a disastrous development
for the Western powers, who found their leverage over Russia now much reduced.
It ultimately would lead to the breakup of the conference, as Lenin recognized.42
For Chicherin and for his government, as one historian notes, the Rapallo agree-
ment was "a great diplomatic and moral triumph" through which "the Soviets
were able to prevent the formation of a common front against Bolshevism."43 It
matched Chicherin's strategy "not only to unearth separate interests but also to
play on the rivalry of separate countries" and would. be the sole discernible ac-
complishment of the Genoa conference. Bilateral negotiations like those with
Germany, Chicherin believed, were "the best means of struggle against the inter-
national united enemy front. Above all, it is necessary to make good use of the in-
fluence of politics over economics, and we arrived at this in Germany."44 The
Russian government had demonstrated that it could overcome its failure to gain
general European investment at Genoa by making individual arrangements with
Western countries and firms. 45
Nevertheless, at the end of the conference, the Soviets made one last plea
for an arrangement on foreign debts and claims in the hopes of obtaining financial
assistance from the Allies.46 The British were somewhat flexible, but the French
and Belgians· were immovable, and the Soviet representatives did not get their
loan. Progress at Genoa thus ground to a halt, and this failure led the Allies to pro-
pose a second conference at the Hague the following month. When it became
clear that the British would not deal with Russia separately from France and Bel-
gium, as Chicherin wished, the Hague conference similarly stalemated over the
issue of debts and credits.47
Carole Fink suggests that the U.S. government was actually pleased that
Lloyd George's goal of unifying Europe through "activist British commercial and
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political leadership" had aborted. Its failure gave Washington the freedom to
make its own demands for debt repayment and to influence more directly repara-
tions payments, tariffs, and immigration policies.48 The United States indeed "ac-
cepted a degree of responsibility for keeping the world economy on an even keel,"
Paul Johnson writes. American banks extended $9.5 billion in loans to foreign
governments and firms by 1924, a figure that increased to $12 billion only three
years later. This money purchased government-backed paper abroad as well as in-
vestments in foreign enterprises, especially public utilities, mining, oil, and rail-
ways.49 However, as both contemporary observers and historians have affirmed,
this lending was "reckless and indiscriminate" and contributed to the stock market
crash of 1929.50
~ HOOVER PROPOSES AN ECONOMIC MISSION TO RUSSIA
Herbert Hoover was very interested in addressing "the primary question of deter-
mining what purpose America can serve in the broad, economic regeneration of
Russia." In July 1922 Hoover suggested an exploratory economic mission to be
sent to Russia, in part to determine whether his American Relief Administration's
assistance was still needed. This mission would serve as the American alternative
to Genoa. It would include two to three dozen businessmen and would gather in-
formation regarding "the application of American capital for restoring industry,
transport, and other items."51
Alexander Gumberg was the originator of this idea, which he persuaded
Robins to impress upon Hoover.52 Robins had contacted Hoover in June, suggest-
ing a commission "to consider the economic necessities of the Russian people
with a view to advising the U.S. Government with respect to the necessity for ad-
ditional measures of relief during the coming" winter ... [and] with a view to rec-
ommending to the Russian Authorities concrete remedies, and to the United
States Government the basis ... upon which the Government and its citizens may
cooperate in the economic restoration of Russia."53
Robins suggested that Dwight Morrow, George Sutherland, James P. Good-
rich, Thomas D. Thacher, and Allen Wardwell should serve on the commission,
with Alexander Gumberg serving as attache. Hoover did not generally agree with
Robins's approach toward Soviet Russia, but the idea of combining a relief trip
with an investigation struck him as a good one.54
Secretary of State Hughes willingly signed on to the Robins-Hoover pro-
posal, noting that the trip would demonstrate the United States' commitment to
"find out the facts and shape our policy in accordance with them." The State De-
partment instructed its ambassador to Germany, Alanson B. Houghton, to contact
Commissar Chicherin to gauge his government's interest in hosting a contingent
of American businessmen on this exploratory economic mission. Houghton was
not the ideal candidate for this task. He felt that the United States ought to remain
"passive" rather than initiate action with Moscow, lest Soviet representatives think
that Washington was capitulating, which would damage the chances of a more
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"conservative" group from getting into power in Russia.55 Nevertheless, he carried
out his duties.
Washington's proposal was examined by a foreign affairs commissar highly
sensitive to the way foreign bourgeois elements treated his government. The or-
ganizers of the nine-nation Washington Armaments Conference sponsored by the
United States that past winter had neglected to include Moscow even though the
meeting's agenda contained issues of vital concern to Russia.56 This slight had an-
gered Chicherin. However, he still saw the United States as a junior partner to
Britain, "'the cream of capitalist society."'57 He was, moreover, reluctant to em-
brace the very notion of a foreign investigation of virtually every facet of the
Soviet economy. The plan was, he said, "an attempt to transform Russia into
Turkey or Egypt," and no Soviet official was prepared to see the country so carved
up and colonized. Nonetheless, the commissar did not immediately reject the
idea, since he felt it had prospects of meeting "various aspirations" of his govern-
ment. The investments and credits that the newly proposed mission might gener-
ate, for instance, would be welcome. In order to take advantage of this potential
bounty, Krasin suggested that a Soviet commission be established to work with
the visiting Americans. This commission would include representatives of the Na-
tional Commissariats of Foreign Trade and Foreign Affairs, Gosplan (the state
planning board), and the Chief Concessions Committee. By pairing these official
agencies-all integral components of the economic machinery of the Soviet
Union-with the visiting delegation, Moscow underscored its view of the signifi-
cant prospects of the mission.58
Despite Ambassador Houghton's suspicions about the value of his proposal,
he approached Commissars Chicherin and Krasin as an enthusiastic envoy. At a
breakfast meeting with them, the ambassador declared he would recommend
"with confidence" that Secretary of State Hughes should "appeal to Russia and
suggest the sending ... of [the] American committee of experts for the prepara-
tion of economic relations." Chicherin did not want the commission admitted,
however, before the two governments involved had met to discuss Moscow's
"concrete conditions." One of these was that the visiting delegates should stay out
of Russia's internal affairs. Then came the quid pro quo. In order to be sure that
the American visit was not tainted by any perception of Soviet inferiority, Chich-
erin pronounced that the delegation could come to his country "only under condi-
tion of the admittance in America ... of our representatives for investigation of
the American market."59 This Soviet insistence on "national honor" was surprising
to some veteran observers, like Gumberg.60
Chicherin's request was echoed in the Soviet press, where a reporter com-
plained that the "one-sided dispatch of an inquiry committee clearly is a contra-
diction to the principles of the equal rights of both sides." Reciprocity was very
important to the fledgling Soviet state, as had been evident at Genoa. Krasin
pointed out to the Central Committee that American representatives had already
been in Russia with the American Relief Administration, and therefore the United
States should be willing to meet Moscow "halfway" with a bilateral exchange.
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Krasin did acknowledge, however, that "without a preliminary ... or even re-
peated acquaintance with general Soviet landscape, American capital will not
come to work in Russia."61
Although the Soviets desired reciprocity, at least one of their representatives
liked the idea of an American mission. The head of the former Far Eastern Repub-
lic mission to the United States, Yazikov, found the idea of a visiting delegation
reason for optimism, believing it would "hasten a favorable decision on the Rus-
sian question in the United States. I think the next meeting in the cabinet will
stand for restoring relations with Soviet Russia."62 But facing both a demand for a
reciprocal commission and the expectation of a new American policy, Ambassa-
dor Houghton was displeased. "So far the only result of our proposing a commis-
sion has been to convince the Russians that the United States is changing its
attitude." Secretary Hughes would have nothing to do with Moscow's counterof-
fer. Soviet leaders had not made it "desirable" to "make any proposition to them,"
he sniffed.63
While the Secretary of State had been pursuing this commission through his
German ambassador, the Secretary of Commerce was also working on the effort
via unofficial channels. In August, Hoover persuaded his friend Goodrich to lobby
Raymond Robins to contact the Soviet government. This was a mistaken strategy,
because Robins distrusted the secretary's motives. He was, moreover, taken aback
at the "Hoover-centric" proposal that Goodrich presented to him. As he described
it to Alexander Gumberg, Robins was to contact the Soviet government "to ask
for a commission and to ask that 'Hoover be chairman.... If this is done Russia
will be recognized at least in the matter of trade relations within
60 days.... [Goodrich] spoke of Hoover as willing to give two years of his life to
the 'help' of Russia. It was all Hoover from beginning to end." Robins could only
scoff, "I would not wish Hoover on the Soviet in a million years. Russia is a rich
morsel for the hungry wolves of the capitalist world!"64
Robins was soon pestered again by Goodrich, and again he vented to Gum-
berg in disgust: "Your friend said that I should help to get the Soviet.Government
to accept the Hughes note. In other words, have them confess all that the propa-
gandists have said and then ask for mercy, a commission, and Mr. H.H. as chief."
Robins was increasingly convinced of an ulterior motive in Hoover's support for
the commission. "I have regarded the purpose would be Kyshtim and the Russo-
Asiatic Corporation-not freedom for the Russian people." Robins, who won-
dered if Hoover's commission might try to overthrow the Soviet government once
it arrived, did not think the Soviets "should ask for Herbert Hoover without other
courageous free men on the Commission."65
In the end, the commission never went to Russia. Hughes interpreted the
Soviet request for permission to send a delegation to the United States in Sep-
tember as a "definite refusal" of Washington's proposal, and he considered the
matter closed. This failure came as no surprise to President Harding, who had
correctly predicted that the Soviet governmen~ would want reciprocal treatment.
Still, the president wished the matter had been handled with more discretion. "I
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should have preferred to intimate (to the Soviets] in a diplomatic way," he told a
member of Hughes's staff, "that the investigation ... was to furnish the under-
standing essential to the proper consideration of the relations between America
and Russia."66
Soviet Communist party officials were critical of the way that American
"fumbling" had made it necessary for them to reject the mission. But ultimately,
as a party report noted in late 1922, the overture had revealed Washington's desire
for influence in Russian reconstruction. "Our refusing the one-sided commission
and our emphasis on the principle of reciprocity ... did not prevent the press from
looking into the matter of finding some way for official rapprochement with
Russia." The proposed mission had kindled a different outlook in political. and
business circles as well, demonstrating "an undoubted shift from the shrill nega-
tive approach toward entry into negotiations with the Soviet government."67
Above all, the party believed, the commission's origin was based on Ameri-
can financial need, "an inevitable consequence of the West European crisis, which
had economically isolated the U.S. and resulted directly in a great social-
economic shock in America." Political consequences of this crisis were already
apparent, the report stated. "If this situation continues, it will be a large minus for
the Republican Party in the next presidential election." The Republicans had al-
ready suffered "partial defeat" in recent midterm elections. The party analysis
held that Russia's opportunity lay squarely in this poor economic environment.
"Rapprochement with Russia, as a large market, is dictated with particular persis-
tence. It becomes still more urgent in view of Russia's gaining entrance to the
Pacific Ocean, where Japanese-American relations are the object of constant dis-
turbing concern with the U.S."68
This sanguine outlook was based upon a common conception in Soviet
thinking. Officials believed that economic imperatives drove the foreign policy of
the capitalistic United States. This focus on economic factors neglected the idea-
listic and moralistic components of New Era foreign policy. Yet the party's
geopolitical understanding was prescient. Japanese expansionism would be an im-
portant factor in bringing American recognition to Russia, although it would not
occur for another decade.
The party's official analysis zeroed in on the forces behind the aborted com-
mission, but it did not ignore the motivations of the individuals involved. Harding
and Hughes '''completely if unofficially' gave in to thoughts of the desirability of
rapprochement" by their authoring of the mission. In addition to planning a dele-
gation, the party pointed out, the administration had already resorted to "that fa-
vorite method of the American government, dispatching 'its little man' ." This was
unofficial liaison Meyer Bloomfield, a friend of D.C. Poole. Bloomfield worked
discreetly between the State Department and Moscow, communicating with the
Bolsheviks without the need for either side to formally acknowledge him. He had
made two trips to Moscow in 1922, the first for information for the State and
Labor Departments, and the second on his own.69
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The continuing if quiet role of Bloomfield was a sign that the mission idea
was not entirely dead. Moreover, the Soviet government had been informed pri-
vately that if its leaders would make the next overture, Soviet reciprocity would
"possibly" be respected. Deciding to act, Chicherin revived his plan for a Soviet
mission to the United States in late 1922, suggesting that a "Russian Bureau for
Trade Information" be established in New York as a first step toward trade re-
lations. Bloomfield, working as Chicherin's intermediary, asked Poole if the
United States would be willing to approve such an office "provided that a similar
American bureau will be admitted to Russia." But Hughes again opposed such an
exchange because it would appear that America was preparing the way for diplo-
matic recognition.70
Meanwhile, American-Russian Chamber of Commerce president S. R. Ber-
tron suggested to Hughes that because of the increased interest in trade in both
countries, it might be beneficial to dispatch a mission of businessmen to Moscow.
The secretary told Bertron that he was not sure the situation merited "much hope"
but said his department would nonetheless "lend ... assistance in all suitable and
practical ways." An internal State Department memorandum noted, however,
that since the American-Russian Chamber of Commerce "has done much anti-
Bolshevik propaganda," the mission would be "less effective" if it were conducted
solely under the chamber's auspices.7 } The State Department's concern about this
issue was curious but was in all likelihood sincere.
In December, Bloomfield met with Boris Skvirskii to discuss the idea of a
Russian mission. Skvirskii had previously represented the Far Eastern Republic,
absorbed into Soviet Russia in 1922, which was why he was permitted to have an
office in Washington. Two months later, Maxim Litvinov sent Bloomfield to see
Poole, Hughes, and Harding. Bloomfield later informed Gumberg that these offi-
cials had told him that the trade delegation "was dead because of the reciprocity
requirements ."72
The Soviet government's disappointment with this decision was demon-
strated by Chicherin, who took the opportunity to lecture an American official,
Julian Gillespie. The occasion where both men were present was the Lausanne
Conference in Switzerland, which was held to negotiate a peace treaty between
the World War Allies and Turkey. "By refusing to accept a Russian trade
delegation," Chicherin told Gillespie, Washington "was treating Russia as an un-
equal . . . inferior nation." When Gillespie responded that Russia "should' be
willing to be regarded as an unequal, at least temporarily," because it desired rec-
ognition and trade more than Washington did, the commissar of foreign affairs
found this "degrading and unpleasant." Despite the mission's failure, Chicherin
pointed out to Litvinov that it had demonstrated the American "desir[e] for rap-
prochement" in the area of trade, confirming a gradual evolution in Soviet-
American relations that bombastic statements such as the Colby note only
masked.73
THE SOVIET COMMERCIAL
MISSIONS UNDER HARDING,
COOLIDGE, AND HOOVER
When the Soviets had requested that a trade mission be accepted in America, a
Russian group was already in the United States: the Special Trade Delegation of
the Far Eastern Republic (FER), headed by Alexander A. Yazikov and Boris
Skvirskii. This Siberian delegation had attempted to gain diplomatic recognition
at the Washington Conference of 1921-1922, but failed, as the conference recog-
nized that "the delegation ... is closely allied with the present Soviet Govern-
ment of Russia." The FER was indeed linked with Soviet Russia; diplomatically
and militarily, in order to counter the Japanese occupation of Siberia, as well as
politically and economically. The Bureau of Investigation discovered that the
Soviet government had extended two loans to the FER, including one for $3 mil-
lion in the spring of 1922, with $10,000 set aside for "the use of the delegation in
the U.S." A cablegram announcing the $10,000 credit, addressed to "Yazikoff,
Washington," had somehow reached the old Russian embassy, redoubt of Boris
Bakhmetev. He dutifully supplied the State Department with a copy. 1
Few knowledgeable observers were surprised when on November 12, 1922,
not long after the Japanese had committed to leaving Siberia as a result of the
Washington conference, the national assembly of the Far Eastern Republic issued
a proclamation at Chita dissolving itself and joining the Soviet Union. This effec-
tively made FER representative Skvirskii Soviet Russia's "second unofficial am-
bassador to the United States."2 Skvirskii pointed out to his superiors that because
of the union of the FER and Moscow, the representative of the FER "actually will
represent part of Soviet Russia." But Secretary Hughes showed no intention of
recognizing Skvirskii except as a "private citizen." The State Department staff
met with him on an informal basis, hoping to keep its consular offices in Siberia.3
The absorption of the FER into the Soviet Union forced a reassessment of the role
of the two American representatives. Albert Fox, the enthusiastic advocate of
Soviet-American relations who reported for the Washington Post, doubted that
U.S. authorities would withdraw Vice Consul Edward B. Thomas, stationed in
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Chita, and S. Pinkney Tuck, in Vladivostok. But Soviet officials mandated that
the American consuls in Siberia had to be registered with the Soviet government,
and "the State Department, rather than be humiliated by associating with the Bol-
sheviks, [withdrew] their consuls," Fox wrote. They left in 1922.4
Like Martens before him, Skvirskii was limited by his lack of funds. He
needed $3,000 to $4,000 each month, he told Litvinov, and like his predecessor,
Skvirskii also lamented the "chronic seizures of deliveries of money which put
me in a very difficult position." He was unlikely to get more funds, for despite his
title as Soviet "commercial representative," Maxim Litvinov told Skvirskii to stay
out of Soviet-American trade. Litvinov declared that the trade was not worth it,
since Skvirskii's dealings would "not capture even the payment of telegrams." In-
stead, if businessmen wanted to trade with Moscow, they would need to contact
Soviet representatives in Berlin directly. "I understand that this creates a bigger
inco~venience for Americans, but it is not our fault if we cannot have a represen-
tative in America who could conduct preliminary discussions for us," he declared.
Yet Litvinov overlooked the unofficial discussions being conducted on Moscow's
behalf by Armand Hammer, who was already making extensive Soviet contacts
and contracts with American businessmen, as will be discussed later.5
Skvirskii's prospects for an important post improved dramatically in 1923
when Litvinov and his colleagues decided to expand their goals for the represen-
tative. The director of the Justice Department's Bureau of Investigation, Wil-
liam J. Burns, learned in July that Skvirskii had "received instructions from the
People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs to proceed immediately to legalize
himself in the United States." Skvirskii, Bums reported, was "under orders to
work silently and undercover endeavoring to secure the recognition of the Soviet
Government by the U.S. Government. He has been particularly interested in ar-
ranging for trips to Russia by U.S. Senators."6
Indeed, that month a group of senators had traveled to Russia, some of
whom were briefed by Skvirskii's assistant, Alexander Gumberg.7 According to
Bums, the Narkomindel's new initiative for the Washington delegation was based
on a perception that conditions were improving for Soviet emissaries in America.
The commissariat "did not believe that the U.S. would again repeat the action
taken in the deportation of Martens." Yet intelligence agents also learned that
Soviet officials had cautioned Skvirskii "to proceed very slowly." In September
1923 Skvirskii and his associates at the Soviet delegation boldly opened a Rus-
sian information bureau in the nation's capital. Washington Post reporter Fox was
pleased: "American business men and others, including those who have visited
Russia recently, have asked that some such agency be established in the U.S."
Fox continued somewhat naively, "There is nothing political about the Bureau,
according to the Soviet representative here." Skvirskii began publishing a maga-
zine called "The Russian Review," which was modeled after the similarly named
Arcos agency publication in England.8
Another Soviet representative also heightened his profile in 1923, Burns
discovered. Isaiah Yakovlevich Hurgin, a representative of Narkomindel who was
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employed in New York by the Soviet-German-American shipping venture
Derutra, had been advised by the commissariat "to abandon his illegal status and
to officially announce his position." Agent Bums believed that Hurgin was also
targeting legislators to hail the benefits of recognition. He further alleged that
Hurgin was awaiting imminent word of being named "the official ambassador for
the Soviet Government." Although some of Bums's notions were speculative, his
concerns about Skvirskii's and Hurgin's lobbying of congressmen show that he
was aware, as were they, that the legislative branch was more open to reconsider-
ation of diplomatic policy than was the executive branch.9
The intermediary work of Skvirskii and Hurgin would soon develop into
three much larger Soviet ventures in New York. The first was Alamerico, which
was launched by. American Armand Hammer. This was followed by the All-
Russian Textile Syndicate, led by Alexander Gumberg, formerly of Skvirskii's
agency. Finally, there was the large and influential Amtorg trading agency, formed
from the successor agencies of Martens's office and relying initially upon the tal-
ents of Isaiah Hurgin as its chairman of the board.
~ ARMAND HAMMER AND AlAMERICO
Armand Hammer was born in New York City in 1898 to Russian-born Dr. Julius
Hammer and his wife, Rose, who named him in honor of the symbol of the So-
cialist Labor party. When Armand was nine, his father met Lenin at the Interna-
tional Socialist Congress in Stuttgart. By 1919 Julius was chairman of the New
York Left Wing Socialists, then one of the most militant factions on the American
scene, and used the earnings from his successful pharmaceutical firm to bankroll
its successor, the American Communist party. He also worked without salary at
Martens's bureau to which he sold a large stash of surplus drugs for Soviet
Russia, where morphine, codeine, chloroform, and other painkillers were in short
supply. The Hammers shipped "hundreds of cases" of drugs to Russia through the
Soviet Bureau. In just two months, May and June 1920, the amount of medicines
that Hammer shipped through the bureau amounted to $46,000. 10 Although
Armand Hammer described his father as merely an "unofficial trade adviser" to
the bureau, the senior Dr. Hammer was one of Martens's strongest supporters,
providing him with important backing when a fight erupted among the Left So-
cialists in New York over Martens's fate. This Russian connection would stand
Armand in good stead, as he went on to become not only the most well-known
American businessman to deal with Russia, but also the only one whose acquain-
tanceship spanned every Soviet leader from Lenin to Gorbachev (Stalin was the
significant exception). Armand Hammer did not, however, carryon the radical
political tradition of his father. 11
During the summer of 1919, Armand's involvement in Soviet matters
steeply increased when his father was arrested for manslaughter and the family's
business, Allied Drug and Chemical Corporation, became Armand's chief respon-
sibility. Dr. Hammer had performed an abortion that allegedly resulted in the
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death of his patient, the wife of a tsarist official in the United States, and he was
imprisoned at Sing-Sing in September 1920. 12 Despite his new tasks, young
Hammer was committed to graduating from Columbia College of Physicians and
Surgeons, which he did in 1921. Meanwhile, his firm earned over one million dol-
lars. Allied Drug held a monopoly on the supply of "tincture of ginger," a highly
potent legal drug that was often abused during Prohibition to make "really pow-
erful ginger-ale highballs."13
Compared with the successful commerce in "jake," as this sometimes
deadly mix was called, Russian drug sales were a money loser for Allied Drug
and Chemical. They were also illegal during the trade embargo. Hammer had
little respect for the regulations, recall~ng later that "my family ... supplied the
Soviet with medicine and chemicals denied them by Clemenceau's 'barbed-wire
fence' blockade."14 But lack of financial compensation from the Kremlin, on top
of an expensive legal defense for his father, led Armand Hammer to depart for
Moscow in July 1921 to try to recoup some of the family's earnings from the
Russian sales. He carefully left his destination off his passport because the State
Department then restricted most travel to Russia. 15 He hoped to collect the
$150,000 that the Soviet government owed his family's company for supplies in-
cluding drugs and oil-drilling equipment, and wished to make "arrangements
about further shipments and terms of payment." An important aspect of his trip
was his offer of humanitarian assistance, which included delivery of an ambu-
lance and inventory for a fully stocked field hospital worth $60,000. 16
After an exciting journey-including a detention in Britain .at the hands of
Scotland Yard owing to a film he was carrying and in Germany because of Soviet
red tape in granting him a visa-young Hammer arrived at the Kremlin, where
Lenin granted him a one-hour interview. The impressionable twenty-three-year-
old was highly flattered to be in the presence of the charismatic Bolshevik leader.
Hammer recalled that he "felt embraced, enveloped" by Lenin, "as if I could trust
him completely." Lenin thanked Hammer for his kind offer of medical assistance.
But as the Bolshevik leader urgently explained, "What we really need is Ameri-
can capital and technical aid." Lenin had virtually conceded that "Communism
was not working," Hammer recalled. Armand did not disagree, describing what
he saw as a "revolution in tatters." Hammer likely perceived that new investment
would enable his family to recoup their past financial advances to Moscow. He
immediately ordered one million poods (thirty-six thousand tons) of American
grain for the starving country in exchange for caviar, hides, and furs, which he
sold back home for a reasonable profit. He also made plans to develop an asbestos
mine in the Urals. This was the start of Hammer's ventures in Russia, ventures
that would yield profits dwarfing the sum his father had lent the Bureau. 17
Lenin was convinced of the significance of Hammer's asbestos mine, the
first American concession to Russia. "It is extremely, extremely important that his
whole undertaking should be a complete success," Lenin wrote in his letter of in-
troduction for Hammer, which the American would carry with him into the hinter-
lands of Russia. Lenin was so impressed with Hammer's "efficiency" that he
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hoped the young man would be willing to bring electrification to the Urals.
Hammer did not, but his concession paved the way for others to do so and ful-
filled Lenin's hope that his venture would serve as "a small path leading to the
American 'business' world."18
Early in 1922 Hammer convinced Henry Ford to work through him in im-
plementing the sale of twenty-five thousand Fordson tractors to Soviet Russia.
With the New Economic Policy's emphasis on agricultural modernization, Ford
became a major client for Hammer. The young agent soon signed up three dozen
other American firms interested in representation in Russia, including Union
Twist Drill, American Tool Works, U.S. Machine Company, Allis-Chalmers, U.S.
Rubber, Parker Pens, and Underwood Typewriter Company. 19 Hammer decided to
devote himself to his Soviet ventures and sold the family's drug concern for just
over $1 million. He set up a New York-based company called Allied American
Corporation, or Alamerico, in order to sell manufactured goods in the Soviet
Union. In July 1923 Alamerico inked a $2.4 million agreement with Moscow to
sell American finished goods in Russia in exchange for Soviet raw materials.
Soon, Alamerico had signed more than $1 million in business contracts with do-
mestic firms. In return, it exported from Russia such commodities as furs, as-
bestos, horsehair bristles, timber, flax, caviar, and semiprecious stones.20
In March 1924 the New York office of the Commerce Department dis-
patched an intelligence agent to investigate Alamerico and learned that the firm's
officials had already made overtures to top department staff in Washington. These
included Durand and Lewery of the Eastern European Division, who were "thor-
oughly familiar with the Allied American Corporation." Not all officials were so
open to Soviet opportunity. Carl J. Mayer, the American trade commissioner in
Riga, Latvia, protested that Alamerico was "in reality a propaganda organ of the
Soviet Government" and run by a "communist."21
Mayer received a stiff rebuke from his superiors in Washington for express-
ing these sentiments. Leonard J. Lewery reminded Mayer that "it is not the object
of the Bureau to interfere with the business relations of any American concern in
Russia or with any of their agents doing business with Russia" unless actual sus-
picions of fraud were a consideration. Lewery had received "direct complaints"
about Mayer's negative comments, from Armand Hammer as well as from H.W.
Watts, president of the United States Machinery Company. Watts was "doing a
highly satisfactory business" with the Bolsheviks, Lewery reported, and did not
appreciate Mayer's immoderate comments. Allied American's agents were al-
ready "the largest exporters to Russia of automotive and electrical. equipment,"
and they had recently purchased over $500,000 worth of cotton "at one clip." The
trade commissioner was admonished to be more careful about his sources and to
use "a great deal of reserve" when weighing the opinions of "Russian exiles and
refugees" on the Soviet Union. Lewery's dressing down of Mayer clearly shows
the priority that the Commerce Department put upon Soviet trade, and its concern
to protect American firms from departmental insinuations that their trading efforts
were somehow improper. Lewery's invocation of "a highly satisfactory business"
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with Moscow indicated how much the government's position had changed since
the Martens era.22
Indeed, Alamerico experienced little interference from authorities and until
1925 handled a substantial amount of Soviet-American trade, though not "all the
trade," as Hammer had claimed. Its import and export turnover reached a total of
$10 million through April 1924, but there were competitors, such as the Robert
Dollar Company. After Lenin's death in May 1924, the Kremlin established its
own purchasing agency in Manhattan-Amtorg-to replace Alamerico.23
~ ALEXANDER GUMBERG AND THE TEXTILE SYNDICATE
Hammer's exports, while important early successes, were modest in size. A more
impressive record was compiled by another Soviet agency, the All-Russian Tex-
tile Syndicate, launched in the United States by Alexander Gumberg in 1923. The
textile syndicate's cotton purchases were the largest Soviet orders in America
until the mid-1920s and were only surpassed by Amtorg. The Russian-born Gum-
berg, who had immigrated to the United States as a youth in 1903, was quite a re-
markable character. After struggling to make a living, he eventually landed a job
as business manager of a Russian newspaper published on New York's Lower
East Side, a paper to which Trotsky also contributed. During the first Russian
revolution, Gumberg traveled to Russia with the Root Commission as its inter-
preter. He was then hired by Raymond Robins as his personal secretary and inter-
preter while Robins was head of the American Red Cross in Russia during
1917-1918. In May 1918 Gumberg returned to the United States, and soon began
working for the Far Eastern Trade Delegation.
A diligent advocate of improved Soviet-American relations, Gumberg's in-
fluence grew as he worked closely with Sen. William E. Borah and others active
in the prorecognition cause.24 Gumberg always emphasized commerce as crucial
to improved relations between the United States and Soviet Russia. Despite his
sympathies for Russia, he was no ideologue. William Henry Chamberlain, a close
friend of Gumberg and reporter for the Christian Science Monitor, asked Gum-
berg why he did not wish to return to Russia, perhaps "to be a nepman." Gumberg
explained:
Well, I have been there before. I could not be as crazy as some of our American
"idealists" and kid them in Russia (and even myself) that I could be a sincere
member of the party of the revolution. If after all the years of my associations in
the Novy Mir and after I did not get converted, and went through the revolution
in 1917 unscathed, there is not much chance of my becoming a convert at this
late hour. And frankly, I have seen so many of the post-1917 bolsheviks, that I
have no desire to look like them. I prefer to remain a free lance, a sympathetic
bystander and well-wisher.25
Gumberg was also greatly enjoying Washington. He had attended a Grid-
iron Club dinner, along with Harding, Coolidge, Harry Sinclair, and other indus-
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trialists, "the cream of the cream of the country.... So why hurry away from
here?" he asked. Such an evening had provided him with more insights than he
could have obtained in five years, he told Chamberlain. Despite his attempt to
detach himself from the Bolsheviks, his role in the United States in the 1920s
greatly contributed to the health of Soviet-American relations. Working to gain
American recognition for the Soviets, Gumberg would also begin to furnish
Russia a commodity it urgently needed: cotton.26
Textile production had long played an important role in the Russian econ-
omy, and by the time of the revolution it represented the country's most industri-
alized sector. In 1922 the government consolidated approximately 350 textile
plants in Russia into the giant All-Union Textile Syndicate.27 The syndicate was
said to be "the first combination of big industrial groups in the economic field in
the post-Revolutionary epoch." It controlled 117 sales branches in Russia that dis-
tributed cotton on both the wholesale and retail levels. As Soviet authorities con-
fidently hailed the "revival of Russian-American business relations," the textile
syndicate and the Soviet Chief Cotton Committee made plans to buy almost
175,000 bales of American cotton. The orders were placed through European bro-
kers, just as they had been before the war.28
In 1923 the president of the textile syndicate, Victor P. Nogin, decided to
open an office in New York. He hoped that this would eliminate the cost of
middlemen and, believing that economics and policy were closely linked in the
United States, also bring favorable official attention to the Soviet Union. James P.
Goodrich helped arrange Nogin's visit to New York and then to Louisiana and
Texas. Nogin was struck by "how much the relation of American business circles
to Soviet Russia had changed." He also noted disapprovingly, however, that
blacks were not permitted on his train car south from the nation's capital. While
in the South, Nogin was impressed by the new attentiveness to Soviet Russia, as
meetings with cotton dealers, bankers, and other "bourgeois" representatives
showed an attitude "dictated purely . . . [by] commercial, business, and practical
positions," not the least of which was his plan to purchase 200,000 bales of
cotton. W.L. Clayton, head of the United States' largest cotton brokerage, was en-
thusiastic. "These purchases have come at a time when our own textile industry
has been passing through the greatest depression perhaps in its history.... We
"have found a sorely needed outlet in Russia."29
The New York offices of the All-Russian Textile Syndicate (ARTS) opened
in October 1923. Gumberg at different times served as the firm's secretary-
treasurer, general manager, vice president, and director. The Soviet press believed
that the new office would be auspicious "not only in commercial, but in political
circles."30 The cotton buying did not result in the hoped-for transformation in
Washington's policies, despite the lobbying efforts of cotton magnates such as
Clayton. But it did change the face of Soviet-American commercial relations by
transcending political barriers. Despite the lack of relations, Herbert Hoover him-
self was interested in meeting with Nogin.31
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The most significant change that the Soviet textile syndicate brought was its
ability to generate bank credit for the cotton purchases. Syndicate executives were
confident that their organization's $1 million capitalization and its other resources
would enable it to obtain financing. Because of the cooperation of the Rockefeller-
controlled Chase National Bank and its vice president, .attorney Reeve Schley,
they were proved right. In 1923 Chase offered short-term financing of $2 million
to ARTS for cotton shipments and warehouse stock, backed by the guarantee of
Gosbank, Russia's state financial institution. Sherrill Smith of Chase praised the
"prompt, orderly and satisfactory" practices of the syndicate.32
Schley's former law firm, Simpson, Thacher, and Bartlett, arranged the in-
corporation of the textile syndicate in New York. The first cotton shipment, worth
$2 million, went to Russia in February 1924. In its first nine months, ARTS was
able to purchase $36.7 million in American cotton. The syndicate did not use
American ships to carry its cargo but instead commissioned foreign vessels to
transport cotton from Houston and Galveston, Texas, to Murmansk. Foreign
steamers were used because Russia levied port charges five times higher on Ameri-
can vessels to retaliate for the lack of political relations. 33
The syndicate's credit initially covered only shipment to Bergen, Norway,
pending final payment. In 1925 conditions improved significantly. First, the syn-
dicate's financial position stabilized and cotton shippers were allowed additional
credits as insurance premiums dropped. Using the cotton as security, ARTS could
ship as much as $25 million worth of the fiber at a time to Murmansk. That year,
too, Chase Bank granted $15 million in credit, and as a result the syndicate
bought a total of $43 million worth of American cotton in 1925.34
To Nogin, Chase's investments were "proof of a new tendency among
American financial circles." Chase was the second largest financial institution in
the United States, with almost $800 million in deposits. The bank had not been a
major investor in the tsarist empire and had not experienced the heavy losses of
other institutions such as National City Bank, the nation's largest. National City,
with assets worth $1.25 billion, had over $33 million worth of assets in Russia at
the time of the Revolution. Its leaders wanted compensation and were disturbed
by Chase's Soviet financing. Accordingly, Chicherin viewed National City as
"one of our leading established enemies in the American capitalist circles."
Charles E. Mitchell, the president of National City, headed the Committee for
Protection of Creditors, which urged the State Department not to deal with the
Soviets until the issue of claims had been resolved.35
But National City could not prevent the Soviets from getting financial help
from competitors. In 1926 Chase arranged an additional $30 million credit line
for Moscow. Equitable Trust Company, ninth in size in the United States with
$500 million in deposits, also entered Soviet financing operations, enticed by a
50 percent guarantee from the Soviet state bank. This financing helped the All-
Russian Textile Syndicate buy almost $117 million worth of American cotton
over its first three years.36
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Other prominent individuals also took a role in enabling Soviet-American
business relations. Dwight Morrow, a close friend of President Coolidge, was di-
rector for the syndicate of banks and industrial companies that J.P. Morgan con-
trolled. Morrow's interest in the "Russian question" spurred him to meet with
Nogin to discuss financing. The Morgan banks "usually did not finance commer-
cial transactions," Gumberg noted, and so "they cannot give credit to the Textile
Syndicate." Still, Morrow's commitment to "recommend" that banks work with
the ARTS was heartening. Despite the success of the cotton purchases, the dis-
creet Nogin did not want his offices to be used for lobbying for closer relations
between the United States and Russia. He warned against a "repeat [of] the mis-
takes of 1919 and 1920." After Nogin died in 1924, his caveat was ignored and
Gumberg became an active lobbyist for the cause.37
American officials were well aware of the importance of cotton in the
Soviet-American trade mix. Frederick W.B. Coleman of the American legation in
Riga warned his government in 1925 that reports of Russia curtailing its cotton
and flour imports by 1929 "will tend to reduce the Soviet-American trade ... to
an insignificant figure." As American cotton shipments to Russia increased from
60,408 bales in 1922-1923 to 322,617 bales in 1924-1925, domestic cotton pro-
duction in Russia had increased even faster, from 63,136 bales to 391,828. At the
end of the decade, however, the Soviets were still buying "large amounts" of
cotton in the United States, though in 1928 exports of cotton to Russia were sur-
passed by exports of manufactured goods. Nevertheless, cotton had played an ex-
tremely important role in pioneering a credit relationship between the United
States and the Soviet Union.38
~ THE AMTORG TRADING AGENCY AND THE
AMERICAN-RUSSIAN CHAMBER OF COMMERCE
In the fall of 1924 Hammer's Alamerico agency entered its final months in busi-
ness. The Amtorg (short for Amerikanskii Torgovlaia) Trading Agency, which had
opened the previous May, would take its place.39 With a capital base of $1 million
furnished by Gostorg, the Soviet state trading agency, Amtorg would purchase
durable goods including agricultural implements and railroad equipment. At first,
Amtorg planned to purchase goods with the proceeds of its sales in the United
States. However, since America bought scant quantities of Soviet goods, the pur-
chases were financed instead by Soviet sales to Europe as well as by American
banks. Amtorg superseded Hammer's trading agency, but it did not replace all of
the Soviet commercial bureaus in the United States. The Soviet-controlled Tsen-
trosoyuz cooperative, for instance, was flourishing. Tsentrosoyuz received credits
in the United States "at a highly favorable percentage rate" based on the value of
its export cargo on docks in Russia. In January 1924 Tsentrosoyuz got a credit
from National City Bank to purchase $400,000 worth of International Harvester
reapers. The normally reluctant National City offered the credit because it had the
security of a $2.5 million deposit from the prerevolutionary Moscow Union of
Consumers' Societies.40
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Amtorg was the most important Soviet trading agency of the era. The Na-
tional Association of Manufacturers (NAM) fittingly made Russia "the principal
topic of discussion at the foreign trade section" of its annual meeting the very
month that Amtorg opened in 1924. Its program was entitled "The Truth About
Russia, Industrially." It attracted a large audience, as well as the involvement of
E. Dana Durand, the chief of the Commerce Department's Eastern European Di-
vision, who provided NAM with suggestions of individuals and organizations to
participate in the panel.41
As the session began, Chairman Norman J. Gould declared that his group
had no official opinion on the controversial issues under discussion. This silence
on the merits of Soviet trade and recognition has led historians to criticize the as-
sociation, as well as other business groups of the era, for giving "implicit support"
to the United States' policy toward Russia. Earl Constantine, a top assistant
in NAM, indeed had contacted Hoover to encourage him to have Durand "stress"
Hoover's views at the panel. These views included Hoover's conviction that
"it was high time the manufacturers of our country knew the truth about Indus-
trial Russia and disillusioned themselves as regards its immediate potential as an
export market."42
Despite its politically astute antennae, the association's panel on the "The
Truth About Russia, Industrially" is evidence of NAM's recognition of a wide-
spread interest among its members. If the views of Washington were solicited, so
too were the perspectives of Moscow. Amtorg vice president Sherman was
invited to give the opening address on the panel in 1924 and also in 1926, when
NAM held a similar panel. In 1924 the dapper, pince-nezed Sherman acknowl-
edged the many problems that his country had encountered and then announced
that Soviet Russia "has shown really remarkable improvement." Russian-
American trade was growing, but so too was a European presence in Soviet trade,
he cautioned. The Soviet Arcos agency in London had placed over $200 million
in orders there since 1921, "while we in New York lag hopelessly behind," Sher-
man lamented.43
In 1926, Sherman's second appearance at NAM, the Amtorg official claimed
that in 1925 Russian economic production was 82 percent of what it had been in
1913-an amazingly rapid achievement, he pointed out, since in 1921 production
was barely 15 percent of the prewar figure. Russia was ready for the introduction
of mass-production machinery. Sherman told the audience that with its shortage of
capital, his nation needed long-term credits from the United States, credits that Eu-
ropean firms were offering. He was gratified that more firms were recognizing
"that the Soviet credits are a good business, financial and moral risk."44
As returning panel chairman Norman Gould noted in 1926, the earlier ses-
sion had shown that "a large proportion of our businessmen are alive to what is
going on in Russia." Referring to the gathering of two years before, he recalled
that "at no session of that convention ... was the attendance larger than at the
Russian session." Gould pointed out, however, that in 1924 the topic of "unse-
cured credits" to Moscow had not even come up, while in 1926 Soviet buyers
were regularly obtaining two-year financing. The panel chairman was again care-
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ful to emphasize that his association "in no way questions the attitude of our Fed-
eral Government." Firms should remember that their credits "to Russian agents
are credits ... to the Socialist Soviet Government itself," said Gould, but he did
not propose that these be limited.45
Much indeed had changed between 1924 and 1926. Most importantly,
Soviet-American trade had moved into the mainstream, thanks to Amtorg's large
purchases·, including five thousand tractors in 1924-1925. Among the indications
of change was the decision made by Journal ofCommerce editor H. Parker Willis
to spend over $7,500 for publicizing two "Special Russian Editions" in 1926. The
issues were designed "for the promotion in the U.S. of the financial, commercial,
economic and industrial interests of Russia," and the journal planned to send rep-
resentatives to Russia and to obtain Soviet advertising.46
That year, too, the defunct American-Russian Chamber of Commerce was
reborn. The old chamber had closed down in 1922 despite its president's efforts to
revive it. In 1924 C.H. Carver, an associate ofAverell Harriman, began discussing
the formation of a new chamber with Alexander Gumberg and urged the Russian
to try to persuade attorneys Allen Wardwell and Thomas Thacher to join them in a
proposal for a "Board of Trade for Russian-American Commerce." Commissar
Krasin was pleased to learn about it, noting, "I can only welcome such an associ-
ation, which I trust will ... help reestablish normal trading relations between our
countries." Allen Wardwell, a prominent liberal and former member of Robins'
Red Cross mission to Russia, agreed to serve as vice president of the chamber.
Civil engineer Hugh L. Cooper, "the great apostle of American-Soviet friend-
ship," became its president. The chamber went on to become an important player
in Soviet-American trade. Among other actions, as Saul Bron noted, the
American-Russian Chamber of Commerce gained a "favorable reception" with its
lectures in fifty major cities.47
Cooper was tremendously excited about the possibilities of American sci-
entific and technological involvement in Russia, describing them to the members
of NAM in 1926. As the architect of a colossal hydroelectric power plant on the
Dnieper River, which he predicted would support $500 million worth of manu-
facturing in the Ukraine, he had good reason to be bullish. His project was
a veritable armamentarium of American manufacturing know-how. It would be
powered by four 880-ton generators manufactured by General Electric, each of
which would be driven by water turbines from the Newport News Shipbuilding
and Dry Dock Company..So huge was the scale of the project that the entire col-
lection of General Electric parts for Cooper's hydroelectric station filled 130 rail-
road cars.48
The success of Cooper, and the chamber, was mirrored in the sales racked
up by Amtorg. The agency's orders alone doubled from $13.1 million in
1925-1926 to $26.3 million in 1926-1927. To the trading agency's purchases can
be added those of the All-Russian Textile Syndicate, which bought $117 million
worth of southern cotton for the Soviet Union between 1923 and 1926 with
financing supplied by Chase and other banks. Soviet sales of raw materials to
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Russia for the American Relief Administra-
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Boris E. Skvirskii (left), director of the Soviet Information Bureau in Washington, is shown
with Soviet envoy Maxim Litvinov in New York, November 19, 1933, during Litvinov's
visit to negotiate diplomatic relations with the United States.
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William C. Bullitt, U.S. ambassador-designate to Russia, greets President Franklin D.
Roosevelt, November 17, 1933, in Washington.
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Americans rose from $13.2 million to $14.1 million in the same period.49 In 1928
Americans shipped $75 million in products to Russia; in 1930 U.S. exports to the
Soviet Union were $114 million, and Amtorg's overall share of Soviet-American
trade was 85 percent as compared with only 11.3 percent in 1923-1924. At the
end of the twenties, the agency could claim to be "the largest single buyer of
American agricultural and industrial equipment for export."50
To facilitate this trade, in 1927 the chamber had established an office in .
Moscow under the direction of Charles H. Smith. Smith had been connected with
Russia since the war, first as a member of the Inter-Allied Railway Commission
and then as a concessionaire. He was extremely impressed with Soviet progress
and told the chamber in 1928 that "the American way is being disseminated
throughout the land."51
~ AMTORG: ILLICIT ACTIVITIES
Some of Amtorg's procurement activities raised suspicions among American of-
ficials, including J.Edgar Hoover, who became director of the Bureau of Inves-
tigation in 1924. Hoover learned in 1925 that Isaiah Hurgin of Amtorg had
approached Robert Cuse, a Brooklyn dealer, and asked him "to make negotiations
for the purchase of Liberty Motors and other air plane motors." Cuse confirmed
that he was supplying Amtorg with reconditioned war surplus engines made from
Liberty Motor spare parts supplied by Packard Automobile Company in Detroit.
He told the New York office of the Bureau that he was selling the engines for
$1,000 each and noted that "there is an enormous amount of stealing going on" of
such materiel.52
Seeking further information about Cuse and his connection with Amtorg,
the Bureau of Investigation interviewed N. Streloff, who had worked for Cuse oc-
casionally since 1915. Streloff reported that Cuse had tried to recruit him to
obtain drawings of airplane catapults from the Chance-Vought Corporation,
Streloff's employer. He also described Cuse's factory in Jersey City, where four
hundred of the reconstructed motors were built, some of which were shipped
through Britain to Russia. The Bureau learned that Cuse's firm had also written to
McCook Field to get drawings of bombsights, ships, and gun synchronizers,
among other items. Amtorg's appetite for war materiel demonstrates that the
Soviet Union was concerned with developing its military strength as well as its
industrial might in the mid-1920s. But these sales concerned American authori-
ties, not only because of their sensitive nature but also because Amtorg was work-
ing through intermediaries, attempting to evade detection of its purchases. In
1930 Basil W. Delgass of Amtorg testified in Congress that his agency had indi-
rectly purchased four hundred motors from the War Department and then had
them "repaired, crated, and shipped illegally to Russia in the general category of
machinery" along with "secret instructions for their reservicing."53 Yet despite
Amtorg's success in obtaining war supplies, its regular dissemination of pro-
Soviet information, and its development by the early thirties of an espionage
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operation, the agency consistently received better treatment than the earlier Soviet
Bureau, a reflection of the government's recognition of its important trading
role.54 Where Martens faced a blockade and harassment, Amtorg saw Washington
refer firms to its offices and permit these firms to offer short- and long-term credit.
Through three chief agencies in the United States-Alamerico, ARTS, and
Amtorg-Soviet leaders had succeeded in launching a growing Soviet-American
economic relationship. As a result, they had fulfilled not only Martens's hope that
his legacy would prove positive, but also Lenin's wish that the "path leading to
the American 'business' world ... should be· made use of in every way."55
TRADE AND FOREIGN POLICY,
1923-1929
Soviet representatives have named 1923 as the year marking the "resumption of
trade relations" with America. That year Russia's grain crop was at last large
enough to supply exports for hard currency. Armand Hammer's agency, Alamer-
ico, was in full operation, and the All-Russian Textile Syndicate opened. The year
was also notable for a milestone in Soviet-American legal relations. Remaining
diplomatically unrecognized by the United States, Russia's national sovereignty
was acknowledged in American courts in 1923, when the Soviet government was
found not to be subject to U.S. civil laws. The case arose in a New York suit
brought by furriers Wolfsohn and Son, who had stored $800,000 worth of mer-
chandise in Siberia when it was still under the control of Admiral Kolchak. The
furs were seized by Communist authorities in Irkutsk in 1920, and the company
sought a court order to obtain reimbursement for its losses from Soviet property
held in the United States. A New York State court denied Wolfson's claim, stating
that "foreign powers cannot be subject to [U.S.] laws," a ruling that pleased
Moscow's lawyer, Charles Recht.!
The court had decided that the United States' refusal to grant diplomatic
recognition to Moscow was irrelevant to establishing Soviet Russia's legal exist-
ence. Recognition, the. court concluded, "does not create a state" nor did its ab-
sence prevent such an entity from existing. Recht was relieved that his Soviet
clients could now make deposits, and hold property, in the United States "without
the risk ... [of] confiscation."2 Indeed, despite nonrecognition, the U.S. govern-
ment had consistently affirmed the "territorial integrity" of Russia's boundaries.3
The Wolfsohn furriers did not throw in the towel. In 1925 they appealed the
ruling to the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York. This time,
Wolfsohn sued Amtorg's vice president and treasurer in New York as "managing
agent of the defendant, R.S.F.S.R." Recht represented Amtorg and the Soviet
Union and, using the previous New York State court ruling, argued that the Soviet
regime was "the de facto government of Russia, constituting the foreign State of
Russia and is, consequently, immune from any suit in American courts without its
consent." Judge Knox of the U.S. Appeals .Court agreed and confirmed the lower
court decision that "without its consent, the Soviet Government may not be held
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to be subject to the suit of American citizens in American courts." The complaint
against Amtorg was dismissed as well.4
At the same time Soviet representatives in the United States continued their
efforts to improve relations. Agent Isaiah Hurgin suggested that his government's
best strategy was to "play our economic propaganda" and alert businessmen to the
Soviet Union's potential. Hurgin's intent was shared by a Soviet representative in
Britain, P. Berzin, who pointed out that Westerners, "especially those of England,
France, and America," had only an "extraordinarily vague" impression of the op-
portunities waiting for them in Russia "in spite of our printed and spoken propa-
ganda."5 Perhaps this was because Western countries were inundated with Soviet
propaganda of a different sort, although Moscow authorities insisted that the re-
sponsibility for that campaign lay with the Third International, ostensibly a sepa-
rate organization. Nevertheless, State Department administrators repeatedly
insisted that Soviet Russia must stop the political propaganda as well as make uni-
lateral concessions on the renounced Russian debts and property claims ofAmeri-
cans in Russia before any discussions could be held.6 Soviet officials just as
regularly stipulated that the United States should pay compensation for the dam-
ages caused by America's role in the military intervention and blockade of Russia.7
The New York-based Daily Worker believed that Hughes's opposition to
recognition was having "its effect on American public opinion." Most Americans
supported the administration's policy, but the public was not especially excited
about the issue if the limited number of letters to President Harding on the subject
are any indication. It would take the Great Depression to tum public opinion in
favor of diplomatic relations.8
Secretary Hughes and his colleagues did face some vocal domestic oppo-
nents. One of them was Sen. William Borah, who tirelessly promoted the cause
from his influential position on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, where
he became chairman in 1924. Although one historian has described Borah as a
"curious combination of isolationist and advocate of international cooperation in
limited areas," Borah's biographer, Robert Maddox, suggests that the senator's
isolationism was consistent with his push for recognition. Borah wanted to prac-
tice "the diplomacy of abstinence" and stop meddling with the course of the
Soviet government.9 He strongly pushed the recognition issue in front of the
public. On June 27, 1922, he gave a speech in Philadelphia at the first mass meet-
ing of the Women's Committee for the Recognition of Russia and followed this
with encores in Boston and Chicago. 10
Borah was joined by many other advocates of Soviet-American relations,
including textile syndicate head Alexander Gumberg, lecturer Scott Nearing, pro-
fessor Jerome Davis, former governor James P. Goodrich, author Sherwood Eddy,
and suffragist Lucy Branham. These individuals were active in groups such as the
Foreign Policy Association, with its credo of a "liberal and constructive American
foreign policy," and the Women's Committee for the Recognition of Russia, a
new organization formed by the Women's International League for Peace and
Freedom (WILPF) in 1921. 11 The Women's Committee was led by Lucy Bran-
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ham, "the suffragette history professor" of Columbia University, who had accom-
panied Armand Hammer on trips in the Soviet Union in 1921. 12 Branham, with
contacts on the East Coast and in Chicago, was executive secretary and chief or-
ganizer of the committee, which lobbied congressmen and the administration
from a small office in Washington. It also planned meetings throughout the coun-
try, inviting prominent advocates like Raymond Robins, Borah, and other con-
gressmen to speak. Alex Gumberg was impressed with Branham: "I have seen her
on the job and know that she is an ideal person for it." Gumberg apparently found
Branham an unusual woman, because he also believed that "one cannot use
proper political lingo with ladies around."13
Branham's organization had sufficient credibility.'to gain two interviews
with Secretary Hughes, and their second meeting, on March 21, 1923, gained wide
attention. Hughes received the women with "great pleasure" but pronounced that
there would be no change in U.S'. policy, using the occasion to deliver a major
statement on the subject. Asserting that the United States had no wish to intervene
in the internal affairs of Russia, as "such interference would be futile," the secre-
tary declared it was Moscow's policies that stood in the way of U.S.-Soviet ties.
He told the committee that he appreciated its interest in peace, "a cause which is
very close to my heart," but noted pessimistically that "there is no hope for the suc-
cess of the gospel of brotherly kindness while the world is run on a policy of hate."
He added that it was a "fallacy" to think that recognition would favorably influ-
ence trade and furthermore dismissed prospects of trade as "insignificant." The
secretary was not entirely closed to Soviet-American rapprochement. "We are just
as anxious in the Department ... as you can possibly be, to have a spirit of mutual
understanding." But he added, "The world we desire is a world not threatened with
the destructive propaganda of the Soviet authorities." Recognition was off-limits
without "good faith and the recognition of obligations." At the end of the secre-
tary's jeremiad, one woman challenged him, "Mr. Hughes, what would happen if
the United States did recognize Russia?" The WILPF Bulletin recorded his evasive
reply: "the Secretary hesitated a moment, then said in substance: 'Ladies, I do not
care to be questioned,' and withdrew."14
Hughes's declaration on Russia was front-page news the next day. 15 It was a
disappointment not only to the Women's Committee but also to Soviet observers.
The journal Izvestiia protested, "In 1918 Hughes' speech would not surprise any-
body. In 1923 it is very much out of tune and is an anachronism." Gumberg
groused, "Mr. H. is like a stone wa11."16 Hughes's posture on the issue did not dis-
courage Women's Committee leaders from sending an open letter to both Harding
and his secretary of state in early April, asking for the United States to invite Rus-
sian representatives to meet "in a friendly atmosphere ... [to] try to find a basis
for friendly relations acceptable to both countries."17 Nothing happened, and after
a series of attacks on peace groups by the government and the popular press, the
Women's Committee was eventually dropped by WILPF in an attempt by the
larger organization to defuse attacks from conservatives that WILPF was a pro-
Communist organization. 18
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Yet Gumberg had not given up entirely on the secretary of state, who re-
mained the pivotal player in any change in policy. Two days after Hughes's
speech, Gumberg echoed the Women's Committee by urging Borah to request
Hughes to have a "conference with Russian representatives ... not a back door
conference; rather, one in which his terms could be frankly discussed. I have no
doubt that if approached in the proper spirit, the Russians would be very reason-
able, and ... a great stride toward peace would be made." Although Borah had al-
ready lambasted U.S. policy in the Senate, he should raise the issue again,
Gumberg declared, and "demand a hearing before the Foreign Relations commit-
tee." The committee would then appoint a subcommittee to look into the matter,
which Borah could chair, giving him an opportunity to "call a lot of witnesses
who would be favorably inclined towards recognition." The time to act had ar-
rived because "1923 would be a year of decision in Russian-American affairs."19
Of all the advocates of Soviet-American relations in the twenties, none was
more assiduous in his efforts than Raymond Robins. A friend of Harding, he
aimed his efforts squarely at the Oval Office. The president proved difficult to
budge, however. On one occasion in 1922, Robins seemed ready to give up. "This
last appeal of mine was based upon his letter to me of a most friendly and appre-
ciative character. [But] we have probably broke for good now. He left the door
open but I don't think I would find anybody home!" Despite his frustration,
Robins did not flag. Instead, he worked closely with Goodrich and Gumberg in a
concerted attempt to change policy in the spring of 1923.20 The Soviet govern-
ment undermined their efforts, however, by placing a Catholic priest, Father Con-
stantine Buchavich, on trial for treason in March. Buchavich was accused of
collaborating with the Poles during Russia's recent war with its former pos-
session, and he was executed. The judicial murder (for Buchavich's trial was
more show than substance) caused a huge outcry in the West. Gumberg agreed
with Borah that this violent act had been occasioned by "the policy of interven-
tion and blockade," since "hate is what feeds extremists on both sides." But he
was both disgusted enough and realistic enough to see what damage the Soviet
judges had done. "These fellows still seem to be sitting up nights trying to think
up some scheme that will get them in dutch with the world," he lamented.21
By early June the furor had died down, and Gumberg again felt the time
was appropriate to lobby Harding, whom he believed would be sympathetic. The
president was then making plans to leave for a speaking tour of the West Coast
and Alaska. Gumberg told Goodrich that "if the right move is made now it will be
met in the spirit of sincere cooperation." The governor dutifully talked to Harding
but reported to Gumberg that "the Chief ... won't take this matter up until he
returns in August." Goodrich did write Harding an eighteen-page memorandum
on the subject, largely based on a report that Robins had written the previous
month. Robins had alluded to the importance of Russia's vast size, great re-
sources, and excellent investment and trade opportunities, as well as its improved
economic position owing to the recovery of its agricultural sector. He clinched the
argument by saying that Soviet trade would bring increased prosperity, "essential
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for Republican success in 1924." He finally recommended that the United States
should send a commission to meet with Russian representatives to settle outstand-
ing issues, especially since Germany, Great Britain, and other countries were
taking advantage of Soviet opportunities.22
Robins himself visited with Harding in June and urged' him to move quickly
to end "the Wilson non-intercourse policy." Instead of putting off Robins again,
Harding finally decided to send him to Moscow on a fact-finding mission. Secre-
tary Hughes was not consulted. Robins traveled to Berlin, where he awaited in-
structions to proceed to Moscow to begin discussions on a new Russian policy for
the president. William Appleman Williams believed that this trip brought the
Harding administration remarkably close to recognizing Russia.23 Robins was not
the only envoy to be dispatched to Russia without Hughes's authorization. With
Harding's encouragement, Interior Secretary Albert B. Fall also traveled there. He
went on behalf of Sinclair Oil, one of the two firms from which he had collected
bribes in Wyoming, and "quickly became a convert to the cause of Russian recog-
nition." Unfortunately, Fall's oil interests also played a role in the demise of
Harding, the most hopeful prospect for early recognition of Russia. The Teapot
Dome oil scandal, in which the interior secretary was later implicated, may have
precipitated Harding's sudden collapse that summer as he journeyed to Alaska, al-
though it is clear that the president was already dying from cardiovascular dis-
ease.24
If Harding was not able to recognize Russia, it seemed difficult to imagine
that his successor Coolidge would. Indeed, Gumberg, already sick that summer,
lost ten pounds in five days after Harding's death on August 2, 1923. It was not
until the fourth day that he could even choke down an egg and a slice of toast. 25
~ COOLIDGE AND SOVIET-AMERICAN TRADE
Harding's vice president, Calvin Coolidge, had impressed some recognition ad-
herents as a "non-entity" and others as an unalloyed reactionary. He appeared a
very unlikely candidate for introducing an improvement in Soviet-American re-
lations. In 1919 the former Bay State governor had been pushed into national
prominence when he halted a Boston police strike. He had been applauded then
by the National Association of Manufacturers for his "successful vindication of
the supremacy of the forces of true Americanism."26
But Coolidge was also planning to have a conference with those "Senators,
Congressmen, and other prominent individuals who investigated conditions in
Russia," Gumberg reported. There were indications that the new president was
more interested in foreign affairs than his predecessor had been. Coolidge had
urged a "close study of the Russian question ... without prejudice" soon after
taking the oath of office. Such plans encouraged Soviet representative Isaiah
Hurgin to suggest that "a certain stunted spring" had commenced with the presi-
dent's entry into the White House.27 Hurgin was too pessimistic; Coolidge's
season in the Oval Office actually included remarkable growth in trade relations.
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The first year of Coolidge's administration saw the opening of two major
Soviet purchasing bureaus, ARTS and Amtorg. And in his first speech to Congress
on December 6, 1923, Coolidge announced that he was "willing to make very
large concessions for the purpose of rescuing the people of Russia." He added that
"while the favor of America is not for sale," if Soviet Russia took the requisite
steps in the areas of debts, claims, and propaganda, the United States should "be
the first to go to [its] economic and moral rescue." Coolidge, moreover, was not
opposed to "doing business with the Russian people."28 Chicherin responded to
the speech in a cable he authored jointly with Alexander Gumberg and American
recognition advocate Raymond Robins. The wire advised the president that as
long as "Soviet dignity and interests" were taken into account, the Kremlin was
eager to address "all questions, touched on in your message." On the issue of
claims, Moscow was "entirely ready to enter into discussion ... on the basis
that the settlement will be based on the principle of mutual reciprocity." If these
stipulations were addressed, said Chicherin, his government was willing to do
everything possible to bring about a "restoration of friendship" with the United
States. The Soviet leadership clearly expected an approaching shift in American
policy, as its desire for equal treatment and respect continued.29
Within two days Charles Evans Hughes, whom Coolidge had retained as
secretary of state, quashed all hopes by declaring, "There would seem to be at this
time no reason for negotiations." The Soviets were expected to make financial and
political settlements before any discussions could be held. 30 Senator Borah was
disgusted at this continued official recalcitrance and tried once again to push his
recognition initiative through the Senate. But in January his resolution was "over-
whelmingly" torpedoed when Robert Kelley of the State Department introduced
evidence of Soviet propaganda inciting revolution. Hughes formally commended
Kelley for his impressive collection. 31 Not only did Borah face the stiff opposition
to recognition of senators like Henry Cabot Lodge, but the Teapot Dome scandals
were then also coming to the fore, pushing Russia to the back burner in Con-
gress.32 Borah could only complain in frustration, "the opposition to the recogni-
tion of Russia is so pronounced that I have been unable to make any decided
progress ."33
The Coolidge speech had beneficial results for Moscow nevertheless. The
address, and Hughes's brusque retort to Chicherin afterward, bolstered trade by in-
creasing publicity for the Soviet representatives in the United States, suggests
James K. Libbey. Executives from "no fewer than four banks" made arrangements
for lunch with textile men Gumberg and Nogin within a week after the secretary of
state sent his rejection to Chicherin. Herbert Hoover also met with Nogin and
Gumberg. Soviet historian Tatiana Kargina agrees that the speech had a positive
outcome, describing it as the pivotal juncture between the limited Soviet-American
trade relationship before 1923 and the expansion of commerce that followed. Be-
forehand, few Americans believed in "equal rights and mutual advantages" be-
tween the two countries, and fewer contracts w~re worked out. After Coolidge's
address, which "officially permitted [Americans] to enter into 'trade relations with
TRADE AND FOREIGN POLICY, 1923-1929 95
Russia,'" such rights were recognized as essential to support trade. This recogni-
tion of rights helped legitimize Moscow's American missions.34
To Narkomindel, Coolidge's speech indicated a new priority on trade for
the United States. Economically attuned Soviet officials cited "large trends in the
world market" that had made exports an "American national problem." They pre-
dicted that Washington would have to become more involved in supporting com-
merce abroad; thus, the "reformation of American capitalism" was at hand. Soviet
representatives hoped for much from the progressive wing of the Republican
party, which showed signs of strengthening in Congress after the 1922 elections.
Boris Skvirskii believed that the formation of a new Progressive party was pos-
sible. Stalin was more cautious. "Must we work with each disadvantage, which
reckons itself left or progressive? No. In particular, in America, which has so
many false progressives, speculating with progressive policy-it is necessary for
us to distinguish between progressives and progressives."35
Narkomindel representatives disagreed with Stalin. Their faith in the Pro-
gressives, and particularly the Farmer-Labor party supporters of Sen. Robert M.
La Follette of Wisconsin, led them to believe that a Progressive victory in the
1924 presidential election could change matters significantly, bringing a "trans-
formation of all aspects of American political life" and a reassessment of the
whole Soviet issue. The growing Progressive movement encouraged Rosta, the
Soviet news agency, to predict that labor leader Gompers, the "instrument of anti-
Soviet agitation," was in the process of losing his moorings against a growing
wave of prorecognition sentiment. Because of this imminent and "inevitable
defeat," Gompers's lobbying had assumed "an almost hysterical character." Gom-
pers had angrily blamed Moscow that year when the Farmer-Labor party was
"captured by the Communists" at its convention in Chicago.36 Alexander Gum-
berg urged La Follette to ensure that the Farmer-Laborites demand Soviet recog-
nition in their election campaign. Rosta grumbled, however, that La Follette
"abstains from publicly speaking out on his opinion of Russia, not wishing to set
himself against Gompers." The La Follette Progressives, like the two major par-
ties, gave scant campaign attention to the recognition question.37
Raymond Robins did not believe that La Follette had a chance of being
elected in 1924. But he disparagingly referred to the Coolidge-Dawes ticket as
"The Golddust Twins, Address Wall St." To Robins, Harding was "the only con-
servative that could have been elected in 1924." He was, of course, mistaken.
Coolidge won the election in a landslide, polling nearly sixteen million votes to
just over eight million votes for Democrat John W. Davis. La Follette received
almost five million ballots but only 13 out of 531 electoral votes.38
~ THE ROLE OF THE PRESS IN THE
SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONSHIP
Soviet leaders' hopes for incipient recognition and trade relations were fanned
periodically by members of the American press. In mid-1923, Washington Post
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reporter Albert W. Fox reported, "There is genuine hope in many quarters that the
President's desire to see America's foreign relationships established on a benefi-
cial ... basis may be fulfilled, even with respect to Russia." He added, "The idea
that such a relationship would encourage extreme forms of bolshevism ... is no
longer seriously entertained."39 William Randolph Hearst's papers were also sup-
portive. Hearst's New York American editorialized that in the area of relations with
Russia "America . . . lags behind," as did the "daily account of the American
press." Chicherin told Ambassador Child that he and his colleagues appreciated
the American's efforts and believed that the "Hearst press was fair," but worried
that Hearst did not have enough influence in a Republican administration.40
Hearst's efforts and attacks were resented by the administration, particularly when
the American suggested it was "authoritatively known" that Hughes has "been
unable to ascertain definitely [Coolidge's] views in relation to Foreign Affairs."
This was "absolutely false," Hughes protested to Coolidge, accusing the publisher
of "scurrilous abuse."41
Early in 1924 Rosta observed with pleasure that a major "daily organ of
conservative business circles" had joined the fight for diplomatic relations. Finan-
cial America editorialized that Washington's professions of openness toward
commerce with the Soviet Union were "entirely superfluous and senseless" since
"without relations ... the work of American capital in Russia is impossible." Fi-
nancialjournals, in fact, had long been prominent among the newspapers support-
ing Soviet-American relations. As early as 1919 H. Parker Willis, editor of the
Journal of Commerce and the New York Commercial, declared that his paper was
running a "publicity campaign ... in the hope of precipitating the resumption of
commercial relations." Willis became one of the most active business supporters
of Soviet-American trade in the next decade.42
The American media often rushed to print their hunches about shifts in offi-
cial policy. Because Soviet journalists relied heavily on American accounts, these
positive reports were soon printed in Soviet newspapers as harbingers of change.
Rosta's Kenneth Durant worried that this was harmful to Russia's prospects. Not
only did it "misrepresent official [U.S.] opinion in Moscow regarding the question
of recognition," but in the United States it was "exploited with the purpose of em-
barrassing Senator Borah and others." An example of this effect occurred follow-
ing Hughes's resignation from the State Department in February 1925. American
journalists initially "showed a greater tendency to expect a speedy change of the
American policy than did the Moscow press," Durant noted. But soon the Soviet
press was predicting that the "longed for recognition by America" was at hand.
The recently completed Soviet-Japanese treaty, Izvestiia suggested, would also
spur Washington to seek relations.43 Similar reports started pouring into the
American consulate in Riga, where Moscow's minister was reporting that con-
tacts between the two governments had actually begun. Stories appeared about
meetings between American and Soviet officials that had allegedly taken place in
three separate cities.44
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Some American journalists, meanwhile, were going so far as to report that
Senator Borah had influenced Hughes to resign and that his replacement, Frank B.
Kellogg, was "more open" on the issue of Soviet-American relations. Such opin-
ions were unfounded because Kellogg was as opposed to recognition as Hughes
had been: he was Hughes's hand-picked replacement. A few days before Hughes
left office, as if to cement the link between him and his successor, the State De-
partment issued a memorandum reiterating that trade treaties or political agree-
ments with Russia were unlikely to garner the United States any more business
than it was already getting. Further, the memorandum declared, nations recog-
nizing Russia were not spared propaganda of an "extreme, vicious" nature;
Berlin's chief of political police, for example, reported that the Rapallo treaty had
not stopped revolutionary propaganda in Germany.45
The notion that links with the Soviets might be hazardous to American do-
mestic tranquility was shared by some outside the State Department. These in-
cluded Elihu Root, the former secretary of state, Nobel Peace Prize laureate, and
president of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, who had journeyed
to Russia with his "Root Mission" under the provisional government. He felt that
recognition of Russia would bring an "inevitable decrease of faith in our own in-
stitutions." Most opponents of recognition professed more confidence in the
strength of American organizations than did Root. Perhaps they realized too that
nonrecognition was hardly a barrier to communist advocacy in the United
States.46
As secretary of state, Kellogg quickly put all speculation of abrupt change
to rest. He telegraphed Coleman in Riga that there had been no policy change and
sent all consular and legation offices in Europe the same message. Soviet trade
was strictly at firms' own risk, just as before. Those who asked for advice or in-
formation on the subject were "invariably [told] that ... they must be their own
judges." Nevertheless, Borah did find Kellogg's department to be more concilia-
tory than Hughes's.47
~ THE REGIME OF FRANK B. KELLOGG
Secretary Kellogg, like Hughes, had worked as a trustbuster for the government,
targeting Standard Oil and General Paper Company. A native of Minnesota, Kel-
logg had long been active in the Republican party, and in 1916 he was elected. to
the Senate, where he served one term and, allying with Borah, helped to defeat
the League of Nations. Afterward he obtained the prestigious post of ambassador
to the Court of St. James, where he stayed until his appointment as secretary. Kel-
logg did not "cut an impressive figure," according to one contemporary. Unlike
his dignified and erect predecessor, he was short, "gnarled," and nervously dis-
posed, a condition that he controlled with generous amounts of golf. His biogra-
pher, L. Ethan Ellis, wrote that he is "most fairly viewed as a busy mediocrity."
Yet Loy Henderson, who worked under Kellogg, remembers this administrator as
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inspiring others with the vision that the United States, "in spite of its policy of
noninvolvement, was contributing its share to the maintenance of world peace."
Indeed, the secretary would win the lustrous Nobel Peace Prize for the well-
intentioned, if ineffectual, Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928.48
In 1926 the department's old laissez-faire approach to Russian trade was ar-
ticulated by Robert Kelley, a hard-boiled opponent of bolshevism who ran the
State Department's Eastern European Affairs Division, in a speech to officers
at the Foreign Service School. America could "enjoy the benefits of com-
merce" with the Soviets so long as recognition was not inyolved, he told the audi-
ence. Secretary Kellogg, however, soon made significant adjustments in the
policies that determined economic relations with Soviet Russia. Growing Soviet-
American trade spurred him to shift from Hughes's policy. In 1927, for the first
time, the State Department authorized long-term credit for an American sale to
Moscow. The American Locomotive Sales Company, which had received a large
contract from the Soviet government, was permitted to offer five-year terms of
payment, the kind of credit that is essential for a sizable heavy equipment order.
Kelley, who was advising the department on the matter, had declared that the pro-
posed financing violated the carefully preserved distinction between the estab-
lished and acceptable practice of offering short-term credit to Moscow and the
unprecedented and, in his view, unmerited practice of granting long-term credit.
B'ut he was overruled by three men equally anticommunist in their outlook: Presi-
dent Coolidge, Commerce Secretary Hoover,. and Treasury Secretary Andrew W.
Mellon. They decided that the State Department "would not look with disapproval
upon banking arrangements incidental to the financing of contracts concluded ...
with the Soviet authorities" as long as securities sales were not involved. This was
a significant breakthrough. Herbert Hoover, who had said in 1921 that "trade with
Russia on credit was out of the question" and even more specifically that "com-
munism and long term credits are incompatible," had now endorsed a different
approach.49
So too had the State Department leadership. In 1924 Evan E. Young of the
East European Division had dismissed the potential of Soviet-American com-
merce, scoffing at the idea that anyone would offer large credits and questioning
why any country would send a trade representative to Moscow.5o But in February
1928, Secretary Kellogg issued a four-page statement on his department's Russian
policy, which revealed that long-term credits had become routine. The secretary
vaunted the higher level of trade enjoyed by the United States as compared with
Britain and Germany, both of which had already recognized and signed trade trea-
ties with Moscow. Kellogg declared that his department "endeavored to reduce to
a minimum difficulties affecting commercial relations" between the United States
and the Soviet Union.51 Yet Kellogg's trumpeting of trade did not stop Robert
Kelley from continuing to "promote a hard line toward the Soviets." Kelley's
training of Soviet experts for the department, including George F. Kennan and
Charles E. Bohlen, was designed to inculcate "the values against which to judge
Soviet behavior," and this emphasis was maintained well after recognition.52
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Although long-term credits and even an occasional loan had now become
available to Russia, some commercial restrictions stayed in place.53 America's ban
against Bolshevik bullion was galling to Moscow since the policy was based on
the assertion that gold originating in Russia had been stolen from its prerevolu-
tionary owners. Also at issue was the inequitable way the ban was enforced. Al-
though Russian gold was not permitted entry, Western European nations routinely
serviced their accounts in the United States using remolded Soviet bullion. The
Moscow State Bank decided to test this prohibition in February 1928 and trans-
ported $5 million in gold bars directly to New York, consigning the shipment to
the Chase National Bank andthe Equitable Trust Company. Despite long accept-
ance of "laundered" Soviet gold, this more straightforward use of the metal
became an international issue. Within two weeks, the French ambassador told the
State Department that his government would sue whomever took this gold, be-
cause he claimed it was owed to France. Chase National Bank and Equitable
Trust refused to certify the Soviets' title to the gold shipment bearing the Bolshe-
vik seal because they feared a French lawsuit.54 The Treasury Department ulti-
mately rejected the gold bars on the attorney general's advice that "acceptance
might imply United States recognition of Soviet ownership." Although Soviet of-
ficials had proof that the gold had been manufactured in the mid-twenties and not,
as French representatives alleged, ten years earlier, they were wary of a court
battle. The gold was recalled to Moscow.55
The Tass correspondent covering the event was furious. He declared bitterly
that this was "the only Soviet gold which the American government refused
during recent years. The bourgeoisie imagined itself carefully protected from taint
of Bolshevik gold by the vigilance of Treasury officials," he bristled, yet "hun-
dreds of millions" worth of gold had "entered unprotested" since the early twen-
ties.56 This was completely accurate, as the Federal Reserve itself had noted.57
Yet in other areas there were important successes. In 1928·the International
Civil Aeronautics Conference, which carried U.S. sponsorship, requested permis-
sion from the State Department Division of Protocol to invite representatives from
Amtorg to an upcoming meeting. The conference's executive officer explained,
"The Amtorg Trading Corporation is placing special orders for aircraft equipment
in this country, and undoubtedly there are Russian technical men whom the Con-
ference might like to meet and hear." East European chief Kelley was willing to
allow the networking to proceed, while preserving existing policy of official non-
intercourse with Soviet representatives. Knowing full well that Amtorg men were
all affiliated with the Soviet government, he responded disingenuously, "This De-
partment does not desire to interpose any objection to the presence at the Confer-
ence, in a private capacity, of Russian aeronautical experts or technical men."58
The State Department thus permitted American businessmen to speak to their
Soviet colleagues at an officially sponsored event.
The aeronautical conference was evidence of the growing access that Soviet
representatives were gaining to the United States. In 1925 Amtorg had com-
plained that as many as forty-two Soviet purchasing agents wanted to come to the
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United States but were prevented by visa regulations.59 Three years later the
American military attache in Paris reported that "about 100 men" had passed
through France from Russia on their way to the United States. "While some of
these men are doubtless going to America for the purpose of buying goods, estab-
lishing credits and other financial arrangements, advantage is being taken of this
legitimate business for the purpose of introducing into our country a large number
of Bolshevik political workers," alleged T. Bentley Mott. Soon after, J. Edgar
Hoover noted that three men were coming to lobby for recognition of Russia, but
"they will enter the U.S. ostensibly for the purpose of negotiating for the purchase
of automobiles and other machinery."6o
Stalin claimed that these fears of political intrigue were exaggerated. In
1929 he stated that "No representative of the USSR has the right to meddle in the
internal affairs of countries in which he is directed, not directly, not indirectly."
This had been expressed in the "most firm and strict orders to all our personal
staff in Soviet agencies in the U.S." He mentioned the Amtorg staff specifically:
"Bron and his colleagues are not the least bit connected with propaganda in any
way." Unlike Amtorg, however, the executive committee of the Comintern faced
no such constraints. It had an ambitious agenda for the American Communists.
"The Workers Party must actively struggle with the imperialist policy of the
American capitalist class," the executive committee resolved in 1929. The party
"must energetically help national-revolutionary movements in countries which are
now colonies," including the Philippines, Cuba, and Puerto Rico, since "the
American capitalist class ... using the Dawes plan as its principal big stick" was
trying to subjugate North and South America as well as Asia. The Comintern's
leadership blamed this imperialism on "the gigantic industrial expansion of the
U.S."61 This expansion was being fueled, ironically, by Soviet orders, which con-
tinued to increase thanks to greater access to credits.
~ CREDITS BECOME THE CURRENCY OF TRADE
Initially, American firms had tightly restricted their financing in accordance with
Washington's posture toward the Soviets.62 But in 1924 Soviet reports noted an
"undoubted improvement in conditions of credit," although it was short-term.
Credits to Russia averaged just over five months then, and many firms required 50
to 75 percent of the order amount up front. By fiscal year 1925-1926 the average
length of American-based financing had almost doubled, and the amount of credit
available had also significantly increased, as Soviet accounts confirm.63
International Harvester was among the first major American firms to offer
financing to the Soviet Union. Shortly after the revolution, one of the managers of
the firm's struggling Russian plant, Sidney McAllister, had told a company offi-
cial in Chicago that "in a business sense, our people and our government, whether
they like [it] ... or not, if they want to do business, must get into the game imme-
diately." Harvester began selling American-made products to the Soviet coopera-
tive Selskosoyuz as early as 1920. By 1924 Harvester was offering financing to
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several of the New York-based Soviet cooperatives for binders, trucks, reapers,
and mowers. The arrangement required 50 percent down and monthly payments
so that the purchase would be completely paid for one year after delivery.64
In October 1924 Amtorg sought a $1.5 million to $2 million credit from
Harvester with no money down. Amtorg officials Isaiah Hurgin and Paul Ziev in-
formed Harvester's O.H. Browning that "in none of their transactions are they
asked to pay 20 percent cash with their orders." Ziev declared that Harvester was
impelling Russian business to go to German factories, where terms were "very
liberal," as were Canadian requirements. Ziev showed Browning a letter from the
Massey Harris Company indicating that the firm granted Amtorg two years' credit
with no money down and the first payment of 20 percent due six months after the
goods were received in Russia. Harvester's less liberal terms made Amtorg vitu-
perative. "Mr. Ziev advised us that if we had the very best truck in the world, and
at the very lowest prices of any, he would not, under the present circumstances,
buy ours," Browning related.65
Yet Harvester machines were, as always, highly desired in Russia, and the
company's terms were actually better than those of its chief rival, Ford Motor
Company. The Dearborn firm offered no credit until late 1925 yet still managed to
get the lion's share of the Soviet tractor market through that year owing to the ef-
forts of Armand Hammer's export agency and the passion for all Ford products
and methods, which were thought to be the wave of the future.66 Realizing the ad-
vantages Harvester offered, Amtorg placed a $1.5 million order with Harvester in
late 1924 with terms of half payment, half credit. The Harvester officials were
pleased to report that payment "was made promptly at maturity."67
International Harvester was "the first of any importance to extend credit to
the Russian Government," according to Fayette Allport, representative of the
Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce in Brussels. Harvester's action
prompted Ford to offer 25 percent credit beginning in late 1925. George Sando-
mirsky, Harvester's Russian agent, wrote, "The Commissar of Foreign Trade had
been dealing with the Ford Co. and trying to get Ford tractors on a credit basis,
with the hope that, if they offered Ford an order for 10,000 tractors, they might
expect to receive them with a fifty percent [credit] from 6-9 months."68
Thus, the Soviet Union "used the [Harvester] arrangement in many countries
as a lever to obtain similar or more advantageous arrangements," Allport observed.
Harvester was contacted by many foreign firms, as well as the French Ministry of
Commerce, requesting details. Harvester, gun-shy from its losses through nation-
alization, did not permit the outstanding amount at any given moment to exceed
$4 million and always received a bank guarantee for its credits from the Soviet
banks in London. Yet, Allport intimated, "the bank guarantee is of course little
more than a fiction" because these financial institutions were Soviet-linked. Al-
though firms in other countries, including Canadian, Swedish, German, and
Czechoslovakian manufacturers, were besting the Harvester terms-the Swedes
offering up to two years' credit with no cash down-the Soviets still liked to brag
about their Harvester credits "because it is undoubtedly the most responsible con-
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cern from which the Soviet Government has been able to obtain credit," noted All-
port. Yet Soviet purchasers always desired better conditions and Harvester official
E.A. Brittenham related that he was "constantly under pressure" to ease credit.69
This pressure came internally as well. Sandomirsky believed that Harvester
could still get a share of the Soviet tractor business, estimated at $7.5 million or
about eighteen thousand tractors for 1925-1926, if only the "percent of cash pay-
ments were reduced." German firms were taking away much of the business.
Deutsche Works and Krupp shared a $10 million order that year, and Sandomir-
sky feared that "the fulfillment of these orders will result in German machines
being forced on to the Russian farmer, who still is trying to get a McCormick or
Deering Machine."70
Because of these competitive pressures, Harvester for the first time in 1925
extended its payment terins beyond one year, granting an eighteen-month,
$2.5 million credit to Amtorg. This accelerated a significant move by the Soviets
away from Fordson tractors to other makes. Ford continued to be very tightfisted
with financing and also experienced problems in its production of spare parts
after 1926.71
Harvester's financing contributed to a larger trend, and by 1925-1926 the
length of financing offered to Russia by the average firm had significantly in-
creased.72 Even as company-supplied credits were becoming common, however,
unsecured financing was not. When W. Averell Harriman and Company wanted to
extend a $35 million credit to German industrial firms to promote German exports
to Russia in May 1926, the firm ran into roadblocks at the State Department. Har-
riman's effort was part of a 300-million-mark credit to Russia to permit purchases
of German light equipment and heavy machinery, and his credit was of course
pushed by the German government and the Reichsbank.73 Leland Harrison ex-
plained that the State Department objected to the proposal because it would entail
"the employment of American credit for the purpose of making an advance to the
Soviet regime." The government declared that its disapproval of a loan to Moscow
was key in the decision, rather than opposition to German-Soviet trade.74
However, there are indications that fear of aiding a competitor was a princi-
pal reason for the rejection of Harriman's financing. American officials were be-
ginning to see Germany as an important rival for Soviet business. Every year
between 1923 and 1930, with only two exceptions, Germany edged out the
United States in exports to Russia. 75 Since Washington already facilitated private
American loans to Germany under the Dawes Plan, and these loans partly fi-
nanced Soviet-German trade, the State Department's decisionto prohibit Harri-
man's involvement was also contradictory.76 In 1926 journalist H. Parker Willis
warned members of the NAM that the Germans were using American bank loans
to finance their exports to Russia. He asked critically, "Will [the Russians] get
their funds from American bankers, or will they get their goods from American
manufacturers?"77
Washington's position against Harriman's loan, however, dimmed German
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hopes for effecting "economic pioneer work in Eastern Europe." According to a
German newspaper, greater access to the Eastern markets was necessary since
"Germany's hopes for a benevolent attitude of the Western Powers toward import-
ing German goods have not been fulfilled." In 1928 Chase National Bank backed
an even more ambitious, and similarly unsecured, effort to finance railway bonds
for the Soviet State Bank at 9 percent. It too was denied by the State Department.
These difficulties did not prevent Germany from offering sizable long-term fi-
nancing to Russia. In 1929 Berlin hoped to offer an additional large credit to sup-
port Russo-German trade, as the German ambassador to Russia, Dr. Herbert von
Dirksen, informed American ambassador to Germany Jacob Gould Schurman. In
a further demonstration of the irrevocable connection between American financ-
ing of Germany and German financing of Soviet trade, Berlin was told to wait
until "the Young plan and associated questions have been definitely settled"
before extending the credit.78
The government's opposition to unsecured Soviet financing-that is, fi-
nancing that was not tied to orders for American goods-should not obscure the
importance of Washington's decision to loosen its policy on long-term credits.
Authorizing such credits was clearly the most important innovation in u.S. eco-
nomic policy toward Russia in the late twenties. In 1928, following American
Locomotive Sales' five-year financing arrangement with Moscow, International
General Electric offered an even larger five-year credit-$25 million toward the
Soviet purchase of massive electrical apparatus. It made a "profound impression"
among businessmen,. according to gleeful Soviet sources. General Electric re-
quired only a 25 percent down payment, far better than the deposits often de-
manded by other firms, with the balance to be paid five years from the scheduled
shipping dates. Clark R. Minor, president of International General Electric, an-
nounced that the contract, because of its "higher rate of interest charged," would
settle all nationalization claims against the Soviets, which then amounted to $1.75
million.79 Certainly this was a violation of the spirit, if not the letter, of State De-
partment policy that all claims be repaid before new financial assistance was of-
fered. As a Tass correspondent crowed, "General Electric considers new business
importanter [sic] than pre-Revolutionary claims."80
The contract had taken more than a year to hammer out and was negotiated
under the watchful eye of the State Department. Assistant Secretary of State
William R. Castle Jr. noted, "As this was merely a financial credit not involving
Russian securities in the American market, it was not a thing that we would disap-
prove formally." This appears to be an example of diplomatic double-talk. It is
difficult to imagine the department accepting such a liberal financing proposal just
two or three years before, when such arrangements were discouraged. The State
Department had its own reasons for approving the deal, and one of them was the
notion that "hopes awakened by the GE contract" would undermine the German-
Russian trading relationship.81
In 1928 Saul Bron of Amtorg reported, "About fifty first-class firms, each
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of which is a leader in its particular sphere, have offered considerably improved
conditions for short-term credits." As long-term credits were also becoming more
frequent, "all of this gives reason for a certain optimism in estimating the imme-
diate prospect of development of the business relations between the USSR and the
United States."82 Bron's hopes were fulfilled. In 1929 he reported that his agency
had received one-year credit terms from over two hundred companies and longer
terms from many others.83
Isaac Sherman's Industrial Credit Corporation, founded in 1927, greatly
aided this effort. Since Amtorg had been unsuccessful in selling its acceptances to
banks, Sherman would "assume the risk of postponed payments," using a $3 mil-
lion fund, by purchasing Amtorg acceptances and then trying to sell them to
others. William R. Corson and Robert T. Crowley write that Sherman's credit
company was completely subsidized by the Soviet trading agency and did not
entail Sherman's "own money," as he had claimed. It was "simply intended to
provide access to that part of the U.S. business community that did not want to
deal directly with Amtorg."84
The trend toward greater accessibility in credit enabled the import-export
trade to increase from 1923 to 1930 by more than 2300 percent, from $6 million
to nearly $140 million. The great bulk of this was American exports, and most of
the increase took place after the Five-Year Plan had replaced the New Economic
Policy in 1928.85 The plan's economic blueprint was largely oriented to heavy in-
dustry. By the end of the decade, Soviet orders represented a significant share of
several sectors of the American economy, including oil drilling and refining
equipment, agricultural implements, construction and mining machinery, and
electrical and metalworking apparatus.86
Between 1925 and 1929 the largest item the United States sold Russia was
fifty million rubles' worth of farming machines, including twenty thousand trac-
tors, mainly Fordsons, but also lesser quantities of International, Harris, Keyes,
and Advance Rumely models. Together these shipments amounted to 25 percent
of all American tractor exports. Metal and electrical equipment-including grind-
ing machines, high-speed precision lathes, and mining, boring, and quarrying im-
plements from firms such as Cincinnati Milling, American Tool, Pratt and
Whitney, and Brown and Sharpe-was worth.twenty-five million rubles in·total
sales. The oil industry purchased fifteen million rubles' worth of American equip-
ment and technology, and the automobile industry ordered three and one-half mil-
lion rubles' worth of Fords, Buicks, Packards, Dodges, and Harley Davidsons.87
American products were preferred in Russia because of their advanced
technological design, although U.S. firms had to compete with German ones,
which had the advantages of proximity as well as a trade treaty that included ex-
tensive government-backed long-term credits for Moscow. Overall, American and
other Western technology acquired during the First Five-Year Plan had a tremen-
dous impact upon the industrialization of the Soviet Union, contributing in a
major way to the plan's success.88 So dependent was the Soviet Union on foreign
technical assistance that International Harvester claimed in 1930 that the Soviets
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were trying to get 150 American engineers and other technical workers at Har-
vester and GE to leave their jobs and work in Russian plants by offering raises of
50 to 100 percent.89 Despite such suspected double-dealing, technical assistance
contracts and the expansion in exports during the early plan were beneficial for
both American suppliers and their Soviet customers.
Herbert Hoover could take some credit for his Commerce Depart-
ment's contributions to the Soviet-American trade relationship that peaked in
1929-1931. Nevertheless, Soviet sources were convinced that Hoover's refusal to
distance himself as president from Hughes's old demands on debts, claims, and
propaganda was evidence that Hoover remained "hostile" to the Soviet govern-
ment. Officially, American diplomatic relations with Russia had changed little
since the end of the First World War. When Rep. C.B. McClintock asked Secre-
tary of State Henry L. Stimson what kind of safeguards existed for several of his
Connecticut constituents who were going to work in Russia in the fall of 1929,
Stimson answered tersely, "Persons who proceed to Russia in present circum-
stances must do so at their own risk." The secretary reassured McClintock, how-
ever, that he had received no reports of harm to "the not inconsiderable number of
American citizens" already in Russia. Similarly, Worthington Pump and Ma-
chinery wished to send a Russian-born, naturalized American citizen to install an
oraer of machinery in Russia. But Robert Kelley informed the company that since
the State Department lacked a naturalization treaty with Russia, it "can give no
assurance that such a person would not be treated as a Russian citizen should he
place himself within the jurisdiction of Russia."90
Despite such difficulties, those who wished to trade with Russia were doing
well. In late 1928 the American-Russian Chamber of Commerce surveyed its
membership for information regarding their experiences in doing business with
the Soviet Union. More than half of the members responded, and in a positive
fashion, as the organization noted: "The majority of the replies stated that credits
had been extended and that all obligations were carried out meticulously." The
Bausch and Lomb Company was typical, reporting that "payment has invariably
been prompt" in their dealings with Amtorg. The export manager of Black and
Decker Manufacturing similarly stated, "We feel very optimistic about the possi-
bilities of securing business in that territory.... We have had 100% help and co-
operation from the Amtorg organization, and are going to continue to keep a
representative permanently in the USSR."91
H.I. Freyn of the Freyn Engineering Company, which served as technical
adviser to the iron and steel industry of Russia, offered a glowing report. The firm
was planning to broaden its consulting agreement and noted that "the aim of the
Soviet Government is Americanization on as broad a scale as possible." But,
Freyn cautioned, "If American bankers, engineers, industrials and merchants are
unwilling to furnish the aid for which Soviet Russia stretches out its hand, other
nations will have to do it, and will do it." Other firms offered similarly positive
sentiments. Samuel Newberger, whose firm supplied the All-Russian Textile
Syndicate, found his customer "most punctilious and correct in its manner of han-
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dling both actual cotton transactions and contracts of all forms." Charles E. Stuart,
of Stuart, James, and Cooke, Inc., technical advisers of the coal industry of
Russia, was very upbeat. His firm had "the largest individual group of foreign en,...
gineers in Russia." Although Stuart had heard rumors of starvation and other dif-
ficulties, he could find little evidence of them. Moreover, he affirmed that the
Soviets paid their bills. This consistently positive response on Soviet payments
and potential was drawn from a group devoted to Soviet trade. But those who sold
to the Soviet Union rarely found reason to complain about payments on current
accounts. It was the old debts that were unmet.92
In July and August 1929 the chamber with much fanfare sent a delegation
of one hundred---'-including businessmen, their wives, socialites, and tourists-for
a month to the USSR to explore economic possibilities.93 Alexander Gumberg,
who organized the trip along with Chase National Bank's Reeve Schley, re-
marked, "Our delegation was the first large group of foreign travelers to make
such an extensive trip in Russia under comfortable conditions." In the first leg of
the trip, travelers stopped in Leningrad, Moscow, and Nizhni Novgorod (Gorky),
where Ford was making plans to erect an automobile factory. The group then
floated down the Volga to Stalingrad and went on to the Caucasus resorts and oil
regions in Georgia. Finally reaching the areas of heavy industry, they saw the
Donetz coal mines, the Dniepropetrovsk steel mills, the Kichkas-Dnieprostroi
dam, which was the showpiece of Hugh Cooper, and the cities of Kiev and Khar-
kov before returning to Moscow.94
The 95 guests, each of whom paid $1,000, traveled almost six thousand
miles by luxurious train, steamer, and automobile. The junket received wide
coverage in American papers, and Alex Gumberg heralded the trade potential of
the trip.95 It also drew the attention of the Russian public, especially when some
of the women on the train donned their silk pajamas to cope with the heat. Time
magazine poked fun at the "sack suits" male delegates had to wear to avoid "vani-
ties that might strike a bourgeois note in the communist paradise."96
Serious business was conducted during the trip too, and these initial con-
tacts led to some of the major construction and consulting contracts of the First
Five-Year Plan. Most spectacularly, the Austin Company of Cleveland agreed to
build the Ford automobile plant near Nizhni Novgorod. Ford had already signed a
four-year technical assistance contract for the construction of an $18 million fac-
tory, for which Ford would contribute approximately 40 percent, as well as supply
technical experts and train Soviet workers and engineers. Using parts that Ford
would sell (worth up to $30 million over the life of the deal), the plant would be
capable of assembling thirty thousand cars and twenty thousand trucks annually
by 1933. The Soviet Union had in 1929 only twenty thousand cars on its roads,
half of which were in working condition. The first Ford was built in Nizhni Nov-
gorod in 1932.97
Westinghouse representatives also agreed to provide equipment for a.power
plant in the Stalingrad tractor factory, and twenty other firms began negotiations
during the trip, including the Animal Trap Company, Bristol Patent Leather, Rem-
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ington 'Rand, International Business Machines, Underwood Elliott Fisher, and
Gillette Safety Razor. MacDonald Engineering Company of Chicago used the op-
portunity to contract to build grain elevators and refrigerator plants.98
The Soviets treated the Americans well. Better, indeed, than they treated the
British, despite the fact that Great Britain imported more from Russia than the
United States did. The Swedish newspaper Stokholms Tidningen editorialized that
this Soviet attitude was intended to make the British "frightened by the success of
the Americans into being more accommodating." Britain had broken diplomatic
relations with Russia in 1927 after alleging seditious and propagandistic activities
at Arcos, the Soviet purchasing agency in London. Moscow's favorable treatment
toward the Americans had also been bestowed "to gain the benignity of the
United States and to obtain their goods."99
In 1929 Stalin was concerned that a burgeoning Soviet-American commer-
cial relationship would be undone by treacherous European rivals. "Germans con-
stantly cry that the position of the Soviet Government is precarious and that it is not
justified to open serious credits with Soviet economic organizations, but at the
same time, they try to monopolize trade relations with the USSR, and offer credit."
Stalin accused British businessmen also of conducting "an anti-Soviet campaign"
even as they "made an attempt to organize credit for the USSR." Stalin asked,
"How to explain these two-faced German and English businesspeople? They want
to monopolize to themselves the trade relations with Russia, abusing and driving
away the United States from us." Stalin regretted that "the United States is entirely
distant from this struggle" but remained convinced that the United States and the
Soviet Union still had a "great basis for broad business relations."lOo
The contracts signed under the auspices of the American-Russian Chamber
of Commerce in 1929 served to· confirm the Soviet dictator's hopes for American
business. Yet D.C. Poole, observing the returning delegates from his post as coun-
selor at the embassy in Berlin, was skeptical. Although he conceded the impor-
tance of the Austin factory-building deal, he pointed out that International Business
Machines "did no business. IBM found that some of the ideas of the company had
been pirated and some of their patents copied." Moreover, John L. Senior of
Cowham Engineering, who had harbored ideas about building a cement plant in
the Soviet Union, had been convinced by the trip to "give up any idea of entering
the Russian field," Poole noted. As for Westinghouse, its representatives "are un-
derstood to have come out of Russia with the somewhat obvious conclusion that
while sales to Russia should be increased, credit facilities should not."lOl
The tour itself had certainly been Potemkinesque. "Practically all the mem-
bers" agreed that they had been through a staged performance and "only at nights,
in bed, were they left alone," a German newspaper reported. The unrelenting
"cleanliness of the entourage, the lack of beggars, the efficient supply of factories
and mines and the satisfaction of peasants . . . became obvious" as carefully
scripted. The chamber's officials could hardly have missed this themselves, and
they did not publicly disagree with these assessments. 102
Yet Alexander Gumberg had been visiting Russia for the Chase National
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Bank regularly, and the chamber's journey struck him "more favorably than any
previous visit, chiefly because of the increased industrial activity in the country
since the inauguration ~f the five-year industrial program." The organization did
not intend to prepare a formal report about the trip, as had a delegation of British
industrialists earlier that year. The British delegation had been traveling under of-
ficial auspices. to explore the restoration of relations between Britain and the
Soviet Union. A similar report from the American Chamber of Commerce might
be seen as provocative, because its mission had not carried official sanction.
Schley noted, "Our Chamber . . . has endeavored not to be drawn into contro-
versy on political subjects."lo3 The chamber's primary orientation certainly was
trade, not politics. Nevertheless, the organization became active when its leaders
saw it as necessary to promote commerce. In 1931, chamber members helped to
roll back stiff restrictions on Soviet raw material exports to the United States. On
the more purely "political" issue of recognition, however, the group took little
part until the summer of 1933, when its agent in Russia served as a go-between
for American officials and the Soviet government. 104
After returning from its Russian mission in November 1929, the chamber
reassessed the effectiveness ofits agent in Moscow, Charles H. Smith, and the lo-
cation of his office. Neither was deemed satisfactory. Smith himself was consid-
ered too old and passive for a post where the chamber needed dynamic leadership.
He also lacked a "clean slate". A former member of the International Peasant
Soviet, Smith had mining and lumber interests in the Soviet Far East and accord-
ing to the State Department was "more or less an agent of the Soviet Govern-
ment," an opinion confirmed by Raymond Robins. 105 Smith was perceived as too
radical to be properly businesslike. Also, he was not helping develop the business
of the group's members, and the chamber had a financial deficit and could ill
afford an ineffectual administrator. To make matters worse; his quarters in
Moscow were in an inconvenient location. Declining finances meant that the
chamber had not been able to pay Smith since January 1929. Although the cham-
ber's ranks had grown to 156 members, its highest number ever, this was still not
enough to cover the expenses of the summer Russian delegation, the publication
of a yearbook, and Smith's operation. To make up the difference, the chamber
would lean on its major members. The chamber received no funding from Russia,
the only organization of its kind not supported by the country with which it was
affiliated. 106
The chamber decided to move its offices to the Soviet Union's Chamber of
Commerce for the West, or Torgpalata, which would provide rent-free space and
a better location. The organization also agreed to pay Smith $7,500 in back salary
and look for a new agent. The desirable hire would be someone who was "not
over 40, active and energetic, who has had business experience and who will be
able to establish cqntacts in Russia and keep in touch with all business develop-
ments there." At Gumberg's suggestion, and to protect Smith's feelings, he would
be told only that the office was closing. Smith was warmly congratulated on his
"pioneer work in developing American-Russian relations."107 Tatiana Sofiano, a
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secretary at the USSR Chamber of Commerce who had served the delegation the
previous summer, temporarily took Smith's place. The Soviet government did not
mind sparing Sofiano, "an astute and omnipresent Soviet figure among Americans
working in Moscow." In her many capacities, she remained loyal to the Soviet se-
curity apparatus. The chamber eventually hired Spencer Williams, a young news-
paper reporter who had joined the trip to Russia, for Smith's post in 1930.108
Some were unhappy with this change in personnel. The head of the Torg-
palata, L.M. Khinchuk, wired the chamber expressing his displeasure about
Smith's resignation. The departure of this "sincere friend of the Soviet Union"
was considered a "serious loss to the establishment of relations." Khinchuk was
joined in his sentiments by six American newspaper correspondents, including
William Henry Chamberlain of the Christian Science Monitor, Walter Duranty of
the New York Times, and Eugene Lyons of the United Press. They had come to
rely upon Smith as their liaison with the Kremlin. Spencer Williams proved to be
an asset to the chamber, however, serving in Moscow until 1940, when the Nazi-
Soviet alliance made Soviet-American trade vexatious. Many of the American
goods exported during that brief period were resold to the Nazis and in December
1939 President Roosevelt ordered a "moral embargo" against shipments of air-
craft and weaponry to Russia. 109
During the 1920s, the groundwork had been laid and the financial scaffold-
ing erected for a burgeoning trade relationship between the United States and
Russia. Although Washington remained intransigent on the subject of diplomatic
relations, officials such as Hoover and Kellogg had facilitated trade with the So-
viets by permitting the extension of once forbidden long-term credits. Economic
pressure had influenced foreign policy and helped legitimize the Soviet regime in
the United States.
AMERICAN BUSINESSMEN,
THE NEP, AND THE
FIRST FIVE-YEAR PLAN
The great expansion in Soviet-American trade relations discussed in the previous
chapter was accompanied by an equally significant growth of American invest-
ment in Russia, related to the launching of the New Economic Policy. By the end
of 1920 the ideological zeal of war communism had reached its apogee. As Alec
Nove suggests, by then Lenin himself had "gone right off the rails" in pursuit of
peasant surpluses and supposedly wealthy "kulaks" in order to feed the soldiers
and the urban workers. 1 But growing unrest among the peasants, as well as a
revolt by sailors at the Kronstadt base in March 1921, helped the Soviet leader
and some of his colleagues see that war communism had reached its limits.
The New Economic Policy (NEP), launched in 1921, allowed peasants to
pay a tax in kind on their goods rather than face outright requisitioning; it also
permitted small businesses to operate and invited foreign investors into Russia to
build up the country's industry. By December 1921 Lenin could declare that
Russia's domestic crisis was finally being addressed: "We have placed on a cor-
rect footing the problem we have been handling this year and which up to now
we have handled so badly-that of forming a sound economic alliance of the
workers and peasants." But a lasting economic solution also required international
engagement: "Without definite relations between us and the capitalist countries
we cannot have stable economic relations."2 This tum toward capitalism at home
and abroad was of course a step backward for the revolution but was necessary
nevertheless, as Lenin explained to the Seventh Moscow Gubernia Conference in
1921: "We shall go on retreating until we have completed our [economic] educa-
tion; until we have made our preparations for a definite offensive."3
NEP's scheme to attract foreign investment found a strong supporter in
Commissar of Foreign Trade Leonid Krasin. He knew that Soviet Russia needed
capitalists to finance and operate industrial facilities and recognized that Russia's
dearth of experienced production managers was endangering the country's eco-
nomic health and its future. During the Revolution and war communism, many of
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the country's educated and experienced supervisors and technicians had become
"demoralized" or had simply "disappeared," he noted. The ever-practical Krasin
recommended foreign concessions as a means to provide "hard currency, technol-
ogy, and administrative direction with the obligation of definite development of
production" in the USSR. Like the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, which was also signed
with a foe, deals with the capitalists would allow the Bolsheviks to "start putting
things in order at home and deepening the socialist revolution," as Lenin put it.4
Although concessions drew a great deal of interest in the early twenties, at-
tracting nearly three thousand applicants, only 6 percent of them actually began
operations between 1921 and 1923. Lenin was perplexed. "Our concessions
policy seems to me to be excellent. But despite that, we do not have any profitable
concessions." The situation had significantly improved by the mid-twenties. The
initial flurry of "speculators" dissipated, as V.A. Shishkin notes, and 482 applica-
tions yielded 110 operating concessions in 1925-1926. Although these foreign in-
vestments comprised only one-half of one percent of production in 1926-1927,
their peak year, they made a very significant contribution to the technological de-
velopment of the Soviet Union.5
Once NEP had been instituted, Lenin had to continue to defend its provi-
sions for international investment in Russia. As he acknowledged, offering con-
cessions "look[ed] like a bloc with foreign capitalism," but he vowed that "the
property of the landlords and capitalists. would not be restored." To those who
might disagree, he lectured, "To think that we can get out of this [desperate eco-
nomic] state without crutches is to understand nothing!" But he also intended to
limit the power of concessionaires, reassuring critics: "There is nothing to fear in
concessions so long as we retain possession of all the state enterprises and weigh
up exactly and strictly the concessions we grant, and the terms and scale on which
we grant them. Growing capitalism will be under control and supervision, while
political power will remain in the hands of ... the workers' state."6 These politi-
cal limitations, along with a deeply rooted disdain for foreign investors and a
growing advocacy of state-run enterprises to effect rapid industrialization, would
prevent the Soviets from developing a lasting relationship with the capitalists.
In the beginning, foreign investment was vital, regardless of the inconsis-
tencies it created. In a speech he gave in early 1921, Lenin declared, "So long as
revolution is not complete, bourgeois capital will be useful to us as we can accel-
erate the development of our economic life." At the same time, the Chief Conces-
sions Committee of the Supreme Soviet of the National Economy (Vesenkha)
recognized that in order to bring an increase in exports of raw materials and
native industry, improvement in domestic transport and in manufacturing capa-
bility was required. Indeed, it was a vicious circle, for it was impossible to
"restor[e] transport and industry without improving exports, and improving ex-
ports can't be imagined without preparing to receive from abroad the necessary
locomotives, rails, machines, and other equipment of industry." Yet the Vesenkha
also recognized the drawback to allowing foreigners to export Russia's "natural
riches" and exploit its workers. "The principal disadvantage of concessions . . .
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is the recognition for concessionaires of the right to partial property in equipment
of the undertakings and products . . . granted them by the right to export abroad
products of the concessions." But the committee recognized that without the
concessionaires, there might be no machinery from abroad "to equip factories and
plants, materials necessary to us for technical, organizational, and administrative
strengths." Foreign capital was thus the prerequisite for financing imports, infra-
structure, and, finally, the manufacture of exports.?
Although the NEP has been portrayed as the "encouragement, by the state,
of a private business sector," concessionaires soon found that this "private sector"
was a highly public matter. After Lenin's death, opposition to concessions, both
ideological and opportunistic, increased. The ~'fundamentaldilemma of NEP"-
the potential enriching of groups such as peasants, Nepmen, and foreign investors,
"whose basic outlook was inimical to the regime"-became more and more unac-
ceptable.8 By 1926 "increasing emphasis on the need to industrialize the Soviet
Union on its own resources restricted the scope for concessions," as Carr and
Davies write.9
This change in policy was unfortunate not only for Western businessmen,
but also for Leon Trotsky, who became head of the Chief Concessions Committee
in 1925. Trotsky, a former foe of concessions who had once argued for reliance on
internal resources instead, had by 1925 come to embrace foreign investment. In
his new post, he was concerned about the slow pace of industrialization and the
low output of Soviet workers. As Richard Day points out, Trotsky recognized that
capitalist investment would ensure" 'the transfer to our country of foreign plant,
foreign productive formulae, and the financing of our economy.'" Trotsky be-
lieved, notes Jon Jacobson, that "importing the most sophisticated and expensive
technology ... would catapult the USSR into the industrial future and allow it to
create the objective basis for true economic independence from capitalism."l0
Stalin and Bukharin, however, had now taken up Trotsky's former position against
concessions and in favor of autarky, and it was dangerously provocative for the
former Red Army chief to advocate the opposite course so strongly. Trotsky knew
Stalin's views were highly influential in the party and accused his rival, who had
placed Trotsky in his new post, as aiming "purposely to compromise [me] in the
eyes of young communists." He added acidly, "It's already being said that I'm on
Averell Harriman's payroll."11 In character, Trotsky tried to use the post as a
springboard for his "attack on [Stalin's] reactionary theory of 'socialism in a
single country.'" He declared, "We are becoming a part, a highly individual but
nevertheless component part of the world market." But in his new incarnation as
foreign investment enthusiast and world integrationist, Day suggests, Trotsky
"committed political suicide."12
The New Economic Policy's promise of improved Soviet trade and invest-
ment opportunities initially caught the imagination of American businessmen, un-
aware of the difficulties and party battles that were to come. In terms of actual
financial benefit, however, the plan brought disappointing results. As Evan E.
Young of the Department of State's Division of Eastern European Affairs noted,
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"The experience of foreign business men has been that the practical working out
of concessions has fallen far short of expectations with the result that many firms
have withdrawn from their Russian enterprises."13
~ INTERNATIONAL HARVESTER AND THE
NEW ECONOMIC POLICY
Young was writing in 1924, the same year that the International Harvester Com-
pany finally pulled out of Soviet Russia, and the history of that firm's Lubertzy
works near Moscow well illustrates the conflict between American businessmen
and Soviet economic planners during the NEP era. One of the few large private
enterprises to survive war communism and its wide-scale nationalizations, Lu-
bertzy faced a new threat during the New Economic Policy when the Soviet
government pressured Harvester to tum Lubertzy into a concession and thereby
make a major investment in its plant.
Since its opening in 1910, the Harvester factory had manufactured thou-
sands of inexpensive, rudimentary reaping machines known as logobreiki (liter-
ally, "brow-sweaters"), as well as more sophisticated Deering reapers and en-
gines. As the predominant prewar producer of agricultural machinery in Russia,
Harvester manufactured 97 percent of that country's reapers and binders for what
became by 1914 the firm's largest foreign market. As the largest prerevolutionary
investor in Russia, Harvester managed to tum a slight profit at Lubertzy up until
the First World War. 14
In November 1917 Lubertzy still had a work force of more than two thou-
sand, ranging from engineers, draftsmen, and factory workers to secretaries,
bakers, doctors, nurses, and teachers, among whom, as the firm readily acknowl-
edged, "we no doubt have many [socialists]."15 After November the plant contin-
ued to gain government contracts despite the upheaval in Russia, first from the
farmers' cooperative, Selskosoyuz, and after 1919 from the new government agri-
cultural machinery agency, Selmash. I6 Even so, the company's leaders had to
cope with lagging sales, labor disruptions, and food and transportation shortages.
In the earliest days of the revolution, the bloody street fighting in Moscow inter-
rupted daily operations and resulted in at least one unsuccessful takeover at-
tempt. I7
In the ensuing months, government decrees undermined Harvester's ability
to operate the factory. The situation for Harvester was even worse in the prov-
inces, where the firm maintained a network of branch houses that delivered imple-
ments to local farmers. Lacey G. Gray, who worked for the company in Omsk
where he also served as a U.S. vice consul, protested that "the combined worry of
keeping this, that, and the other of our personal effects from being requisitioned
and the shortage of food had made [Harvester agent FJ.] Brown, Mr. Jordan, the
British vice-consul, and myself decide it was not a place for white men [SiC]."I8
Harvester's main plant got some help from Raymond Robins, head of the
American Red Cross in Russia. Robins developed close connections with Soviet
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leaders, including Lenin and Trotsky, during the first six months of the revolution.
"Colonel Raymond Robins . . . has a very good and clear understanding of this
situation and its necessities as relating to the American government and Ameri-
can commercial interests," manager Sidney McAllister noted. This greatly bene-
fited Harvester. Robins's "entree with the Bolsheviks" helped the firm fend off
several takeover threats and assisted it to secure contracts for Lubertzy. During
one takeover attempt, McAllister reported, "[Robins's] speaking of the matter at
headquarters resulted in [government representative] Kosmin coming to us with
instructions, as he stated, to straighten out all difficulties of our Company."
Robins's efforts helped keep Harvester from being immediately nationalized, and
it continued to receive orders from the Soviet government. 19
The Soviets spared Lubertzy from nationalization during their initial drive
to control the economy's "commanding heights" in 1918-1919, not only owing to
·Robins's efforts but also because of Harvester's position as the major producer of
machinery for agriculture, the most vital economic sector in the Soviet Union.
Because large industry was, in Lenin's words, "incredibly devastated," the gov-
ernment -required some factories that were operational.20 George Sandomirsky,
Russian manager of the plant, informed Harvester officials in Europe that Lu-
bertzy had "established good, cordial relations with the ... Vesenka and with
the Commissariat of Food and Supplies [the distributor of Harvester machines]."
Harvester had avoided the seizure of any company assets by emphasizing that
"our Company means real work," and it made an important contribution to the
Soviet economy.21
Harvester's situation in the USSR remained uncertain nonetheless into the
early years of the New Economic Policy. The country was in a "transitional
phase," Lenin acknowledged, and "we are forced to seek highly complex forms of
relationships." Harvester officials realized that their status in Russia was as "pre-
carious" as it was "exceptional." Harvester's delicate position is confirmed by the
Soviet government's refusal in 1920 to let the firm import $50,000 worth of medi-
cal goods and clothing for Lubertzy. As a company official reported, authorities
"could not allow our factory at Lubertzy (which is unnationalized) to take better
care of its workmen than the nationalized concerns could take." T.H. Anderson of-
fered a realistic appraisal: "Our position in Russia calls for a different and more
conciliatory policy than fims whose property has been confiscated. Our Com-
pany should invest a reasonable amount to assist Lubertzy and show our good in-
tentions . . . and thereby in a measure further secure our assets in Russia." It
was for this reason that the firm decided neither to financially support nor to par-
ticipate in a proposed exploratory mission to Russia sponsored by the U.S. Cham-
ber of Commerce. "I believe we have too large [an] interest in Russia to let up in
furthering any plan of this nature and we have, perhaps, more at stake than many
other companies," said Harold McCormick.22
In 1922 the company's outlook on investment in the USSR changed when
the Soviet authorities began aggressively pushing Harvester to update and expand
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the Lubertzy factory. According to the principles of the recently created New Eco-
nomic Policy, plants had to operate under conditions of "advanced production as
against backward production." It was no longer acceptable for Harvester to con-
tinue operating the factory in its prerevolutionary state. Initially, authorities
simply requested that Harvester invest additional capital in Lubertzy.23 By 1924,
however, Soviet goals were more grandiose: Harvester must transform Lubertzy
into a state-of-the-art concession, completely electrified, its production line ca-
pable of modernizing Soviet agricultural methods and producing forty-two thou-
sand items of machinery annually within five years.24
Harvester opposed establishing such a significant stake in Russia for several
reasons. The plant had not been profitable since 1914, and there was little reason
to think it would become so after a large infusion of private capital. There was
always the hazard of nationalization, and the rules for running concessions meant
that Harvester would have very limited control over Lubertzy. Finally, the govern-
ment demands hit Lubertzy when a 2000 percent inflation rate was making it dif-
ficult for the factory even to pay for supplies and labor. As a result, a mower
manufactured at the plant in 1922 cost $108 versus $62 for one shipped from the
United States. In September 1922 the State Department received word that the
plant had been closed "because the Soviet Government, which takes all its output,
has been unable to dispose of the products at their high cost price."25
The plant had not shut down, but it faced continu.ing difficulties. Later that
year,. a state investigative commission determined that half of the Harvester plant
now belonged to the Bolshevik government. It was alleged that Soviet supplies of
new materials were high enough so that when depreciation of existing stock was
factored in, Harvester's ownership of Lubertzy dropped to a fraction. Manager
Hans Emch wrote that he felt "quite sure that a certain plan exists to investigate
and attack ... the running of the factory, with the idea of finding matter for criti-
cism in past business."26
In December the metalworkers union, with Selmash's blessing, advocated
the takeover of the Harvester plant.27 In the union's view Lubertzy was too vital
to be shut down, and its owners threatened just that by their "refusal to put float-
ing capital into the production." The metalworkers' goal matched that of the New
Economic Policy: to obtain new infrastructure and technology from foreign in-
vestment.28 And as the State Department confirmed, "The Harvester Company
has put no outside capital in its Russian business since the Revolution but has
heretofore kept it going on a turnover of its Russian assets.... The object of the
Harvester Co. was simply to keep the plant going and intact." Confident that Rus-
sian engineers were capable of operating the plant, the metalworkers declared
that it was "necessary to nationalize the factory and transfer it to the institution
supervising the construction of agricultural machinery in the Republic," the Sel-
mash truSt.29
Still, Emch was guardedly optimistic. He advised company officials that
"the general opinion in higher circles" was "that there cannot be any question of
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nationalizing an American enterprise at the present time." Harvester's general
manager, Alexander Legge, remained apprehensive, however, and contacted Sec-
retary of Commerce Hoover to tell him of the problems at Lubertzy. Hoover in-
formed Charles Evans Hughes, who expressed concern but could do little owing
to the absence of relations between the two countries.30
On the first day of 1923 the Soviet government enacted a new law requiring
that "owners of large industrial establishments may run such only on a conces-
sionary basis." Lubertzy would no longer be allowed to operate without the ex-
press authorization of the Chief Concessions Committee. The plant's managers
were well aware that this authorization would not come without an investment of
capita1.3! Harvester's difficulties were rooted in the government's decision not to
renew the factory's yearly contract in October 1922, a contract that had been re-
newed routinely for four years. Selmash, already late in its payments, refused to
send any more rubles. Emch and Sandomirsky desperately wrote to the chairman
of the presidium of Vesenkha in early 1923, pleading for renewal of the pro-
duction contract and asking for prompt payment of 180,000 prewar rubles·owed
for past deliveries. If payment was not forthcoming, McAllister was prepared to
shut down the factory.32 By this point, the number of employees had shrunk to just
689. Although this was equal to 33 percent of the prewar staff, Lubertzy's output
was just 14 percent of prewar production.33 Even so, there were 3,540 mowers
sitting in Lubertzy's warehouses. Wishfully, the firm wanted the Soviets to extend
peasants credit for machinery purchases and also to establish "a proper govern-
ment sales organization."34
Selmash chairman Davidov was unsympathetic. "If the Russian government
is compelled to furnish capital to finance the Lubertzy factory," he demanded,
why transfer this money from Russia's "lean purse" to the Americans' "bulging
pocket"? After all, "the government could retain the entire advantage of the in-
vestment by nationalizing the factory." But he emphasized that the factory need
not be nationalized if Harvester would only invest in it. McAllister, who was now
running Harvester's European manufacturing operations, was adamantly opposed
to such a step. "We will absolutely not put any good money into Russia, nor will
we negotiate anything along the lines of a concession." Instead, the company
would "do the· best we can to keep things alive and when we cannot do this we
will inform the officials that we find it impossible to operate . . . and propose to
close down temporarily." McAllister clung to a long-standing Harvester belief
that "the Russian government cannot afford to do anything along the lines of na-
tionalization of the Lubertzy works in the face of their . . . necessity of creating
a favorable impression on the American government, capital, and business." But
he was mistaken.35
In March 1923 Harvester received permission from the State Department to
meet with Soviet representatives to try to keep the plant operating.36 This effort
was unsuccessful, and within two months the company suspended operations,
cutting off water and steam lines to the plant. After Lubertzy shut down, Har-
vester officials tried once more to avoid nationalization. Hans Emch met in
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London with a Soviet representative, Sudakov, who insisted, as had Lenin, that
his government was "very anxious to make business connections with America."
Harvester continued to insist, however, that it would not invest further in the plant,
which contradicted the goals of the New Economic Policy and made Lubertzy's
demise as an American enterprise inevitable.37
Late in the afternoon of September 24, 1924, a commission from Glavmetall,
the state metal industries agency, entered the factory armed with a document
from Vesenkha ordering Emch to surrender the plant. With little choice, Harvester
simply requested "formal documents and proper receipts." The company was in-
structed by its lawyer never to acknowledge that the nationalization had been
lega1.38
Harvester personnel wondered if they had done all that they could to pre-
vent nationalization. Vice President Herbert F. Perkins reported that Harvester
treasurer Austin Ranney "expressed some anxiety that we may not have been
clearly understood by the Soviet authorities in Russia to be very willing indeed to
consider an opening of the Russian factory." Perkins disagreed, writing McAllis-
ter: "I would like to ask you if you have any doubt whatever . . . that both our
representatives in Russia and you yourself ... have consistently and continually
indicated our willingness and desire to negotiate."39
Although Vesenkha had assumed control of the plant, Soviet officials still
wanted the Harvester managers to stay. They asked the company to sign a thirty-
year concession agreement at the end of which Lubertzy would be transferred to
the Soviet government. The agreement specified that Bolshevik authorities would
determine output, quality, and prices, and Harvester "shall deliver in kind for the
benefit of the- State ten percent of [its] manufactured productions first." The ar-
rangement also prohibited Harvester from leasing or selling Lubertzy. This
sounded to McAllister and Legge as if the facility already belonged to the Soviets,
and they were not interested in an agreement on such terms.40
In Washington, the Coolidge administration told Harvester to forget about
filing a ~laim with the U.S. government for the factory until the United States re-
established relations with the Soviet Union.41 Undoubtedly, diplomatic relations
would have made it easier for Harvester, and other firms, to look after their Rus-
sian interests. The firm did enter a claim on its 1924 tax return, charging off
$2,291,000 in "depreciated book value" for Lubertzy.42 In fact, the company lost
over $43 million from its Russian operations.43
The Lubertzy works went on without Harvester, although it did not produce
in the quantities that it once had. In the United States, the International Harvester
Company in Russia, a subsidiary of International Harvester, continued its paper
existence. One of Harvester's spokesmen noted in 1932, "We have kept this com-
pany going now for 15 years since the Revolution. It is some expense and trouble
to hold the annual stockholders' meetings and directors meetings and believe it
would be safe to omit these." By the 1940s Harvester in Russia was holding meet-
ings only every three years. As late as 1959 the company was still making active
efforts to recoup its Russian losses with the U.S. government.44
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~ AMERICAN CONCESSIONAIRES IN THE SOVIET UNION
Harvester did not tum its plant into a concession because its leaders believed that
they would lose control of the plant. Other American firms, however, did yield to
the siren song of concessions. These businesses had never invested in Russia
before, and the promise of quick economic gain in a highly populated, rapidly in-
dustrializing country proved particularly enticing. Unfortunately, the logic of
investment in the Soviet Union undid most of them also. The Bolshevik ·govern-
ment could not long allow capitalists, and foreign capitalists at that, to remove
products and "excess capital" from Russian shores.
American engineer Washington Vanderlip launched the first attempt at a
concession in the fall of 1920. When Vanderlip arrived in Russia, the Soviets had
him confused with the wealthy Frank Vanderlip, former president of National
City Bank, and believed also that he came with the backing of the incoming presi-
dent, Warren G. Harding. The journal Novy Put divulged that Vanderlip represen-
ted "twelve of the largest concerns and banking corporations on the Pacific coast."
These included Harry Chandler of the Los Angeles Times and Edward L. Doheny,
the oil magnate. Although Washington Vanderlip was linked with some of these
wealthy West Coast businessmen, he was himself a man of modest means, a well-
traveled geologist, engineer, and prospector, excitable but not the "billionaire" the
Soviets believed him to be. Moreover, there is no evidence that he had any con-
nection with Harding.45 He had long had an interest in Kamchatka's riches, how-
ever, and the concession that the Narkomindel authorized him was gargantuan, a
sixty-year lease of 400,000 square miles in Siberia, including the resource-rich
Kamchatka Peninsula. Itincluded "extraction of oil, rock coal and fish." Vander-
lip was to deliver a certain percentage of his products to Russian ports, where the
Soviet government would have the right to purchase what he could not sell. In
order to carry out these requirements, Vanderlip would build railroads, highways,
harbors, and twenty fish factories. There was one problem, however, with the
Kamchatka location: the Japanese still controlled it. This did not deter the ambi-
tious Vanderlip. He wanted to buy all of Kamchatka, and he recklessly promised
American recognition of Russia for it. Moscow, however, had no interest in
selling. Instead, Lenin relished the potential American-Japanese rivalry in the Far
East. "We will utilize the growing hostility between America and Japan and offer
Kamchatka on lease instead of losing it without proper compensation, especially
in view of the fact that Japan already has taken from us vast territory in the Far
East," the Bolshevik leader declared. "Already we are sowing discord among our
enemies," said Lenin slyly. "The concessions do not represent peace, but war of a
profitable economic nature."46
In addition to his vast Siberian concession, Vanderlip had agreed to obtain
$1 million worth of credit for Russian purchases in the United States through a
banking syndicate, and to find markets in the United States for Russian exports.
But Vanderlip's concession was "conditional ... only after establishment be-
tween U. S. and RSFSR [of] normal relations and by the establishment of such no
THE NEP AND THE FIRST FIVE-YEAR PLAN 119
later than 2 July 1921." Ludwig Martens, who had returned to Moscow, noted the
Vanderlip "treaty" with great enthusiasm, declaring that with the imminent arrival
of Harding to Washington "everything seems indeed to point to a radical change
in the policy of the United States toward Russia." Despite Martens's hopes,
"normal relations" did not transpire in the allotted time, and the Vanderlipconces-
sion in Japanese-controlled Kamchatka turned out to be little more than a pipe
dream, as the engineer returned to California.47
In early 1922 Sinclair Exploration Company also tried to open a Siberian
oil concession. Harry Sinclair signed a deal with the Far Eastern Republic, later
subsumed by the Russian Soviet Federated Soviet Republic, for reserves in the
area of Russia then occupied by the Japanese but claimed by Russia. Unlike Van-
derlip, Sinclair did have close ties to the· Harding administration, but he got no
help from the State Department in his attempts to press the Japanese to permit
him to operate on the island of Sakhalin. Hughes was more interested in maintain-
ing cordial relations with Japan than in recognizing the legitimacy of Soviet Sak-
halin' where Sinclair's concession lay. This was so even as Japan continued to
occupy Russian Sakhalin in violation of the Washington Conference requirements
to evacuate it. Sinclair was unable to press its claim to the oil, and Japanese inter-
ests eventually got the very lucrative concession.48
By now the first American concession in Russia had really opened. Armand
Hammer carne to Russia in the summer of 1921 to collect the debts the Bolshe-
viks owed his family as well as to bring charitable assistance.49 Owing to his
family connections, Hammer received help directly from Lenin, who steered him
through the nettlesome Soviet bureaucracy so that Hammer would be able to
swiftly establish an asbestos mine at Alapayevsk, in the Ural Mountains. The
Chief Concessions Committee approved Hammer's concession in October 1921.
His venture was required to produce 80,000 pounds of asbestos in the first year of
operation, 100,000 in the second, 120,000 in the third, 140,000 in the fourth, and
160,000 in the fifth. The Soviet government would get 10 percent of the output.
The U.S. government was largely uninformed about the project, and as late as Oc-
tober 28,1921, the Commerce Department did not know who Hammer was.50
Lenin needed Hammer for more than simply capital investment. As the
Soviet leader told Ludwig Martens, who had become head of the state metallurgi-
cal agency, the American doctor's financial involvement in Russia was "politi-
cally" significant.51 Lenin accordingly went out of his way to assist him, telling
Zinoviev, "I beg you to help the comrade Armand Hammer; it is extremely impor-
tant for us that his first concession would be a full success."52 As the first Ameri-
can concession operator, Hammer would serve as "the bellwether to induce other
American capitalists to invest." Lenin believed that "we must make a special
effort to nurse the concessionaires; we must woo [them] energetically."53 But he
also seemed convinced of his minions' ability to make a botch of the venture. "I
am sure that not a damn thing will be done unless there is exacting pressure and
supervision," Lenin hectored Ivan Ivanovich Radchenko of the People's Commis-
sariat of Foreign Trade on Hammer's behalf.54
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Indeed, even with Lenin's friendly influence, establishing the asbestos mine
in Russia was not an easy task for Hammer. The Soviet authorities impounded a
vital shipment of German equipment on one occasion, and Hammer had to push
hard to import this material duty-free as had been promised under the agreement.
When he first arrived, he also had to deal with the terribly backward conditions in
the mine. Its five thousand workers were digging holes for dynamiting the ore
with long iron rods and then lugging away the chunks of asbestos for further pro-
cessing. To speed up this operation, Hammer supplied the laborers with hydraulic
drills and built a new railroad to move the ore. This done, he laid off half of the
mine's work force. Hammer did offer his remaining employees relatively good
benefits; in addition to a salary of approximately $7 per month, they received free
utilities and subsidized clothing and food. 55
When the facility was complete, however, Hammer's mine ran into eco-
nomic problems. High production of asbestos abroad, particularly in Canada,
combined with low demand for the ore in Russia meant that his venture stayed
disappointingly in the red. By 1926 Hammer had relinquished control of the con-
cession and had turned his attention to other prospects in Russia, where, unlike
most concessionaires, he ended up doing very well.56
While Hammer dug for asbestos in the Urals, another American entrepre-
neur drilled for oil in the Caucasus. Mason Day and his associates at the Barnsdall
Corporation began efforts to set up an oil concession in Soviet Georgia in 1921.
The firm, newly christened International Barnsdall, dispatched· three men to the
Caucasus: Day, trade representative Frederick G. Menard, and assistant secretary
Eugene F. Connors. In Tiflis, the Soviets presented them with two options: either
start a "mixed corporation" or form a concession. A mixed company arrangement
involved equal ownership with the Soviet government, and the company rejected
it. Barnsdall wanted "monopoly rights in the region and to export all kinds of raw
materials from the Caucasus." The firm thus decided upon a concession that in-
cluded raw materials ranging from tobacco to coal, but the primary interest of the
firm was oil exploitation.57
The Barnsdall group would have to wait for word from Moscow on their
concession, because the Soviet leaders responsible for such deals, including
Krasin, were at the Genoa Conference, where Standard Oil and Royal Dutch were
also competing for oil rights in the region. Standard Oil's recent acquisition of
Nobel's nationalized holdings in the Caucasus was hotly disputed by the British at
Genoa. Soviet representative F.Y. Rabinovich, president of the Union of Georgia,
Azerbaijan, and Armenia for Foreign Trade, suspected that the Barnsdall delega-
tion was doing more than prospecting for profitable opportunities. Rabinovich in-
ferred, "It has the task from Hoover to investigate the economic status of the
Transcaucasus republic, independently of the interest of the separate firms."58
By January 1923 Barnsdall vice president Philip H. Chadbourne wrote
cheerily to Gumberg, "Have closed contracts for all the machinery, etcetera, and
everything looks fine." The agreement reached in Tiflis was favorable to the com-
pany. Barnsdall would have the "exclusive right to handle, sell, and market all or
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any of these goods: oil, tobacco, wool, skins, silk, timber, lumber, coal, licorice
root, cocoons, manganese." Barnsdall got the right to all of these products tax-
free, and it would also have "preference over any other shippers over all railway
lines, steamship lines and pipelines at reasonable rates." Subsequent agreements
added to the amount of land involved and broadened the scope of the operation.
The Russians and Georgians would get a 30 percent commission when the goods
left the country.59
The Barnsdall people were impressed with the oil industry and the govern-
ment in Russia. They were also conscious of their role as investment pioneers.
Chadbourne professed, "I am moved not only by personal considerations, but I
know that a large portion of the American public is following with close attention
this opening of industrial relations with the soviet republic." Chadbourne believed
that American recognition was imminent. He along with Day thanked the Central
Executive Committee (Ispolkom) for their help, stating, "We are now but awaiting
the arrival of our tools and equipment to commence work."60
In early March 1923 the Barnsdall representatives, including Chadbourne
and Brown, the vice president of Barnsdall New York, arrived with their oil-
drilling equipment specialist from the Lucey Manufacturing Corporation. They'
met with the president of the Azerbaijan Soviet, Comrade Mousabekoff, who of-
fered his felicitations: "It is difficult for us to rebuild everything ourselves, and
therefore the proletariat of the Soviet Federation in general, and that of Azerbai-
jan in particular, heartily desires the cooperation of representatives of cultured na-
tions, in the front rank of which America stands." Brown returned the
pleasantries, and Chadbourne chimed in that the work was but the "first swallow"
in a "new era in the economic relations between the U.S. and Soviet Russia." As
the agreement was signed between the Soviet oil agency Azneft and the Barnsdall
Corporation, Mousabekoff nearly choked up: "The Americans are the first to
reply to the . . . need from Soviet Russia."61
Soviet functionaries were greatly impressed with Barnsdall's commitment.
As a Comrade Serebrowski noted in the Baku Workman, "the Americans are going
at the matter very seriously. They are acquainting themselves thoroughly with
those parts of the oilfields where they wish to bore." He was encouraged by the sig-
nificant involvement of the Lucey engineering firm, whose president was due to
arrive presently. "It is clear that if Mr. Lucey himself is coming here with Mr. Day,
the Americans attach very great importance to their future operations in Baku."
Serebrowski crowed, "We can therefore look forward to seeing American machin-
ery and piping follow closely upon the coming of their engineers, and this ... will
greatly augment the productionin those fields."62 The Soviet interest in using for-
eign investment to enhance their technological arsenal was once more evident.
In May Chadbourne wrote to Gumberg again, noting that conditions had
become difficult for his venture in Russia but adding gamely that "nothing worth-
while comes without a struggle." He reported how busy he was, "getting build-
ings, office, quarters etcetera ready for arrival of machinery in July." Gumberg, in
the midst of the campaign to persuade Harding to send a diplomatic commission
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to Russia, responded with encouragement. "Things are getting better and better as
far as American attitude to Russia are concerned. While we are not yet arrived, I
really think that there may be something doing this year."63
Barnsdall's leaders were bullish on the project, and for the Soviets, Barns-
dall's venture was a tremendous "propaganda effort" that succeeded in "keeping
the major oil companies off balance," particularly Standard Oil, notes Floyd Fith-
ian. It even drew in Harry Sinclair, who attempted to follow Barnsdall's success in
the Caucasus while avoiding a repeat of his failure in the Far East. Sinclair
planned a $150 million investment in Central Asia, but then the Teapot Dome
scandal bubbled around him, preventing him from raising the necessary funds.
And Barnsdall, despite its promising beginnings, left Russia in 1924 having lost
money. Its record was another in the annals of overambitious and unfulfilled
Western concessions in Soviet Russia.64
Nevertheless, the State Department had to occasionally cool the ardor of
some of its more enthusiastic representatives for American investment in Russia.
Even before the' formal signing of the Barnsdall concession, for example, the
high commissioner in Constantinople, Mark L. Bristol, wrote to Washington that
Henry Mason Day had been made "virtually the fiscal agent and Minister of for-
eign trade" for the Autonomous Soviet Republics of Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Ar-
menia. "[This] means that the United States controls and dominates the
commercial activities ... of one of the richest territories in the Near East," crowed
Bristol, ignoring the fact that the United States had nothing whatsoever to do with
a private arrangement between an American individual and these Soviet states. He
was soon chastened by Acting Secretary of State Dearing: "Unusual care should
be taken that the action of American officials should not be construed as extend-
ing the official sanction of the Government to the negotiations between Mr. Day
and the Caucasus republics."65
But D.C. Poole was more interested in Day's plans, likely because he rec-
ognized the strategic import of Barnsdall's product, oil. In' a report to Secretary
Hughes, Poole related that he had told Day, "We will do anything possible to
assist any legitimate American enterprise in securing these materials" in the Cau-
casus, which had only recently come under Soviet control. The government could
help, Poole thought, by establishing "official representation at Tiflis" and sending
U.S. Shipping Board vessels to ports in the region. The Commerce Department
had already unofficially dispatched a representative to the Georgian capital. Poole
added discreetly that the Shipping Board should consult the State Department for
authorization and that the department would respond as favorably as possible,
weighing "commercial considerations" against "paramount political considera-
tions." Approval was seen as likely, because the State Department had recently
authorized the Shipping Board to ship to Soviet ports.66
The profit potential of transoceanic traffic to Russia was also discovered at
this time by Averell Harriman, who had long been interested in Soviet Russia.67
When he graduated from Yale College in 1911, Harriman had at first planned to
follow his father, Union Pacific magnate Edward Henry Harriman, into a career
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with the railroad. But after a short stint on the firm's board of directors (he was
probably the only member of that august body to'also work as a "gandy dancer"),
Harriman turned instead to ocean shipping and operated the successful American
Ship and Commerce Corporation during the First World War. By 1920 he headed
an investment firm, W.A. Harriman and Company, and served on the boards of
several leading American corporations, including Guaranty Trust Company. This
combination of transportation, financial, and administrative experience, along
with an ebullient curiosity, made Harriman eager to buy a share of Derutra, the
German-Soviet shipping line, in August 1921. Derutra was the first mixed com-
pany, or joint venture, in Soviet Russia.68
Harriman had previously dabbled in Soviet trade, having assisted Hamburg
banker Max Warburg in financing Soviet orders in Germany. Warburg consistently
assured him of the safety of doing business with Russia. Harriman recalled that
his desire to better "understand the Revolution" also spurred him to greater finan-
cial involvement in the Soviet Union.69 In the spring of 1922 Harriman's associ-
ate, Clifford Carver, negotiated final arrangements for the new shipping firm with
Soviet representative Leonid Krasin and Derutra's German partner, the Hamburg-
Amerika Line. At the first of these meetings, Krasin insisted that as a condition
for the establishment of the new shipping line, the United States must officially
recognize his government. Like many Soviet leaders, he believed that business
and government in the United States' were closely linked. Carver, however, was
able to convince Krasin of the merits of making some kind of "beginning" with-
out waiting for a change in the political situation.70
The new freight service gradually gained notice. The New York Times re-
ported in 1924 that the company in large part "account[ed] ... for the already im-
pressive movement of trade between unrecognized Russia and this country."
Isaiah Hurgin, the Soviet representative at Derutra's New York office, declared
that Derutra demonstrated the potential of Soviet-American trade. Derutra
shipped cotton, timber, scrap iron, asbestos, flax, furs, and charity freight, in-
cluding that of the Russian Red Cross. It got $3.50 per box for shipping Hebrew
National Kosher Sausage relief packages.71
In 1926 Harriman disclosed that his New York branch of Derutra was doing
better than any of the line's offices in Europe. Still, he had not been able to recoup
his investment. Harriman's .American Ship and Commerce Corporation and its
German partner divested their holdings in Derutra that year and returned full own-
ership to the Soviet government.72
By this time Harriman was already deeply involved in a more ambitious
Russian venture, a concession to exploit manganese ore at Chiaturi in Soviet
Georgia, which he hoped would dwarf Derutra in its success. Russia had supplied
more than half of the world's manganese production before the war, and three-
fourths of that output had come from Chiaturi. The war greatly boosted demand
for the ore because it was needed for the production of steel as well as for batter-
ies, paint, dyes, and glassmaking.73 Harriman's interest in the mine was encour-
aged by an optimistic view of its potential return. As one of his telegrams
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proclaimed in 1925, "PRICE MANGANESE ASSURES LARGE PROFIT." Harriman sensed an
"exceptional opportunity to control enormous basic industry with very limited
capital and risk." He believed that his earnings from Chiaturi, the largest such
concession the Soviets had made with an American, would reach $120 million.74
Harriman did not bother to contact the State Department about Chiaturi.75
He signed the concession contract in June 1924 and by the summer of 1925 had
paid $3,450,000 for excavation rights. To guarantee his commitment to spend $3
million on railroad construction and mine mechanization at Chiaturi, he was also
required to deposit $1 million in Gosbank, the Soviet state bank.76 The entire ar-
rangement was confirmed on July 27,1925, and a new firm, the New York-based
Georgia Manganese Company, was created to operate at Chiaturi.77
To Harriman, who would be the chairman of this new company, the conces-
sion was more than just another investment. Not only was his company's money
at risk, Harriman declared, but so were "our reputations as conservative business-
men." A successful Soviet venture would serve as an ~xample for other American
firms, "including several of the most important interests who have already talked
to me," whose representatives were monitoring the situation. One of Harriman's
advisers predicted that, should the operation be successful, "it would have a bear-
ing on even the attitude of the Foreign Department of the United States."78
Chiaturi appeared to be a promising venture, as demonstrated by the inter-
national following it attracted in the investment community.79 Even before Harri-
man officially purchased the Chiaturi concession, Georgia Manganese had
received orders for over 110,000 tons of manganese from large American con-
cerns including Bethlehem Steel. The ore fields contained an estimated eighty
million tons of manganese, as well as two to three million tons of peroxide, a
more valuable compound.80 An additional boost came when Capt. T.T.C. Gregory,
a former member of the American Relief Administration who was described as
the "closest friend of Mr. Hoover," reported that the commerce secretary had
given his blessing to the operation.81 Even Henry Ford was interested in the man-
ganese project, being "the world's largest consumer of this metal."82
Yet within the first six months of the concession's life it was apparent that
problems were developing. A competing mine at Nikopol in the Ukraine, run by
a German concern, Rawack and Grunfeld, was starting to produce manganese
ore in quantities sufficient to erode Harriman's price. The German firm had also
been given responsibility for the distribution of the entire Soviet state monopoly
of manganese abroad, putting Harriman in a vulnerable position. Although a
memorandum of understanding between the two mines stipulated that Harriman
would ship 60 percent of all manganese exports from the USSR and Nikopol
only 40 percent, the "combination of German-Soviet competition" soon over-
whelmed the American businessman. While Chiaturi's production mushroomed
from 52,177 tons in 1922-1923 to 775,700 tons four years later, Nikopol's output
increased from 74,177 tons in 1922 to 615,000 tons in 1927. It was little wonder
that world prices plummeted.83
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In an attempt to resolve the problem, Harriman met with Chief of Conces-
sions Trotsky in December 1926. Trotsky, the now fervent concession supporter,
had been removed from the Politburo just one month earlier, in part for his un-
orthodox views. Given his precarious status, Trotsky was in no position to take
action on behalf of Harriman; nor did he particularly want to. 84 It did not help that
Harriman's mine was situated in Soviet Georgia. As Robert H.M. Robinson,
Georgia Manganese's president, pointed out, many local citizens were eager to
take control of the mine themselves, and "through Stalin the Georgians have just
now immense power."85
The predictions of large profits from manganese turned out to be "in some
degree inaccurate," as one of Harriman's close associates noted with great under-
statement. In addition, there was increasing hostility toward concessionaires from
officials, and Moscow remained stubbornly inflexible on royalties and output r~­
quirements in the face of fluctuations in the world price. The Chiaturi workers
were also well paid and well supplied by Soviet standards and because of frequent
government inspections of the mine, enjoyed over 125 days off per year. 86
In early 1927 Robinson recommended to Harriman that he negotiate out of
the deal as soon as possible, even though the firm had not yet fulfilled its obli-
gations by building a railway from the mine to the Black Sea. Before giving up,
however, Harriman tried to renegotiate. He asked the Soviet authorities for cut-
backs in production, a "sliding scale" of royalties based on market prices and
shipping costs, and a steep reduction of the ambitious rail construction called for
in the original plan.87 Soviet officials agreed to consider these proposals but were
disturbed at Harriman's suggestion that his firm not pay for the railway work. The
rail line was to be a concrete result of NEP's program of using "foreign capital for
working out our riches." As they reminded Harriman, "according ... to the 'bour-
geoisie' morals," their right to hold him to the agreement was "incontestable. "88
Eventually, the concessions committee did decide to cut back Nikopol's
production significantly in favor of Chiaturi's. It also released Harriman from
some of his contractual obligations. In return, Georgia Manganese was required to
increase its total output by 25 percent, from sixteen million to twenty million tons
of ore over the twenty-year life of the contract. Robinson protested that these pro-
duction figures were not feasible. In addition to these requirements, Moscow was
making it difficult for Harriman's foreign staff to exchange their hard currency for
rubles at favorable rates. In September 1928 it finally became apparent to Harri-
man that he could not make the mine a going concern, and he terminated the
deal. 89
Despite his troubles, Harriman claimed that Georgia Manganese had left
him "with a small profit." Because the mine's actual operations lost money, this
profit was based on the unprecedented loan that the Georgia Manganese Com-
pany had granted to the Soviets. At the termination of the concession, Soviet
representatives agreed to give back Harriman's $3,450,000 investment only if
he would assist them by purchasing Soviet bonds for $4,450,000. Harriman·
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promised to buy the specified amount of Soviet state notes, which yielded 7 per-
cent interest and had a fifteen-year maturity. Shrugging off the profound difficul-
ties he had experienced, Harriman claimed that this loan had secured him a
"reasonable profit" on his earlier investment. This bond purchase, as the Soviet
purchasing agency Amtorg was proud to note,was "the first American loan re-
ceived by the Soviet Government."90
Control of the Chiaturi excavation went to Rawack and Grunfeld. After this
experience, Harriman stayed out of Soviet affairs and did not turn his attention to
Russia again until the Second World War. Once he left, his former employees saw
their wages cut 20 percent, and the clothing and shoes that Harriman had im-
ported for them seized and sold by local -authorities for quite a good profit.91
Concessionaire Armand Hammer's asbestos mine had also become unten-
able during this period. Hammer's losses at the facility followed another defeat,
when the Soviet government established Amtorg to eclipse his import-export
office, Alamerico, in New York. But Hammer refused to give up and instead
turned his attention to new opportunities in Russia. On October 8, 1926, he
opened a concession in an old soap plant in Moscow, where he produced pencils
and pens, to which he soon added three more facilities manufacturing items in-
cluding celluloid and asbestos roofing tile. To expedite his pencil output he turned
to Ge~any, where he recruited technicians and engineers employed by the highly
regarded manufacturer Eberhard Faber. Hammer's pencils were more expensive
than those issued by the Soviet government, but they were of a higher quality and
far more in demand. Hammer's workers produced the writing implements on a
piecework basis, and the factory was able to export some of them.92
The American entrepreneur's four plants employed up to one thousand
people in peak periods and, unlike his other Russian concession, reaped gen-
erous profits, ranging from $550,000 to $600,000 annually on gross sales from
$2.5 million to $4.5 million. Historian Antony Sutton reports that Hammer's
plants represented one of only two foreign-owned concessions among the 340 es-
tablished to make such substantial earnings in the Soviet Union during this era.93
By 1929 Stalin was tightening the screws still further on foreign concession
operators. His extreme distrust of international influence in Russia had already
been manifested in the Shakhta affair of 1928.94 Within' a year Hammer found
himself heavily taxed and unable to secure credit in the United States to support
his businesses in Russia. On February 18, 1930, he relinquished his concessions
in exchange for "several million dollars paid in rubles cash, [and] Soviet bonds."
In addition, he was permitted to take. his valuable art masterpieces, precious jew-
elry-including the exquisite Faberge Easter eggs-and ornate icons. This "Ro-
manov Treasure" had been collected by Hammer and his brother Victor during
their Russian residence. A 15 percent export tax was levied on this personal art
collection, but at the same time many additional artworks went duty-free to the
United States with Hammer. These he would auction off in America for the So-
viets, earning a 10 percent commission on each sale. Hammer would not return to
the Soviet Union for more than thirty years.95
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The NEP program of foreign concessions was constrained by high state de-
mands for investment and output, limits on repatriation of profits, and require-
ments for pay and benefits that far exceeded the standards Moscow set for its own
plants. Operators like Harvester that could not or would not comply with the tech-
nological imperatives of the NEP soon found themselves out of business. This
suggests that even had Cyrus McCormick assented to Soviet demands to modern-
ize Lubertzy, International Harvester would likely have been compelled to leave
Russia by the end of the 1920s as did Hammer, a favored concessionaire. Har-
vester thus made a prudent business decision when it decided instead to cut its
losses in 1923. Moscow so strictly defined conditions for American firms in the
Soviet Union that its policies usually led to failure.
~ THE FIVE-YEAR PLAN AND
TECHNICAL AsSISTANCE CONTRACTS
The experiences of Harriman and Hammer signal the end of the NEP and its
policy of bringing in foreign concessions to reconstruct the Soviet Union. From
its inception, the policy had been self-contradictory for the Soviet regime. Even
Lenin had admitted that the concessions were "a foreign thing in our system."96
The domestic side of NEP was unraveling by this time too, as grain collections
collapsed in 1927-1928. Grain exports had been envisioned as the best means by
which to pay for Soviet industrialization under NEP, but it had become increas-
ingly clear that they would not be sufficient for this purpose under existing pro-
duction and marketing conditions. Moscow thus launched brutal collection
methods-"extraordinary measures"-under Stalin's leadership in 1928. Nikolai
Bukharin and Alexsei Rykov, supporters of "limited collectivization" of agricul-
ture, rejected these strong-armed tactics. They called for grain imports instead, as
well as more effective inducements for farm output so that "NEP could be rescued
and sustained." This importing option was contradictory for NEP advocates, how-
ever, since it would restrict Moscow's ability to buy the Western technology
needed to industrialize, one of the main goals of NEP.97
Bukharin's protests were drowned out, as Alan Ball notes, by NEP oppo-
nents who convinced many that the program "was incapable of sustaining a suffi-
ciently rapid tempo of industrialization, in large measure because of the difficulty
of acquiring grain."98 The two factions battled it out in the Politburo, and after de-
nouncing Bukharin the party confirmed its acceptance of the Five-Year Plan in
April 1929. Peasants, small business owners (the Nepmen), and foreign conces-
sion holders became targets of a ferocious and implacable "socialist offensive"
designed to root out "enemies" at home. At the same time, Stalin identified an
even more menacing threat from "international capital;' that led to an emphasis on
defense-related production within the accelerated industrialization of the plan.99
The plan's development of large-scale industries would be far greater in
scope and far faster in implementation than the New Economic Policy's initiatives.
Foreign expertise would still be needed, but it would be used for the development
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of Soviet-run plants and installations to promote self-sufficiency in production.
Technical assistance, which involved the procurement of Western information,
processes, or training-or at most, construction of a plant or other facility-
swould replace the long-term, foreign-owned concessions of NEP.lOO
The new emphasis on technical assistance to develop the Soviet economy
was more beneficial to American companies than the concession system had been.
In 1925 Americans had just eight out of ninety active concessions in Russia. Four
years later, the number of new technical assistance contracts held by American
firms had reached forty, surpassing the number held by any other country, and
there were over thirteen hundred engineers and technicians, mainly Americans
and Germans, working in Russia as consultants. lOi
The Soviets knew that the Americans, "who had taught the world speed and
efficiency and for whom obstacles do not exist," were the world's technological
leaders, and even better, "they do not guard manufacturing secrets so jealously."102
As an Izvestia columnist pointed out, "While many manufacturers in Western
Europe and Japan were in every way endeavoring to 'secrete' from us even the
most innocent processes of manufacturing, their American colleagues freely
admit within the walls of their factories and mills the representatives of Soviet in-
dustry." Moreover, the article continued, "the United States has the highest techni-
cal development in the world. In the production of machines in which the Soviet
Union happens to be particularly interested at present (agricultural, electric,
equipment for heavy industries, etcetera), America stands today outside all com-
petition. In this connection it is exceedingly important that American industry,
which has expanded by virtue of an enormous domestic market and immense con-
centration of capital, is employing methods of standardization and mass pro-
duction on a vast scale."103
America was "the model for Soviet industrial development," one scholar
writes, because the Soviet Union "chose to enter the ladder of industrial develop-
ment on the top rung." Opportunities were plentiful for those who wished to sell
their expertise. A.A. Heller, head of the Newark-based International Oxygen
Company and Martens's former commercial director, publicized this when he
launched the Russian American Compressed Gas Company (Ragas) in Russia. He
raved, "The demand for our products, oxygen and acetylene gases for welding,
equipment, and material, as well as welded products . . . is growing so rapidly
that it will soon exceed our capacity." Ragas, a $1 million venture, constructed
oxygen plants in three major Soviet cities and provided welding assistance to the
oil pipelines "from Tuapse to Grozny and from Baku to Batum."104 Competition
also induced U. S. corporations to contribute important technical processes to the
Soviets. The executives of industrial firms knew that if they refused a Soviet
order, several rivals-foreign and domestic-would compete for the job.
Chemical giant E.!. Du Pont de Nemours and Company had previously re-
jected Bolshevik overtures. When Amtorg had tried to attract Du Pont with a
celluloid, paper, and artificial silk concession in 1927, company president
Lammot Du Pont refused. "Under present conditions ... [we] hardly feel that
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we would be interested," he replied. 105 The Soviet representatives were persistent.
They wanted the chemical firm to assist them by constructing new plants in
Russia and by training Soviet engineers and technicians at Du Pont's facilities in
the United States. In early 1929 the company finally yielded, agreeing to sell its
ammonia oxidation process, used to produce fertilizer, to the Soviet chemical
agency Chemstroi. 106
Several factors influenced Du Pont to move ahead with this new customer.
The work would be financially rewarding and, because the deal was no longer a
concession calling for a massive investment inside Russia, the company was
not exposed to great risk. Also, many other large corporations were entering
Soviet Russia at the end of the twenties. Rival chemical makers, such as Imperial
Chemical of Great Britain, were picking up Soviet accounts. Du Pont entered the
Soviet Union partly as a way to defend its market share. In addition, other Ameri-
can businessmen already in Russia were encouraging Du Pont to join them. They
felt that a larger American presence would give them more clout in the USSR.
One of the men trying to convince Du Pont to make a significant commit-
ment to the Soviet market was Col. Hugh L. Cooper, the chief construction engi-
neer for the $75 million Dnieprostroi hydroelectric power station in the Ukraine.
Cooper campaigned indefatigably for American trade and investment in the
Soviet Union. Hailing Lammot Du Pont as one of the "big men of the world,"
Cooper urged him to help solve the world's "greatest unsolved problem," that of
Russia. In March 1929 he forwarded to Du Pont a cheering report about the
Soviet Union. The chemical executive responded by sending back a newsletter
that gave a more negative view. Cooper dismissed it as "written by some ignora-
mus who probably gets fifty dollars a week" and stated that his views on the Rus-
sian situation had been corroborated by "very substantial men of more important
organizations."107
Du Pont's director of development, Dr. Fin Sparre, was interested in Soviet
"efforts . . . to spread Communism in other countries" and exchanged letters
with Cooper and H.H. Dewey, the vice president of International General Electric,
which had recently signed a $25 million, five-year contract with the Soviets.
Dewey told Sparre that he believed that Stalin's commissars were "much less
radical than they sound. . . . But as yet [they] do not feel strong enough to
admit openly that communism, as advocated by Lenin, is impossible." Dewey was
also optimistic about the Five-Year Plan, which he thought would get the Russian
people so "interested and involved" that they would "modify their radical ideas
and . . . accept a more rational program."108
Cooper agreed with Dewey that the Soviet leaders were not the zealous
revolutionaries many people thought. Cooper was persuaded by party leader
Rykov's argument that one could no more criticize Russia for hosting the Third
International than criticize Holland for hosting its predecessor, the Second Inter-
national. Cooper was convinced that Russia would eventually turn to capitalism
and in the meantime it was "perfectly safe" to do business there. The engineer
again pressed Du Pont to expand his Soviet operations. He urged the chemical
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executive to send his biggest "pessimist" to the Soviet Union for ninety days, so
that Cooper might have an opportunity to convince even the most disbelieving
skeptic. Cooper's exhortations finally had an effect. At the end of July Lammot Du
Pont set up a meeting with Saul Bron of Amtorg at the company offices in Wilm-
ington, Delaware, to discuss expanding Du Pont's ties to the Soviet Union. 109
At this conference Du Pont and the Soviet representatives worked out a draft
of an agreement entitled "For Construction of Chemical Plants and Apparatus in
the U.S.S.R." Under its terms, Chemstroi engineers and workers would receive
training in the United States. Du Pont also agreed to sell the Soviets the process for
making lithopone, a zinc-based white pigment used for the manufacture of paper,
paints, and inks. But the firm declined to sign any blanket arrangement with
Moscow. "We do not regret at all the steps we have taken so far, and will be very
glad in the future to discuss with you the sale of plans or processes ... but each of
these negotiations must contemplate an agreement independent of any other," said
Lammot Du Pont. The executive committee of Du Pont's board of directors reaf-
firmed company policy on this issue. The firm would not invest any money in
Russia nor would it sign any broad agreements. Any deal would have to be based
on a "substantial" payment in American dollars with the balance payable on a
short-term basis. Thus there would be no comprehensive "establishment of indus-
try in Russia under Du Pont guidance."110
In the case of lithopone manufacture, Soviet engineers would be allowed to
come-three at a time-and observe Du Pont's American plants in operation. In
return, the Soviet Union agreed to pay the chemical company $85,000 for design-
ing the lithopone plant, $70,000 of which would be paid in advance. I I I The Gras-
selli Chemical Company of Cleveland, a Du Pont subsidiary, would design the
plant. Fin Sparre foresaw complications in Russia and wanted T.S. Grasselli to
boost his fee to $100,,000. Grasselli wanted even more: $350,000. Stiff competi-
tion, however, meant that it was unrealistic to demand such large payments. Also,
many of these chemical processes were fully developed, meaning that any addi-
tional money Du Pont could get for the established technology would be largely
profit. Thus, although ammonia oxidation technology had cost Du Pont $27 mil-
lion to research and develop, it agreed to receive only $150,000 plus engineering
expenses from the Soviet government. 112
Even with these low prices, the company could not take Moscow's business
for granted. Du Pont specialist William M. Richter held extended negotiations
with the Soviets over Du Pont's lacquer technology only to learn that a competi-
tor, Hercules Powder, "had been in close touch" with the Soviets regarding the
production of nitrocellulose, which was needed for manufacturing lacquer. With
Hercules's help, the Soviets planned to triple their output of nitrocellulose "from
2,000 kilos to 6,000 kilos" and thus make Du Pont's participation unnecessary. 113
One way to ensure that Soviet orders would not be lost to competitors was
through cooperation with other firms. Du Pont and Imperial Chemical Industries
had an arrangement by which they shared information about the chemical pro-
cesses each firm had sold to the Soviets. This helped them to apportion their busi-
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ness. Du Pont would make certain that Imperial was not selling some prodQct or
technology to Moscow before it went ahead with its negotiations, and vice
versa. 114
Du Pont's negotiations with Soviet Russia did not mean that its managers'
ideological allegiance. had changed. On the contrary, the firm's leadership fre-
quently expressed an antipathy for the communist system, even after the contract
with Moscow had commenced. "As time goes on, I am coming more and more to
the conclusion that business relations with Soviet Russia by American corpora-
tions are undesirable, but have not yet come to the point where we should refuse
to sell them goods," said Lammot Du Pont. 115
Yet just as Cooper had hoped, Du Pont's presence in Russia mattered more
than the firm's misgivings. The chemical giant's visible role inspired firms in
other industries. James D. Mooney, General Motors vice president in charge of
overseas operations, pointed to Du Pont's Russian involvement in order to per-
suade company president Alfred P. Sloan to increase GM's business with the
Soviet Union. Mooney also cited "other American companies with a reputation
for conservatism and foresight ... [that] have already gone into this tremen-
dously interesting and potential market." The warnings about Soviet trade that
Sloan may have heard were "bunk."116
Mooney was wary of losing an important emerging market for his automo-
biles. As Stalin had pointed out, Russia had "peasants and workers delivered now
from their former landlords and capitalists . . . and their demand is huge, both
for personal and for industrial use." In 1930 Mooney traveled through Russia for
twelve days of business discussions in the hopes of setting up some kind of
technical assistance agreement. In his report to Sloan, he noted that he had delib-
erately "confined [his] official observations . . . to the economic considera-
tions" of General Motors and did not care "whether that Government is autocratic
or democratic or bolshevik." More important to Mooney was whether the Soviets
would pay for the cars and trucks they bought. He was convinced, regardless, that
the government was "stable."Il?
Mooney recommended that General Motors build and operate a final as-
sembly plant for imported Buicks, Chevrolets, and Bedford trucks in the Soviet
Union. Unlike Ford's Nizhni Novgorod facility, this factory would refrain from
full-scale manufacturing, despite the desire of the Soviet government, since
Mooney felt it would only bring "a rather useless amount of goodwill." The Buick
passenger car had a preeminent reputation in Russia, and commissars
"battled" hard to build the cars there, but Mooney was adamant. The Bedford
trucks could possibly be made in the USSR but not the much-coveted Buicks. 118
Mooney, a thoroughgoing capitalist, put in a good word for the centralized
planning of the Communist party that "accounts for the rapid progress the coun-
try has made." The party "provides the coordination and driving power, and keeps
the unions in line; the leaders have vision; their ability as a nation to pay is self-
evident."119 Lammot Du Pont never held such a view about the Soviet order, no
matter how many processes his company sold to the Kremlin. "These people
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seem to have no realization whatever of the virtue of trustfulness, integrity, and
property rights," he groused. His firm continued to oppose extending long-term
credits to Moscow at a time when many other companies were offering them. In
1936-three years after the United States had opened diplomatic relations with
Moscow-he continued to maintain that "the Russian government was looked
. somewhat askance at, if not distrusted by, American business people generally."I20
Fortunately for both the Soviets and Du Pont stockholders, the president's am-
bivalence about this trade relationship did not prevent his firm's continued in-
volvement in what was a beneficial association. Once the company had launched
trade with Moscow, its profit margins took precedence over the president's predi-
lections. Vice President F.W. Pickard predicted in the early thirties that "Russia
will be a fairly important market for the United States." He naturally included his
own E.!. Du Pont de Nemours and Company among those that would get "our
share."121
The experience of Du Pont affirms the success of technical assistance for
American suppliers and Soviet customers. By selling processes in the short-term,
rather than making long-term investments, firms found Soviet business both profi-
table and manageable, and Moscow got the technology it so badly needed, often
at discount prices. In contrast, the fate of concessionaires like Averell Harriman,
the largest American investor under the NEP, reveals a pattern of lack of control
and losses in Soviet dealings. As Khrushchev-era historian M.E. Sonkin ex-
plained, "foreign capital introduced conditions which for the most part were un-
acceptable in the workers' and peasants' state."122
SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS,
1929-1933
During the First Five-Year Plan, Soviet-American trade reached a peak, although
the high sales were short-lived. From 1927 to 1930, spurred by the industrializa-
tion imperatives of the plan, U.S. exports to Russia increased from $65 million
to $114 million. In 1931 sales dropped to $104 million, but the Soviet govern-
ment's orders still made it America's seventh-largest customer.} Soviet purchases
of American manufactured goods in 1931 were 22 percent higher than those in
1929, a significant increase when compared to the more than 50 percent drop in
overall American exports during this very depressed period. While $104 mil-
lion amounted to only .14 percent of American GNP in 1931, it still represented
4.3 percent of American exports that year. 2 Russia had become the largest for-
eign customer for American industrial machinery. 3
These sales had repercussions outside the United States and Russia. Fred-
eric M. Sackett, American ambassador to Berlin, reported in 1931 that the under-
secretary of the German Ministry of Finance had told him that "in view of the
long term credits granted by American industry to Soviet Russia, Germany would
be forced to increase its terms for the present calender year." The German twelve-
month credits were no match for the American terms of eighteen months or more.
Yet for Americans, sales grew so fast between 1929 and 1931 that Alexander
Gumberg felt compelled to write, "The magnitude of the Five-Year Plan probably
scares more people than it attracts. The thing is too stupendous and complex. Rus-
sian business is concentrated in too few firms." Companies that had been re-
peatedly favored with Soviet business sometimes reached the "saturation point"
in extending credits. Gumberg related a story that he had heard from the president
of a large firm that had granted $700,000 in financing to Russia over two years
and was then asked for more. The frustrated executive declared, "I have to wait
until at least a part of this money is paid off before I can take this matter up
again."4
Soviet orders were highly concentrated in certain industries. In 1931, for
example, Amtorg and its Soviet affiliates purchased the following hefty amounts
of American industrial exports: 58.7 percent of all locomotive equipment, 59 per-
cent of metalworking equipment, 65.6 percent of lathes, 73.8 percent of foundry
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equipment, and 97.4 percent of turbines. Sixty percent of all Soviet orders in the
United States in 1930 and 1931 were placed in just five states in the American
Midwest.5 Much of the equipment would enable the Soviets to produce their own
machinery, consistent with the autarkic goals of the plan.
In the midst of this successful trading relationship, and after a period of dor-
mant interest in the issue, congressional allegations of revolutionary activity were
again leveled at Soviet officials in the United States, this time by New York Re-
publican Hamilton Fish Jr. Fish's charges were based on documents obtained by
New York City police commissioner Grover Whalen in 1930, linking Amtorg of-
ficials with the Comintern. Whalen had a list of "thirty Amtorg attaches" believed
to be "undercover agents of the Communist International." Boris E. Skvirskii, the
head of the Soviet Information Bureau in Washington and the "unofficial Soviet
envoy" to the United States, stood accused of running Amtorg's "Ogpu [Soviet
Secret Police] section." At the hearing in Congress, Amtorg chairman Bogdanov
was treated "very roughly" by the congressmen, Alexander Gumberg reported.
"[They] yelled at him [and] demanded that he answer 'Yes or No.'" Bogdanov got
a vociferous defense from the American Communists, who were also at the hear-
ing and "acted in their usual imbecilic manner," Gumberg scowled. He lamented,
"all this noise has seriously interfered with development of Russian credits in our
country."6
What looked like it might have been a replay of the Martens Senate hear-
ings, however, turned out differently and was evidence of the significant change in
the United States' outlook toward Russia over the previous decade. In the late
spring of 1930, when Whalen began his crackdown on Amtorg for "subver-
sive revolutionary propaganda," the American-Russian Chamber of Commerce
launched its own investigation of Whalen's documents. Suspecting these records
to be forgeries, the chamber appointed a committee of its top officials, including
Chairman of the Board S.R. Bertron, Vice President Allen Wardwell, and Direc-
tors Hugh Cooper and H.H. Dewey, to meet with Commerce Secretary Thomas P.
Lamont on May 27. The committee requested the Commerce Department to in-
vestigate the documents' "genuineness" and were pleased when the secretary told
them that his views about Soviet trade had not changed "by reason of the publi-
cation of the so-called 'Whalen' documents." The chamber was vindicated when
the papers were shown to have been so badly faked that, as Gumberg joked, oppo-
nents of the Soviet Union had supposedly claimed that "Amtorg deliberately man-
ufactured the 'documents' in order to get Whalen in trouble!"7 The Fish
committee agreed that the Whalen evidence was bogus. It also found that "there is
not sufficient competent legal evidence in the record to prove the connection of
the Amtorg Trading Corporation ... with subversive activities."g
Although Fish and Whalen had created a wave of negative publicity for
Amtorg and Soviet-American trade, other government attacks were more damag-
ing. In 1930 Congress enacted the ultraprotectionist Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act
with provisions that targeted the Sov'iet Union; specifically, section 307, which
placed an "embargo for goods made by convict or forced labor." Soviet officials
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believed with some justification that this was designed more to cushion American
businessmen than to protect Russian workers. Soviet pulpwood products, asbes-
tos, manganese, and sausage casings were all cited for having been "dumped" on
the market, even though American exports to Russia were more than three times
the amount of Russian exports to America, with a favorable balance of trade of
$500 million between 1923 and 1930. Depressed commodity prices had spurred
the Soviets to ship even more raw materials to pay for foreign equipment. But
Soviet lumber still amounted to less than 1 percent of American production, while
Russian matches in the United States satisfied one-tenth of American consump-
tion and Russian pulpwood composed less than 5 percent of total pulpwood im-
ports. These new tariff provisions drove the American-Russian Chamber of
Commerce to complain bitterly in the capita1.9
On July 28, 1930, when two shiploads of Russian pulpwood were held in
New York because of allegations that they had been produced by convict labor,
the chamber interceded. Its leaders protested to President Hoover, Treasury Sec-
retary Mellon, and Commerce Secretary Lamont. After a hearing on August 1
with the Treasury Department. and a leading pulpwood importer, the ban was
lifted immediately. 10 Hoover had overruled Assistant Secretary of the Treasury
Seymour Lowman, a strong supporter of the import restrictions, and this pleased
both Raymond Robins and Alexander Gumberg immensely. 11 The issue did not
subside as the Depression worsened. In 1931 the Senate entertained another pro-
tective tariff, the Kendall bill, H.R. 16517. Again the chamber became involved,
sending a delegation to make its views known to Ogden L. Mills, undersecretary
of the Treasury. 12
The combined subversive propaganda and "dumping" charges were a set-
back for Amtorg and, as Amtorg's Bogdanov wrote to Gumberg, they "hamper[ed]
the normal development of commercial relations between the United States and
the Soviet Union."13 It was the Depression-inspired tariff, more than the propa-
ganda allegations, that contributed to the contraction of the Soviet-American
trading relationship at the end of the Hoover administration. As historian Robert
Paul Browder has pointed out, the Soviet government had a "highly sensitive na-
tional honor," and this prickliness made Moscow representatives react angrily to
American charges that they had "dumped" goods. 14
In 1932 total Soviet purchases in the United States plunged to a paltry
$12.6 million, one-tenth of the previous year's tally. 15 American economic nation-
alism was not entirely to blame, however, since the Soviet Union had its own rea-
sons for cutting back. The country was heavily in debt. By 1931, following the
initial flurry of large purchases under the Five-Year Plan, Russia owed $500 mil-
lion in credits, largely to Germany and Britain. These foreign purchases, along
with a sluggish demand for Soviet raw materials and slow delivery of grain from
peasants who had been forcibly collectivized the year before, had contributed to a
$150 million trade deficit, making continued large-scale purchases in Western
countries difficult. 16 This move away from foreign trade also fit the "rhetoric of
autarky" of the Five-Year Plan with its insistence on Soviet self-reliance. 17 Thus,
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between 1930 and 1932, Soviet orders abroad dropped by one-third. Yet certain
countries maintained a strong share of the existing orders, facilitated by trade
agreements. German sales to Russia in 1932 and 1933 amounted to 45 percent of
the goods imported by the Soviet Union over those two years, while the United
States' comparable figure was only 5 percent. I8
Political retaliation did playa part in the steep drop in American purchases
after 1931. Deputy Commissar of Foreign Affairs Nikolai N. Krestinskii told Po-
litburo colleagues, "The loss of Soviet markets ... will be an incentive to Ameri-
can business and political circles to review their traditional position of
nonrecognition of the USSR."I9 President Hoover, however, refused to be moved
by such pressure, even as his secretary of state, Henry L. Stimson, saw the advan-
tages of recognition for strategic and peace considerations after Japan's annexa-
tion of Manchuria in 1931. Stimson's predecessor, Frank Kellogg, also began to
support recognition, citing economic and security factors. Yet Hoover was stead-
fast. 20 He did make one final and remarkable concession, however. In 1932 his
newly created Reconstruction Finance Corporation, designed to help reenergize
the depressed American economy, extended a $4 million publicly financed credit
to Amtorg to finance cotton purchases, which was implemented early in the
Roosevelt administration.
Recognition remained controversial, and in 1932 Franklin D. Roosevelt did
not emphasize it in his campaign. Soon after his election, however, he consulted
with Secretary of State Cordell Hull and Yale professor Jerome Davis in "a care-
ful study" of the issue that generally "assumed recognition would be realized," al-
though some officials in Hull's department cautioned about potential
disagreement with Russia. Meanwhile, popular support grew in favor of the open-
ing, as Peter Filene notes, with newspaper editorials most commonly advocating
the move to promote "Soviet-American trade and international peace." New York
Times correspondent Walter Duranty noted that "there is a good deal of interest
and a general feeling that recognition might help ... where immediate business
interests of groups or individuals are involved. For instance, the General Electric
and General Motors people are quite keen on finding a way, if it can be done with
proper dignity-I might almost say on finding a way anyway."21 Many business-
men did believe that diplomatic relations would improve the faltering Soviet-
American trade picture, and Roosevelt was "sensitive" to this consideration. Yet
as Joan Hoff Wilson points out, there is little evidence that business pressure di-
recdy contributed to FDR's decision to recognize Russia. 22 Government officials
believed that trade would be modest, about $40 million annually. Fantastic figures
were bruited about in the press, however. R.J. Baker, secretary of the American
Steamship Owners Association, saw Russia taking "up to $5,000,000,000 worth
of American goods within the next four years." The more sober New York Times
noted that "even if the $1,000,000,000 [annual] estimate of prospective Russian
purchases in this country is high ... the amount would assuredly be large enough
to act as a spur to both factory and farm."23
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The president's most compelling reason for recognition matched Stimson's
'peace argument. American recognition of the Soviet Union would counter a Japa-
nese invasion of Siberia, which had become more likely since Japan brought its
"Co-Prosperity Sphere" to the Asian mainland. As Senator William E. Borah
declared, "To restore amity between 120,000,000 people on one hand and
160,000,000 on the other is a thing of supreme moment. ... It would be great to
have now at least one realistic move toward a friendlier and more tolerant world."
Edward M. Bennett affirms that FDR hoped to use recognition as the linchpin in
his peace policy, symbolically "lining up" Americans and Russians against the
militaristic states of Japan and Germany. He suggests, too, that Roosevelt "pub-
licly encouraged" the Soviet view that diplomatic relations had been opened to
foster "American-Soviet cooperation against Japanese aggression."24 Interestingly,
Soviet chief propagandist Karl Radek had predicted in 1922 that events in the Far
East would cause America to recognize the Soviets; when the Soviet Union was
strong enough to be useful against Japan, the United States would "be eager
enough to make friends with Russia," he had augured. Following more than a
~ecade of building up trade in order to obtain recognition, Soviet leaders found
instead that a slump in American orders, combined with Japanese imperialism
and German militarism, at last brought them formal notice. 25 Yet the Japanese
government, the purported target of these initiatives, professed a lack of interest.
An official at the American Embassy in Tokyo reported that recognition had "ar-
roused little comment" in the capital. The Japanese minister of war was quoted as
saying that "he did not see how Japan was affected, that he considered that the
motive was economic, and he supposed that the two nations would have to
resume diplomatic relations at some time in any case."26
Washington extended recognition under conditions stipulating Soviet non-
interference in American domestic affairs, religious freedom and legal rights for
Americans in Russia, and acknowledgment of Russian war debts. Aware ofhow
intractable some of these points might be, Secretary Hull wished to carefully and
discreetly settle them before the United States offered recognition. Roosevelt felt
differently. He wanted "a brilliant political success," not "difficult impasses" and
"interminable" discussions. Thus, in Roosevelt's easygoing manner, recognition
was negotiated with Soviet commissar Maxim Litvinov in November 1933, lead-
ing to a "gentleman's agreement" on the outstanding issues. The debt-over $600
million of Imperial and Provisional government obligations owed to the U.S.
Treasury and American· creditors-was drastically reduced, and both parties
agreed that the actual figure would be between $75 million (the Soviet reckoning)
and $150 million (the American). Roosevelt did not press for a firm payment
schedule, and the work of extracting the funds was left for the State Department
and the first ambassador to Soviet Russia, William Bullitt.25
After the president had agreed to terms of recognition with the foreign af-
fairs commissar, it was only appropriate that the American-Russian Chamber of
Commerce was given "the honor of feting Maxim Litvinov." The businessmen
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welcomed the Russian at New York's tony Waldorf-Astoria Hotel, where he gave
the last speech of his successful trip. After the attendees had enjoyed a sumptuous
banquet, which included braised Long Island duckling and cranberry pie, they di-
rected their "rapt attention" to Litvinov. He gave a bold narration of the USSR's
potential for enormous profits, which had singular allure in the midst of the Great
Depression.28
The cozy atmosphere at the Waldorf-Astoria was a distant memory just a
few months later, however, as Bullitt, now ensconced in Moscow, faced a daunt-
ing task in ironing out the details of the Soviet-American agreement. Litvinov's
government had no intention of paying the old obligations without a loan. The
Soviet leaders could logically argue that if they met the American obligations
without financial assistance, they also would have to pay French and British
debts-which were much larger.29 The Roosevelt administration was unlikely to
grant such a loan, and unable to once the U.S. Senate enacted the Johnson Debt
Default Act in 1934, which. prohibited loans to governments that had not paid
their war debts. Congress applied the Johnson provisions to the American Export-
Import Bank, which had recently opened and was "designed to promote Soviet-
American commerce."30 The debt issue thus remained unresolved. 31 In 1935, a
meeting of the Comintern Congress in Russia occasioned further American pro-
tests, with Bullitt denouncing the meeting and its discussions as a violation of the
1933 agreement on "non-interference in the internal affairs of the United States."32
Bullitt's high expectations for a new Soviet-American relationship ultimately led
him to become severely embittered. No longer an effective representative, in
August 1936 he left Moscow to become ambassador to France.33
Although the debt issue prevented economic assistance to Moscow until
World War II, diplomatic relations meant that a trade agreement was finally pos-
sible. In July 1935 the Soviets commited to spend $30 million per year on Ameri-
can goods in return for most-favored-nation status. The agreement was renewed
annually, with subsequent upward adjustments, until the war.34 Soviet-American
trade recovered from the trough of 1932-1934, yet the treaties could never re-
create the high sales of the decade preceding 1933. For the eight years before rec-
ognition, 1924-32, American exports to Russia had averaged close to $70 million
each year, but between 1933 and 1939, annual sales to Moscow were only about
half that figure. 35 Recognition was not to be the economic panacea that many had
hoped for.
CONCLUSION
As this study has emphasized, the commercial opportunities that Moscow offered
after the revolution drew an interested response from American companies and
government officials. As a result, the Soviet Union had an important influence on
U.S. foreign economic policy between 1919 and 1933 despite its lack of diplo-
matic status in the United States. The expansion of trade, particularly during the
NEP era, facilitated the extension of financing to Moscow and also served to legi-
timize the Soviet regime in the United States.
From the time Ludwig Martens opened his office until Franklin D. Roose-
velt opened diplomatic relations, the United States and the Soviet Union under-
went a subtle but significant shift in their relationship. This evolution of Soviet-
American relations before recognition has often been overlooked by historians,
who have portrayed ideologically charged documents like the Colby note as blue-
prints for American policy during this era. But even as American troops marched
in Russia, President Wilson spumed William Bullitt, and Secretary Colby drafted
his thundering missive, Ludwig Martens built a busy office in New York City. His
contacts with entrepreneurs such as Armand Hammer, Henry Ford, and Abraham
Heller and firms such as American Locomotive, Baldwin Locomotive, and Inter-
national Harvester were not lost when he was deported in 1921. By the mid-
twenties, with the New Economic Policy in full swing, new Soviet agencies in
New York were purchasing millions of dollars' worth of American machinery,
equipment, and raw materials. Martens's contacts were revived and vastly aug-
mented. At the same time, the U.S. government had taken a leading role in ex-
tending humanitarian aid to Russia.
Firms responded quickly to Soviet opportunities, and by 1925 International
Harvester and other manufacturers were offering credits of up to one year to Rus-
sian agencies. This trade was accompanied by American investment in Russia
under NEP's concession program. International Harvester's General Manager Al-
exander Legge aptly described the difficulty with these investments: "As soon as
the business commences to show any returns the Soviet authorities will put them
out of the running, either by taxing the business to death or imposing restrictions
of various kinds."! For American firms, the unsatisfactory concessions of NEP
were followed by the far more rewarding opportunities of the First Five-Year
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Plan, where American firms sold technical processes, provided consulting ser-
vices, built factories, and trained Soviet engineers.2
During the 1920s, Soviet purchases drew a favorable response in Washing-
ton, where t~e rigidly anti-Soviet laws and practices of the Wilson administration
were gradually changed during the Harding, Coolidge, and Hoover administra-
tions. Commerce Secretary Hoover, whose department was already actively seek-
ing out Soviet trade opportunities for businessmen, recognized that trade would
greatly increase with the aid of long-term financing. He worked with other mem-
bers of the Coolidge administration to loosen restrictions, and long-term credits
were approved in 1927. Large Soviet purchases had more effectively influenced
American policy than had the lobbying of Borah, Robins, Gumberg, and Bran-
ham. P~rmitting the use of long-term credit was the most important innovation in
U.S. economic policy toward Russia in this period and confirmed official support
of trade. Even Robert Kelley, perhaps the most committed hard-liner at the State
Department, recognized the importance of being pragmatic on the issue. In 1930,
as Soviet agents flowed into the country with purchase orders, he rejected a pro-
posal to exclude Communist party members from joining Amtorg delegations.
Kelley realized that "such an instruction would have a very ill far-reaching effect
on the United States commercial relations with Russia."3 The Soviet search for
trade and financing in America was a success, not only in its acquisition of needed
goods but also in increasing the prominence and legitimacy of the Soviet Union in
the United States.
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